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I. General Introduction 
I would like to begin by introducing the reader to the concept of mental effort. In 
common language, mental effort is often referred to as an abstract kind of “energy” 
which fuels our ability to perform, to concentrate, to put ourselves together to get 
something done. “Putting energy” into something is often used synonymously with 
“putting effort” into something. If we invest effort into something, for example 
when we prepare a presentation, we are motivated to achieve a good result. In turn, 
good results are also frequently attributed to a high amount of invested effort, next 
to more stable factors such as skill. If you imagine yourself for example making a 
presentation, every step of the process requires effort. You have to invest effort to 
bring the contents that you want to present up in your mind, you have to think 
about how you can structure these contents in a way that is suitable for your audi-
ence, and you have to actually make the presentation using for example a computer. 
Every step requires you to carefully process information, and later to transform this 
information into the output you would like to achieve. You invest effort into this by 
monitoring and regulating your mental processes, so that your mind works to 
achieve the desired goal. Effort is not only required for every individual part of this 
process, but also for general factors such as keeping your attention focused. Mental 
effort, put shortly, is thus the power that you deploy to regulate your mental pro-
cesses in order to achieve a goal. Importantly, this regulation is different from the 
actual mental processes. The role of the mental processes is much alike the role of 
your muscles in a physical task: While your conscious mind invests the effort to 
regulate your movements, your muscles actually perform the task. In a mental task, 
you invest effort to coordinate your “mental muscles”, or mental processes. 
 Investing mental effort is accompanied by a subjective feeling: While you are 
occupied with your task, you become aware that performing has an effect on you. 
The feeling might be present at the edge of your mind. Damasio, in his classical 
work on emotions and feelings, considered this class of “background feelings” to be 
a conscious readout of the representation of our momentary state (Damasio, 1999). 
The feeling of mental effort investment is thus related to the fact that you notice the 
effect that your state is affected by performing a task. You become aware that, to 
regulate your mental processes, you are investing a limited resource, and that in-
vesting this resource has an effect on your state. As you are regulating yourself, you 
command your mind to function in a way that is different from its momentary natu-
ral functioning. This is not to say that you are not motivated, or that you have an 
aversion against the task you are performing. If you have to invest effort into any 
task, it simply means that you have to divert your mind from its natural balance and 
temporarily devote it to achieving your goal. The inherent feeling that accompanies 
mental effort investment is your awareness of this diversion, paired with the 
knowledge from your experience that your power to keep your mind diverted is 
finite. 
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Additionally, you are aware that your ability to use a particular mental process is 
limited, just as, to come back to our physical analogy, a muscle will get tired after 
sustained performance. To perform the same movement, you now have to invest 
more effort. The same goes for mental processes: After sustained performance, the 
same mental task requires more effort investment. At this point, however, we start 
to see discrepancies between physical and mental activity: While sustained physical 
activity prompts recovery in form of resting, recovery from sustained mental activi-
ty has been shown to benefit not from passive states, but rather from shifting the 
focus of activity (Rook & Zijlstra, 2006; Zijlstra & Sonnentag, 2006; Winwood, Bak-
ker, & Winefield, 2007). In the case that performance on a particular task must be 
sustained, though, the continuous use of a limited set of mental resources together 
with the continuous need to invest effort to steer your mind away from its idle 
state, will eventually result in the depletion of both the energy used to carry out 
mental processes and the mental effort used to mobilize this energy. As you thus 
feel how much effort you invest in a task, you feel how much power to regulate your 
mind and your mental processes is invested, and also how much energy is con-
sumed by the performance itself. It is important to understand that investing men-
tal effort is the act of mobilizing energy for and regulating its use by processing 
structures. The act of performance itself is thus separate from the act of investing 
effort, just as investing effort to lift a box is a mental act separate from the physical 
utilization of energy by the muscles.  
 This concept of a limited source that fuels your ability to regulate yourself is not 
new: as Baumeister et al. (2007) explain, the idea of “willpower” or “energy” as an 
underlying limited resource which enables a person to inhibit impulses is widely 
featured in folk literature. Psychology has adapted this view in form of the 
“strength model of self-control” (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Baumeister 
et al., 2007). Baumeister et al. (1998) initially termed the process of spending a 
limited resource “ego depletion”, a notion to the apparent limited amount of “active 
self”, the part of the self-concept that actively works to actively steer one`s behavior 
in situations in which automatic responses might endanger long-term goals such as 
health. 
 While this strength model of self-control has on numerous occasions been 
shown to accurately describe the change of people`s ability to regulate their im-
pulses subsequently to facing challenging tasks (Baumeister et al., 1998); but see 
also Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, (2010) for a systematic review of the 
experimental literature), the model does not provide a hint at what this abstract, 
underlying and, above all, finite resource actually might be (Beedie & Lane, 2011). 
 Especially the finite nature of mental effort has an important implication for 
any performance: At some point, we run out of mental effort to invest. Without the 
investment of a sufficient amount of mental effort, however, our mind is not devot-
ed to performing the task. Errors start to happen, and at some point our behavior 
will be no longer helpful in pursuit of our goal. If we have the chance, we change 
our strategy, implying a pause in the pursuit of our goals at this point, recover, and 
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then proceed. As individuals, we are generally able to estimate our “fuel” more or 
less accurately in relation to a task. Even more, we use our experience about how 
much effort we have to invest into something as a way to calculate the “costs” of an 
action in advance (Botvinick & Rosen, 2008). Problems arise, however, when our 
estimations are incorrect: In the best case, we are not able to finish a paper in time 
for the deadline, in the worst case; we underestimate the amount of effort it takes 
to make a road trip and fall asleep at the wheel. Estimating someone else’s need to 
invest mental effort is even more complicated: The terms “human error” and “large-
scale industrial accident” share such a close relationship partly as a result of the 
failure to accurately estimate the effort a person could or would invest into a task. 
Given both the universal relevance of mental effort in goal-oriented behavior and 
its implications for job design and safety, it is not surprising that especially occupa-
tional psychologists have aimed to define, model and measure mental effort.  
 The main problem in this lies in the abstract nature of mental effort: Although 
we do have a very specific feeling of strain that we associate with investing mental 
effort, this feeling remains a highly subjective experience. Even more, the associat-
ed processes happen in the mind, completely invisible to the outside world (Yeo & 
Neal, 2004). This makes it very difficult to design a model of mental effort that in-
corporates all influential factors. The invisibility of mental processes and the sub-
jective nature of the experience also complicate the measurement of mental effort: 
If we cannot measure it directly, and if we do not have objective correlates, how can 
we measure it at all?  
 If, by way of comparison, we take a look at the domain of physical effort, most 
people have a good idea of the factors that determine the amount of physical effort 
that needs to be invested in a task. Picture for example a person carrying boxes. In 
the first instance, we would assume that the muscle mass of the person and the 
weight of the boxes are the most influential factors determining the amount of 
physical effort that this person needs to invest. A certain amount of invested effort 
will result in a certain number of boxes handled in a certain amount of time. If we 
make the boxes heavier, the person will need to invest more effort to handle them. 
If the person is tired at the end of the day, he will also have to invest more effort to 
still handle the boxes, even without them being heavier. The reason for this in-
creased need to invest effort lies in the state of the person himself: As the muscles 
grow tired and hurting from sustained performance, the natural preferred state of 
this person becomes a state of resting. To continue with the task, the person must 
now also overcome this tendency to disengage from the task, and ignore all addi-
tional de-motivating factors such as soreness or fatigue (see also Hockey, (1997)). 
Also, the general capacity of the person carrying out the task influences the amount 
of effort: A skinny person will have to invest more effort compared to the muscular 
person to carry the same box.  
 Our knowledge of the human body enables us not only to design a model of 
physical effort, but even enables us to measure objective correlates of physical ef-
fort investment such as increased pulse or breathing frequency. 
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In the case of mental effort, such easy, straightforward predictions about the 
amount of effort needed by a person cannot be made from the outside. We cannot 
simply, like in a physical task, look at a person and see that this person is muscular 
or rather skinny; hence we do not have a straightforward estimate of someone’s 
capacity.  
 Occupational psychologists have continuously attempted to overcome the elu-
siveness of mental effort and the framework of psychological factors that it is em-
bedded in. In a wider sense, we try to understand how the capacity of a person is 
translated into utilizable resources, and how, given the right motivational incen-
tives, a person uses these resources to perform any kind of task. What defines how 
long this person can perform? Which price does the person have to pay in terms of 
resources, and what does he or she gain? 
 Without the possibility to make the hidden processes of the mind and the brain 
visible, the strategy to investigate the nature of mental effort relied on designing 
progressively more elaborate models of it. The accuracy of these models could then 
be tested by experimentally evaluating if predictions derived from the models 
would correspond, for example, to measurable changes in performance, or in the 
experienced amount of mental effort that the operator could report. As we cannot 
simply measure obvious variables such as the pulse frequency to determine the 
amount of invested effort, we depend solely on the person him-or herself to give an 
account of his or her amount of invested effort, as all relevant processes happen 
invisibly in the mind and brain of the operator. Such self-reports of mental effort 
investment were quickly realized to be of great value, as the subjective account of 
effort investment by an operator was the closest approximation of the invisible 
mental process that, in the end, determined performance (Cooper & Harper Jr, 
1969). Efforts have thus been made to construct tools that enable operators to give 
comparable accounts of their effort investment.  
 Commonly used devices such as the Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME; Zijlstra, 
1993) or the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX; Hart & Staveland, 1988) measure 
the amount of subjectively felt mental effort in relation to a task, thus essentially 
asking the person who carried out a task to indicate the experienced level of subjec-
tive effort on a type of rating scale. These measurement devices assume thus that 
the acute experience of investing mental effort can be accessed at a later point in 
time to provide an estimation of that experience.  
 Our understanding of the process of self-evaluation of mental effort, though, is 
equally hampered as our understanding of mental effort in general by the hidden 
nature of the associated processes in the brain. We do not know how the brain of a 
person that is asked to provide a subjective account of his or her invested mental 
effort actually estimates this amount. Consequently, we also do not know if this 
mechanism is involved in the acute experience of mental effort investment. 
At this point, however, by using methods from the field of neuroimaging, we are 
able to make the previously invisible processes related to mental effort and its 
evaluation by an operator visible. In our opinion, the best way to start this endeav-
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or is to use neuroimaging techniques to better understand the neural processes of 
self-evaluation of mental effort. Instead of attempting to grasp the nature of the 
abstract mental resource directly, we first addressed questions from the more de-
fined area of measurements of mental effort. The crucial advantage in this approach 
is that it enables the use of well-studied instruments quantifying mental effort in-
vestment alongside neuroimaging techniques. By first testing the assumptions un-
derlying this sort of instruments, we would learn more about how mental effort is 
represented in the brain. Equally important, by iteratively developing a paradigm in 
which we are able to manipulate mental effort investment and consequently its 
depletion, we would later be able to use these controlled manipulations to learn 
more about the nature of mental effort as an “energetic” resource. 
 In particular the specific issues around the underlying assumptions of self-
report tools can now be investigated by studying the brain during self-evaluation of 
mental effort. In order to contribute to provide a better insight, two questions in 
particular need to be answered, which form the first two research questions that I 
will discuss in this book: 
1. Which neural mechanism underlies the subjective self-evaluation of mental 
effort investment? 
2. Does the neural mechanism underlying self-evaluation of mental effort invest-
ment reflect acute, experienced changes in mental effort investment? 
 
By answering these questions, we would gain evidence telling us if the self-rating 
tools to measure mental effort investment engage similar neural processes as the 
ones underlying the experience of mental effort investment. If the act of rating one’s 
own effort investment would recruit the same structures as the ones that are sensi-
tive to changes in required mental effort during performance, this would form an 
additional argument for the assumption that instruments like the RSME indeed 
measure the amount of effort that a person experiences. Identifying these neural 
structures does, however, also have some more fundamental implications: The 
knowledge about which brain structures play a role in self-evaluation of mental 
effort investment could tell also more about how the human brain can perform the 
complex task of evaluating an experience that originally happened in this very brain 
itself. 
 
The neuroimaging tools that enable us to investigate these questions, however, 
offer possibilities as well to not only make the experience of mental effort invest-
ment visible, but to shed light on mental effort as an energetic resource as well. The 
characteristic feature of mental effort that inspired the analogy to an energetical 
resource is its finite nature. We cannot perform tasks endlessly, and performing an 
effortful task has a lasting effect. How is this reflected in the brain of a person that 
invested a substantial amount of effort? This forms the third research question that 
I aim to answer in this book. 
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3. How does the investment of a substantial amount of mental effort affect brain 
functioning? 
 
The importance of understanding mental effort as a finite, energetic resource can-
not be overstated; as the universal importance of this resource for human function-
ing makes it a relevant factor in nearly all areas of life that depend on mental per-
formance. The depletion of this resource signals that a profound change has taken 
place in the individual. This manifests overtly, in the behavior of the operator, as a 
lack of motivation to sustain performance any longer by investing excessive 
amounts of mental effort, inevitably leading to disengagement from the task 
(Meijman & Mulder, 1998). Given sufficient investment of self-regulatory activity 
on previous tasks, even performance on subsequent different tasks necessitating 
self-regulation are impaired, even if those tasks require different sorts of infor-
mation processing than the previous ones (Baumeister et al., 1998). This overt 
manifestation, however, can be assumed to be the result of profound covert chang-
es in the brain of the operator that take place as a result of sustained effort invest-
ment. It is not known how exactly these changes in brain function manifest them-
selves, or which neural structures are affected. Showing how the depletion of this 
resource affects brain functioning would in particular be a potential first step to 
develop ways to objectively measure changes in the amount of effort a person has 
at his or her disposal. In a wider sense, gaining a more complete picture of how 
mental effort investment is implemented in the brain would make it possible to 
understand how mental effort as a concept describes the functioning of the brain. In 
the end, any kind of performance refers to more or less specialized mental activi-
ties, which can be linked to specific neural structures. The concept of mental effort 
seems to describe a functional principle of the brain that is beyond the single task: 
Mental effort is both required and consumed by every kind of mental performance 
alike. 
II. Outline of this book 
The aim of this book is to demonstrate how the concepts and instruments con-
cerned with mental effort, as they are used and devised in occupational psychology, 
have a close relation to specific neural structures and their functioning. Hence, the 
main part of this book consists of the description and discussion of three experi-
mental studies which we conducted to gain a better insight into the neural process-
es related to mental effort and its self-evaluation by operators. In the first three 
chapters, I will give a more detailed account of the theoretical background and the 
motivation behind this project.  
 In chapter 1, I will provide a condensed overview of the development that lead 
to modern models of mental effort. This process reflects an interesting change in 
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the view of the person that invests mental effort: While the person was seen as an 
almost mechanical, automatic processor in the earlier models, each subsequent 
model provided more conceptual autonomy to the person, recognizing the ability of 
humans to interact with their tasks in a flexible way. Especially the integrated mod-
el of mental effort by Mulder (1986) is presented in detail, as it forms the conceptu-
al framework on which this work is based. 
 Chapter 2 focuses on the different approaches that are or have been used to 
measure mental effort investment. The purpose of this is to give the reader an idea 
of the multitude of attempts that have been made to find the ideal way to measure 
mental effort investment, both with cognitive instruments and in physiological 
correlates. A comparison of different approaches and techniques is made, which 
demonstrates that some measurements of mental effort investment have crucial 
advantages over other approaches. 
 In chapter 3, I describe how the hypotheses that I have derived from the litera-
ture can be investigated using neuroimaging methods. The chapter cumulates in the 
formulation of specific research questions and hypotheses. These first three chap-
ters are intended not only to illustrate the motivation for and the theoretical use of 
this project, but also to give readers a brief introduction into the concept of mental 
effort. The experiments that are described in the later chapters are designed with 
the theoretical framework which encompasses mental effort in mind. Approaching 
this project from an occupational psychology perspective made it possible to use 
neuroimaging methods to investigate specific questions originating from the 
framework of mental effort and to design these experiments to make use of the 
theoretical possibilities that are offered by this framework. This aspect sets this 
work apart from earlier neuroimaging studies that utilized isolated aspects of men-
tal effort, an approach which is fit to investigate the affected neural structures, but 
which does not add to our understanding of mental effort as such.  
 Over the course of chapters 4, 5 and 6, I present three studies that I have con-
ducted to solve the research questions that I have formulated in chapter 3. De-
scribed in chapter 4, the first study focused on identifying the neural correlates of 
the self-evaluation of mental effort investment on a working memory task. In chap-
ter 5, I present a study extending this design in the sense that it included multiple 
factors influencing the amount of mental effort the participants had to invest. In 
this second study, I investigated which parts of the brain responded to changing 
levels of mental effort investment during task performance. This made it possible to 
compare the neural correlates of effort experience to the earlier identified corre-
lates of effort self-evaluation.  
 Chapter 6 extends the investigation of acute neural correlates of effortful per-
formance by taking a look at the effects that sustained investment of mental effort 
has on the functioning of the human brain. The question of how brain functioning is 
altered by of sustained effort investment is one of the most fundamental questions 
that occupational psychology must solve. The study that is described in this chapter 
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is the first attempt to relate the effect of sustained effort to make these changes 
visible. 
 In chapter 7, I will summarize the findings of all three studies and integrate 
them into the general scope of this book. The results yielded by the experiments 
seem on first glance to provide mainly an extension of our knowledge about which 
neural structures are affected by investment and experience of mental effort. The 
true value of these insights becomes only clear, however, when they are related 
back to the theoretical framework of mental effort. At this point it becomes clear 
just how closely related the concept of mental effort is to the functional principles 
of the human brain. This close relation has a number of implications in both theo-
retical and applied directions, some touching our concept of effort as an energetical 
resource, others prompting an extension of the scope of occupational psychology’s 
overarching goal of improving work to also regard the neurobiological effects that 
work has on an operator. This chapter closes with an outlook of the promising 
combination of the fields of occupational psychology and neuroscience.  
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Chapter 1 
History and development of the concept of 
mental effort 
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The concept of mental effort as it is used today evolved in several characteristic 
steps: initially, when looking at a person in the act of performing a task (to whom, 
for the sake of brevity, we shall refer to as “operator”), the task itself stood at the 
focus of attention. Although this approach did not explicitly include the concept of 
an energetic resource, it implicitly included the notion that humans have a limited 
capacity at their disposal, and that varying the nature of a task (the “task load”) 
affects the associated processing costs for an operator. Yet, all factors that were 
seen as influential for the outcome in terms of performance were mainly sought for 
in the task. The operator was merely seen as an almost mechanic processor, which 
would act the same under all circumstances. Although this assumption seemed true 
for the very basic tasks that it was tested on initially, further research revealed 
severe shortcomings, hence fostering the development models that allowed for a 
more interactive role of the operator in relation to the task.  
1.1. Early observations of limited capacity 
The first step toward the concept of mental effort as it is employed today was the 
observation that humans possess a limited capacity to process information. Early 
models that try to account for this fact date back to the 19th century, when the 
Dutch professor F.C. Donders introduced the idea of mental chronometry. This idea 
paved the road to his now-famous subtractive method (Sartori & Umiltà, 2000). The 
basic principle behind his idea was that, compared to the reaction time on a base-
line task, an identical task with an added subtask would lead to a longer reaction 
time. For example, if an operator was tasked with adding up several numbers that 
are simultaneously presented on a screen, this task would take a certain amount of 
time. An added subtask, as counting how many numbers are odd or even, would 
require extra processing time; hence the operator would need longer to perform 
the whole task. The difference between the two reaction times would be attributed 
to the processing time consumed by the added subtask. By making this assumption, 
Donders’ model was one of the first models recognizing the fact that the human 
information processing system is indeed limited in its capacity. Yet, this early view 
still treated the nature of information processing in a rigid and mechanistic fashion. 
The limited processing capacity was assumed to be allocated equally over all pro-
cesses that the task requires, such as reading the numbers, storing numbers in 
working memory, or calculating the sum.  
 The first major conceptual improvement to this somewhat rigid view was pro-
vided by Moray (1967). Instead of assuming that an operator mechanically carries 
out a task in a fixed series of processing stages, Moray drew an analogy to the 
emerging developments in computer science: In his view, the single stages of pro-
cessing could be seen analogue to specialized computer programs that each per-
form a specific operation on the data that is given to them. The total processing 
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capacity of the human information processing system was still seen as fixed and 
stable. However, Moray included an additional “executive” program that could stra-
tegically allocate the processing capacity to the different programs. Thereby, 
Moray`s framework was the first one that included the concept of an operator who 
had the capability of strategically managing his or her limited processing resources 
instead of performing every part of a task in a rigid fashion. 
1.2. Energetical metaphors 
Using the conceptual improvements of Moray, Kahneman (1973) went a step fur-
ther by replacing the different serial stages of processing with different processes, 
which allowed accounting for parallel processing. Kahneman also added a key con-
cept to the processing oriented capacity approach in form of the metaphor of an 
underlying, limited energy source which plays a crucial role in fuelling processing. 
He identified this limited resource as arousal, the general psycho-physiological 
level of activity (see Figure 1). In this model, arousal formed the hierarchically 
highest parameter in the regulation of processing. An ideal level of arousal would 
lead to an optimal capacity for task performance. Capacity in this model is used 
synonymously with effort or attention that is invested in a task. Most important, 
capacity was only seen as influential for processing itself. Only the occurrence of 
errors due to a lack of capacity would, triggered by the evaluative feedback mecha-
nism, cause an increase in arousal. Any failure to up-regulate arousal in the face of 
insufficient performance is attributed to motivational factors or failure of the feed-
back system. A direct, willful regulation of arousal is not part of the model. Too 
much arousal, thus, is attributed to factors such as anxiety, which in turn cause a 
dysfunctional over-focusing of the information processing system. 
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Fig. 1: The capacity model of attention and mental effort (from Kahneman, 1973). 
 
The introduction of arousal as well as a limited capacity in form of a resource was 
an explicit recognition of the fact that the operator could be influenced by malad-
justed levels of arousal. Although this fact had been stated already in the beginning 
of the 20th century in form of the Yerkes-Dobson law, Kahneman’s model was novel 
in emphasizing the role of arousal as a central factor that also had particular effects 
on information processing. Obviously, under real-world conditions, interfering 
factors such as fatigue, but also sudden distractions, sickness or drugs can interfere 
with the state of the operator. By integrating arousal as the limited and necessary 
source of energy into his model, Kahneman established a more accurate view of the 
operator. As noted by Hockey (1997), Kahneman was also first in actually separat-
ing the concepts of arousal as generalized energy and employed energy in the form 
of capacity, or processing effort. In this model, effort was seen as the mobilized 
form of energy that is used to regulate information processing. In summary, accord-
ing to Kahneman`s model, effort only played a role as a regulative resource which 
requirements is determined solely by the task demands. 
1.3. Two distinct approaches  
Kahneman’s view of mental effort as employed energy can be seen as the first part 
of the modern mental effort construct. Still, in this view, the amount of mental effort 
that an operator needs to invest for successful task performance was determined 
solely by the task load. This view of mental effort being analogous to processing 
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demands has been called the “processing effort” approach. The processing effort 
approach still focused mainly on the task-sided depletion of resources, thereby 
locating the main part of the workload in the computational demands of the task 
itself. Yet, as Kahneman (1973) already stated himself, the amount of available en-
ergy in the form of arousal depends on the psycho-physiological state of the opera-
tor. 
 Broadbent (1971), as cited in Mulder (1986), pictured arousal regulation as the 
most important regulative mechanism that can influence the actual state of an op-
erator. Kahneman had already integrated arousal as a central part of his model. 
Broadbent adapted the role of arousal: arousal was still the direct fuel of infor-
mation processing, yet the role of effort was radically changed: mental effort was 
now seen as a more universal regulative resource. In addition to enabling control of 
information processing, Broadbent pictured the regulative abilities of effort to ex-
tend also to the adjustment of arousal. For this, Broadbent devised two mechanisms 
that determine the level of arousal. One generally responsible lower mechanism, 
influenced by stressors such as noise or intoxication, would determine the level of 
arousal automatically. A higher, incidental mechanism, influenced by acute con-
scious devotion towards a purpose, could be used to consciously regulate one’s 
levels of arousal. This might be necessary in cases were one is to tired (low arous-
al), or too anxious (high arousal) to concentrate on a task. In such a case of a malad-
justed level of arousal, the higher mechanism can override the lower one to secure 
a level of arousal that optimizes performance under the given circumstances. This 
regulative action comes at the cost of effort.  
 The consideration of an operator who has to invest effort in order to reach and 
maintain a state that allows sufficient performance in a task is known as “state ap-
proach” (Zijlstra, 1993). This approach forms a complimentary view to the pro-
cessing effort approach, as it allows the (effortful) regulation of the operator`s 
arousal level. This allowed for a conceptual inclusion of dynamically changing 
states of the operator, as they would occur in real-world scenarios for example in 
the case of fatigue. The need for regulative action to adjust levels of arousal, as 
caused by a suboptimal psycho-physiological state of the operator, is referred to as 
the state load.  
 It becomes clear at this point that workload cannot be determined by focusing 
on the demands of a task (the task load) alone, as it was done in the earlier models. 
As the state of an operator changes, this does not automatically change the perfor-
mance of the operator. Instead, the operator is faced with the need for additional 
regulation in the form of the state load. Only the combination of state and task load 
forms a meaningful concept of the total workload that needs to be met by the in-
vestment of mental effort.  
H I S T O R Y  A N D  D E V E L O P M E N T  O F  T H E  C O N C E P T  O F  M E N T A L  E F F O R T  
 23 
1.4. Development of a unified concept of Mental Effort 
A conceptual unification of the processing approach and the state approach was 
first brought forward by Sanders (1983). He employed a staged processing view 
with four different stages of processing: Stimulus preprocessing, Feature extrac-
tion, response choice and response evaluation. In Sanders’ model those processing 
stages were fueled by three types of resources: Arousal, activation, and effort. The 
new key elements of his model were first of all the existence of an evaluative mech-
anism, which signaled the need for adjustment in one or more domains. Second, 
arousal and activation were considered to be energetical resources linked to specif-
ic functions or stages. The role of effort was split and extended: It was seen as both 
necessary for the conscious, non-automatic processing of information and for the 
adjustment of arousal and activation. 
 
Fig. 2: Sanders’ model of mental effort was the first attempt to combine the dual roles of effort as regu-
lating both the processing of information and the level of arousal. Effort was pictured to influence the
response processing stage, as the earlier stages of processing are not open to conscious intervention.
Activation, also subject to effortful regulation, refers to the readiness to perform motor responses or 
similar output. (from Sanders, 1983) 
 
Mulder (1980) further developed this concept into his “integrated model of mental 
effort” (see Figure 3). Mulder continued to use Sander’s three separate energetical 
resources, now related distinctively to input (arousal), output (activation) and con-
trolled executive function (effort). In his model, effort is simply required for any 
activity which involves controlled processing or adjustment, either during the con-
scious processing of information or due to regulation of the two other energetical 
resources. The origin of the need for effort can be internal or external, but con-
trolled executive functions are treated as equally tapping on the same specific re-
source.  
 In the integrated model of mental effort, effort fuels both the regulation of pro-
cessing and the regulation of arousal, similar to the model of Sanders (1983). The 
integrated model of mental effort, however, emphasizes the role of effort as a com-
pensating resource. Mulder`s model furthermore permits an indirect regulation of 
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other processing stages via the central processing module, accounting for top-down 
control. Such top-down control takes place for example when modules at an earlier 
part of the sensory processing chain are “instructed” to be especially sensitive to a 
certain type of stimulus (think about playing who sees the most VW Beetles as a 
child) (Shulman et al., 1997). Mulder also integrated a basic reservoir underlying 
effort in form of the overall activation of the brain as controlled by the reticular 
formation, thereby incorporating the dependency of cortical functions on the ap-
propriate basic state of the individual.  
 The integrated model of mental effort makes it possible to account for the com-
plex interaction of operator and task, and for the outcomes in terms of perfor-
mance. As stated earlier, the total workload is determined by the task load as well 
as by state load. This means that even despite a constant task load, the total work-
load can increase when for example the state of the operator deteriorates due to 
sustained performance. This is not, however, immediately reflected in a drop in 
performance: As long as the effort reservoir is able to provide additional mental 
effort, the operator can choose to invest this extra effort to maintain the perfor-
mance level. In this case, two things are bound to happen: On the one hand, the 
prolonged sustained performance will lead to a further increase in state load and 
thereby to an increased requirement for mental effort investment; on the other 
hand, the available amount of mental effort will be further drained. Note that the 
only obvious output, the task performance, remains unchanged, while the amount 
of invested effort increases. In the end, the operator can either change the perfor-
mance goals to decrease the task load, disengage completely from the task to re-
charge the effort reservoir, or risk a possibly sudden drop in performance when 
effort runs out.  
 By permitting a flexible role of effort in both the regulation of processing and 
state, the integrated model of mental effort is able to account for real-life scenarios 
better than models which only focus on task-sided factors and performance as an 
outcome. Even more, the integrated model also allows making predictions about 
the subjective experience and the behavior of the operator. As the earlier models 
were focused on the task and took a more engineering-based approach, the inte-
grated model does not treat the operator as a fixed, mechanistic factor, but as an 
autonomous agent in a complex interaction. 
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Fig. 3: The integrated model of mental effort (from Mulder, 1986) 
 
The integrated model of mental effort provides a comprehensive account of the 
factors present in a task-operator relationship that define the amount of mental 
effort that needs to be invested to meet the mental workload. Effort is seen as the 
resource that drives all regulative processes, no matter if they concern processing, 
attentional control or regulation of the state of the operator. More recently, this 
conceptualization of a single resource underlying all regulative processes has be-
come a central feature in a prominent model of self-control impairments, the 
strength model of self-control (Baumeister et al., 1994; Baumeister et al., 2007). 
Central to this model is the notion that investment of self-control, meaning the ac-
tive regulation of one`s thoughts and behaviors, consumes a limited resource. 
Hence, on subsequent tasks requiring self-control, the ability of subjects to effec-
tively exert self-regulation is reduced, increasing the probability of a failure to, for 
example, inhibit an undesirable behavior. Evaluation of this model by means of 
experimental studies has consistently produced corroborating evidence (Hagger et 
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al., 2010). This shared assumption of a limited resource underlying self-regulation 
closely links the strength model of self-control and the integrated model of mental 
effort very closely together. Yet, while this resource, in the form of mental effort, is 
modeled more in its relation to regulative and cognitive processes in the integrated 
model of mental effort (Mulder, 1986), it remains more obscure in the strength 
model of self-control.  
 The concept of mental effort as it is used today is the product of an iterative 
process. Starting with the notion of a limited processing capacity of an individual, 
the focus shifted towards the factors that influence the ability of the individual to 
perform tasks. As a result, the individual itself and its cognitive processes became 
the subject of interest. This, in turn, provided the foundation for the construction of 
models that incorporate the interaction of an individual with a task in an interactive 
manner. As I will elaborate in Chapter 3, this level of refinement has reached a point 
in which the current models converge on a conceptualization of mental effort as a 
coherent resource underlying self-regulation. As a result, the question of the nature 
of this resource poses itself as the next logical research goal, but, at the same time, 
constitutes a methodological challenge: In order to improve our understanding of 
this abstract resource, we have to integrate approaches beyond the traditional cog-
nitive experimental setups, as these seem to merely confirm the current models at 
this stage, not adding fundamentally new insights. Our chosen approach to use 
neuroimaging methods to gain knowledge about the neural correlates of mental 
effort in this context relies on the utilization of the known features of mental effort 
to develop a research line that extends our knowledge related to the present con-
cept of mental effort. Without a very close integration of the concept of mental ef-
fort in our research designs, we would merely create data that would, at best, yield 
questionable relevance for said concept. Our approach thus initially focusses on 
extending our understanding of the quantification of mental effort, as these provide 
explicit indicators of changing levels of effort investment in operators as a result of 
controlled manipulations of the factors that have been shown to influence it. 
 The view of effort as the single underlying resource has an important implica-
tion for any tool that aims to measure mental effort investment according to this 
rationale. It would not be sufficient to just measure the effort that is needed for 
example for the regulation of processing. A measurement device that aims to meas-
ure mental effort investment according to the integrated model of mental effort 
needs to measure the total combined amount of invested effort. In the next chapter, 
I will describe a number of measurement devices and techniques which have been 
designed with this goal in mind. As approaches to measure mental effort also in-
cludes investigations of the usefulness of indicators of neural activity for this pur-
pose, I will also discuss how these approaches so far are related to the wider body 
of neuroimaging research that has used, alas mostly limited, experimental manipu-
lations of mental effort. 
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Chapter 2 
Assessment of mental effort expenditure 
and its effects 
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In this chapter, I will elaborate on why it is important to be able to measure the 
amount of invested mental effort. I will also describe some ways used to measure 
mental effort investment in relation to a task. Previous research into measurements 
of mental effort investment was conducted mainly before neuroimaging methods 
were widely available, hence it was not possible to investigate the neural founda-
tions of mental effort expenditure, its experience by an operator and the conse-
quences that this expenditure has on brain functioning. The concept of mental ef-
fort clearly does refer to the neurobiological basis of information processing in the 
brain. However, the understanding of the neural correlates of mental effort was, at 
the time, limited to the regulation of arousal by the brain stem (Mulder, 1986) or 
the effort-related peripheral reactions and regulations by the autonomous nervous 
system and the neuroendocrine system (Meijman, 1989).  
 Most neuroimaging research that touches mental effort, on the other hand, is 
limited by only employing the concept of mental effort in an incomplete fashion, e.g. 
only employing variations in task load throughout an experimental paradigm. As 
described by Mulder (1986) in the integrated model of mental effort, task load is 
only one factor that determines the total amount of mental workload. State load, 
the component of the total workload that results from the need to regulate one`s 
own state to perform a task, forms a substantial determinant of the total amount of 
mental effort required for successful performance. Most important, this factor is not 
directly related to the requirements of the task itself: Even the act of performing a 
simple task, in itself requiring moderate amounts of effort investment, can require 
disproportionate amounts of effort if the operator is in a state that is not suitable 
for performance.  
 Thus, neuroimaging research that only employs variations in task load neglects 
the second influential component of the total workload. This entails two conse-
quences: First, it can be difficult or impossible to separate neural changes mediated 
by changes in effort investment from neural changes mediated by variations in task 
complexity or processing load. Second, the state load component of the mental ef-
fort construct refers to the occurrence of varying states or dispositions of the very 
information processing system that needs to perform the mental task. Without 
including controlled manipulations of state load in experimental paradigms, this 
important aspect of mental effort in particular, but also of the human information 
processing system in general would remain obscure, no matter how advanced the 
research tools are. 
2.1.1. Development of measuring devices for mental effort 
As illustrated in the integrated model of mental effort, a great number of factors 
influence the amount of effort that an operator needs to invest to perform a task. All 
factors that influence the amount of required mental effort must be taken into ac-
count, as the performance of the operator is only warranted if the need of effort 
investment does not exceed the amount of effort the operator is willing or able to 
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invest into the task. This makes the question of how much effort a task will require 
from an operator quite non-trivial. However, being able to estimate the amount of 
mental effort that operators need to invest to deliver sufficient task performance is 
crucial in a lot of situations, most prominently in the design of work places and 
interfaces. Especially in work environments that rely on uncompromised operator 
performance, it must be assured that the total workload stays within the capacity of 
the operator, and that this is ensured also at the end of the shift. 
 An example of such an environment can be found in the aviation industry. Op-
erating an aircraft is a highly complex process, and the consequences of an operator 
not being able to invest the required amount of effort for this task are potentially 
severe. If we are thus interested in the amount of mental effort a pilot has to invest 
into the task of flying a particular airplane, it is not sufficient to measure the 
amount of mental effort that is needed to perform the single parts of the larger task 
separately. We could, of course, measure how much mental effort a pilot needs to 
invest for the subtask of keeping the plane on a certain course and altitude. We 
could also measure how much mental effort other subtasks as checking the fuel 
level require. In a complex work environment, however, subtasks can interact with 
each other in an unpredictable way. Checking fuel levels during flight, while keep-
ing a plane on course, might initially not exceed the amount of effort that a pilot can 
invest at any moment. If, however, keeping the plane on course requires more ef-
fort due to bad weather conditions, the need to additionally interact with the fuel 
management system could increase the total amount of effort the operator needs to 
invest to a level that the operator is not able to sustain. Even more, the attentional 
capacity of the pilot might be overloaded, a case that is beyond any remedy by fur-
ther increase of effort investment. Also, a pilot has not only to be able to momen-
tarily sustain the required amount of mental effort. Performance must be secured 
for the total duration of his shift, and reserves of effort must be kept for critical 
phases as landing the plane. While factors as stormy weather or the duration of a 
flight are likely to be regarded in the design phase of the aircraft, other situations 
where subtasks interact in a dangerous way might not be as predictable. As a result, 
it might be impossible to predict the feasibility of a work interface without actually 
testing the operator-task interaction under the aspect of mental effort expenditure 
(Cooper & Harper Jr, 1969). 
 There are several different approaches to measure or estimate the amount of 
mental effort that an operator needs to invest into a task. Subjective measurement 
devices require the operator to rate his or her own invested mental effort on one or 
several scales after performing a task. Other methods try to derive an estimation of 
the amount of mental effort from physiological correlates during performance. 
These methods have been tested under various circumstances, and the results of 
these tests have led to a number of questions. 
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2.1.2. Subjective ratings of mental effort 
Historically, there have been different approaches to measure the subjective expe-
rience of mental effort investment. These approaches can be divided into multi – 
and one-dimensional approaches. Multidimensional approaches follow the reason-
ing that perceived workload (and thus the amount of effort required to meet it) is 
inherently influenced by different factors, for example the processing complexity, 
the time pressure under which the task has to be performed, but also if there is the 
need for the operator to modulate his or her own state, for example in terms of 
arousal. Multidimensional scales aim to measure all of these influential factors by 
assessing them separately.  
 Two well-known examples of scales that are designed in this way are the Sub-
jective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT; Reid, Eggemeier, & Shingledecker, 
1982) and the NASA Task load index (NASA-TLX; Hart & Staveland, 1988). The 
SWAT distinguishes three different dimensions: time pressure (determining possi-
bilities for parallel processing or task overlap), mental effort (in this case defined as 
processing capacity consumption) and stress load (the amount of frustration, con-
fusion or anxiety elicited by the task) (O’Donnell & Eggemeier, 1986). 
 The NASA-TLX is composed of six different dimensions: Mental task demands, 
physical task demands, time pressure, and success of the performance, effort and 
frustration level. Additionally, operators have to weigh the contribution of each 
dimension to the overall experienced workload. The NASA-TLX was not exclusively 
tailored for the use in mental tasks, but for workload assessment in general, cover-
ing all relevant factors. Both the SWAT and the NASA-TLX, but also multidimen-
sional subjective workload assessment scales in general have drawn some critical 
comments on them. First of all, multidimensionality refers to certain aspects of the 
subjective experience of the operator. It is highly questionable if these aspects are 
reliably defined in the same way across operators. It depends furthermore on the 
task and on the interpretation of the operator if these dimensions encompass the 
full spectrum of the subjective experience of workload. Additionally, the single fac-
tors have been shown to be highly correlated (Zijlstra, 1993). 
 The first application of a simple one-dimensional rating scale was the Cooper-
Harper-Scale, a simple ten point scale on which pilots could rate the “flyability” of 
an aircraft. This scale is a very simple way to investigate the mental workload 
posed on an operator by a plane, evaluating the ratings of different operators. The 
subjective rating is important, as especially in an airplane the flight control task 
demands are supplemented by a vast number of additional stressors that are very 
difficult to foresee (Cooper & Harper Jr, 1969). Interestingly, in their more applica-
tion-focused study, Cooper and Harper actually describe the implications that only 
later became the foundation of Mulder’s integrated concept of mental effort. In the 
field of aviation psychology it is important to assess if pilot and vehicle interact in a 
way that makes the combination suitable for fulfilling a goal. Knowing the task de-
mands alone is not sufficient to predict the sustainability of the pilot-vehicle-
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interaction. The Cooper-Harper scale is only of limited value for other research, 
though, as it is tailored for the use in the aviation industry and associated research 
(Zijlstra, 1993). 
 A later approach to establish a one-dimensional scale was made by Borg 
(1972), who developed a rating scale with verbal descriptions of different levels of 
task difficulty. The verbal descriptions were used as anchor points on a scale, which 
helped operators to orient themselves in terms of the magnitude of the variable. 
Although these scales have been employed with great success, the method of choos-
ing the anchor points and their distances has been the main source of critique for 
the constructed scales, especially for the one developed by Borg. As Zijlstra (1993) 
arguments, the employed adjectives such as “average” might rationally indicate a 
medium level, but are often used ambiguously in common language. Zijlstra there-
fore went on to construct his own scale, the Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME). In 
this rating scale, he employed a total of nine anchor point items which were exten-
sively evaluated for their common interpretation in terms of related levels of effort 
investment. The second improvement was the spacing of the anchor points accord-
ing to the ratings of operators: The distances between the actual anchor points 
were not equal, but reflected the intuitive ratings of the single items given by 
groups of subjects. The result, shown in figure 4, was a one-dimensional scale rang-
ing from 0-150, on which the anchor points were placed between zero and 150, but 
not too close to those values (2 and 114, respectively). The ratio behind the latter 
design choice was that the numerical values do not represent absolute values, but 
rather relative differences between levels of invested mental effort. The RSME has 
been validated using both manipulations of task- and of state load (Zijlstra, 1993). 
In direct comparisons, it was found to be more sensitive in estimating mental effort 
than the NASA-TLX (Veltman & Gaillard, 1996) and was found to be both more 
sensitive and less complex than the SWAT (Verwey & Veltman, 1996). The evidence 
is thus in favor of a rating scale that asks the operator to provide one coherent es-
timation of invested mental effort, as opposed to instruments that try to separately 
measure different aspects of the experience that might be influenced by either task- 
or state load – related factors.  
 The validation research of the RSME thus provided evidence that shows that 
the ratings provided by the operators are indeed influenced by factors from both 
the domain of task load and state load.  
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Fig. 4: the Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME; from Zijlstra, 1993) 
 
Nevertheless, the RSME and all other subjective scales work with the assumption 
that the estimations provided by an operator after the act of performing a task re-
flect the averaged amount of mental effort investment that the operator experi-
enced during task performance. To test this assumption, it would take a different 
measure of mental effort that could be taken during task performance. Ideally, such 
a variable would not rely on the operator providing a similar kind of subjective self-
evaluation, and it should be possible to measure it without the measurement caus-
ing changing levels of interference with the operator`s task. Previous studies have 
attempted to locate such a variable among the large number of physiological varia-
bles that can be measured in an operator. 
2.2. Physiological measurement methods 
Physiological variables offer the advantage of mostly being easily accessible with-
out interfering with the operator`s performance on a task. Most of these variables, 
however, suffer from various shortcomings which prevent them from providing an 
estimate of the total amount of invested effort. Nevertheless, the accumulated evi-
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dence from previous research provides a direction for a different approach that I 
will discuss. 
 Physiological variables that have been researched include, among others: pupil 
dilation, eye scanning randomness, visual fixation frequency, muscle tension, blink 
rate, respiratory rate, adrenaline level, blood glucose levels and various cardiac 
variables. While these variables represent quite indirect correlates of acute mental 
effort investment that are measured in the periphery of the body, attempts have 
also been made to measure correlates of mental effort using measurements of brain 
activity. Comparative reviews of the validity of these variables as indicators of men-
tal effort investment have been conducted previously, thus interested readers are 
referred for example to Veltmann and Gaillard (1996), Brookhuis and de Waard 
(2010) or to the extensive review by Staal (2004). I will first describe a cardiac 
variable that has been researched extensively, and which also has been compared 
directly with the RSME as a subjective measurement device. 
2.2.1. Cardiovascular effects of Mental Effort 
The connection between mental effort and changes either in cardiac variables such 
as blood pressure or heart rate is believed to be mediated by the autonomic nerve 
system. The autonomic nerve system is tasked with configuring the various systems 
of the body so that physiological requirements for task execution can be met. For 
instance, the heart rate will increase during physical activity to ensure a sufficient 
supply of oxygen. Next to well-known parameters such as the heart rate or blood 
pressure, there are also other parameters of cardiac functioning that form potential 
indicators of effort investment. Mulder (1980) focused his attention on the so-
called 0.1 Hz component of heart rate variability. This component can be under-
stood as a measurement of the regularity of the heart rate. The heart rate of a hu-
man is not completely regular, but varies slightly. Most of the variation happens in 
the frequency band of 0.1Hz, thus comparing periods of ten seconds with each oth-
er yields prominent differences in heart rate. These differences are mediated by the 
system that serves to regulate the blood pressure according to the physiological 
needs of the body. This system is called the baroreceptor blood pressure control 
system. The baroreceptors are pressure sensors located in the larger arteries. By 
varying blood vessel constriction, heart rate and heart constriction power, this 
system serves to regulate the blood pressure. The control of the different variables 
is mediated via the autonomous nerve system. Mulder (1980) conducted one of the 
first attempts to utilize the observation that this 0.1 Hz component is greatly re-
duced by mental workload. He explained this reduction in variability with a de-
creased sensitivity of the brainstem for the impulses of the baroreceptors during an 
effortful state. In particular, the 0.1 Hz component of the HRV was found to corre-
late with a person consciously facing a threat to mental equilibrium. Interestingly, it 
was found that this can be both a difficult task on which the subject is willing to 
perform or also a threatening situation in which a subject finds it effortful to remain 
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calm (for example a dentist exam). There is a substantial body of evidence support-
ing the validity of the 0.1 Hz component for indicating mental effort, although the 
sensitivity of this method for changes in task load vs. changes in emotional load or 
stress is disputed by some authors (Nickel & Nachreiner, 2003). 
 Mulder himself considered making this difference in this particular case as not 
practical, as an increased task load actually would correlate with an increase in 
emotional load. The relevance becomes obvious, however, when comparing the 0.1 
Hz component method with subjective rating scales: as a part of the validation pro-
cedure for the RSME, Zijlstra (1993) compared the ratings on the RSME to the 
changes in the 0.1 Hz component in a laboratory setting and discovered a discrep-
ancy of the two methods. While the conditions of a laboratory task were designed 
to induce different levels of task load, the resulting changes in mental workload 
were only picked up by the RSME. A more thorough analysis revealed that, appar-
ently, the arousal of the subjects influenced the measured 0.1 HZ component. When 
subjects were for example more aroused because they could easily succeed (win) at 
a game-like task, the 0.1 Hz component was actually reduced, which would original-
ly be assumed to reflect a high level of experienced workload. Zijlstra came to the 
conclusion that, although both methods supposedly measured the same construct, 
the sensitivity of the RSME for differences in task load is much higher. In his inter-
pretation, the 0.1 Hz HRV component is rather an index of the transient feeling of 
strain and tension perceived during task performance, or of increased levels of 
arousal during task performance. 
 This discrepancy illustrates a conceptual problem with peripheral measure-
ments of mental effort investment. While these measurements are easily accessible, 
they pose only indirect correlates of the actual variable that is supposed to be 
measured. Even if the 0.1 Hz component indeed accurately reflects arousal or strain 
that an operator perceives during task performance, this would make it an indica-
tor of changes that compose only one part of the total experience of mental effort 
investment. This total experience is influenced by the investment of mental effort 
into all regulative processes that are necessary to perform a task. Peripheral varia-
bles might form an indicator of one or more aspects of mental effort investment, 
but they do not equal nor indicate the subjective experience of the operator. Hence, 
no single peripheral variable on itself would fully reflect the amount of subjectively 
experienced mental effort. Therefore, the role of such variables as a means to test 
validity of subjective rating scales by providing an account of subjectively experi-
enced mental effort investment during task performance is at least severely limited. 
2.2.2. Metabolic indicators of mental effort investment 
Another approach to assess mental effort is to use metabolic measures which indi-
cate the actual use of energy in form of glucose. Glucose is the bodies’ main fuel. The 
human brain consumes a not at all marginal portion of this fuel during mental tasks. 
Fairclough and Houston (2004) investigated the possibility of using this fact to 
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deduce the amount of exerted effort from the changes in blood glucose levels in 
their subjects during the execution of mental tasks. Their manipulation included 
differences in task load, but also prolonged task performance to induce time-on-
task-effects (TOT), which change the total amount of mental work load by increas-
ing the state load that the operator has to meet with his or her effort investment. 
The control measurement methods were the 0.1Hz component described above as 
well participants` performance on the mental tasks. Fairclough and Houston uti-
lized Stroop tasks with different levels of distraction to manipulate task load. As 
Fairclough and Houston state, blood glucose decreases as a function of task difficul-
ty and time. Even though they did not observe a related decrease in performance 
over time, other studies have established the link between decreasing blood sugar 
and decreasing performance in high-demanding tasks of different sorts (Feldman & 
Barshi, 2007).  
 With this approach, Fairclough and Houston tried to quantify the total invested 
mental effort by measuring the expenditure of the source of energy that fuels all 
mental processes on a neural level. This follows the assumption that the amount of 
invested effort is reflected in the amount of metabolized glucose. Additional evi-
dence indicates that the decrease in performance shown by Fairclough and Houston 
(2004) is mainly due to a loss of self-regulative ability that does not depend on the 
precise nature of the task. In a series of experiments, Gailliot et al. (2007) showed 
that several kinds of self-regulative activities decrease blood glucose levels. The 
lower the levels of blood glucose, the lower an individual performed on a subse-
quent self-control task. This view of blood glucose as an indicator of energy con-
sumption of the brain seems invitingly straightforward at first glance, as the role of 
glucose as an energy source for most processes in the human body is common 
knowledge. Yet, in case of the brain, energy supply and consumption is a quite 
complex process in which levels of blood glucose merely are one of several factors, 
which make the relation between blood glucose and neural functioning all but 
straightforward (Beedie & Lane, 2011). For example, blood glucose is not directly 
available to the neurons, and both the extracellular fluid and the astrocytes in the 
human brain act as an intermediate energy storage, which introduces a delay for 
any influence of changing blood glucose levels (Gibson, 2007). This underlines a 
major limitation of peripheral variables as indicators of a psychological construct as 
mental effort: While those variables might ultimately be influenced by the metabol-
ic processes underlying effort investment, the indirect nature of a variable`s rela-
tion to the psychological processes in question acts as what can best be described 
as a “filter” with unknown properties. Changes in the psychological process some-
how result in changes in the peripheral variable; but without knowing the precise 
functional relation between the psychological process and the peripheral variable, 
it is not sound to treat changes in the level of the peripheral variable as unambigu-
ous evidence that a change in for instance the level of mental effort investment has 
taken place. Levels of blood glucose, after all, are influenced as well by a multitude 
of other physiological processes. Hence, the validity of the approach to use blood 
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glucose levels as indicator of previously invested effort on the one hand depends on 
the understanding of the precise mechanics that connect mental effort investment 
to changes in the level of blood glucose. Furthermore, the use of this approach is 
limited to settings in which the influence of other, secondary physiological process-
es on blood glucose can be controlled or ruled out.  
 Nevertheless, this approach poses an attempt to find not only an objective cor-
relate of the subjective investment of mental effort, but to also find a correlate of 
the operator`s decreasing resources in relation to sustained performance using a 
peripheral indicator. What especially the results by Gailliot et al. (2007) show, 
above all, is that the ability to perform acts of effortful self-regulation is a general, 
meta-level ability of the human brain that is not specific to a certain task, and that 
depleting this resource results in performance decrease that is not specific to the 
domain of the task by which the resource was depleted in the first place. This is 
consistent with the notion that the concept of mental effort refers to a domain-
unspecific functional principle of brain functioning. At the same time, these results 
form a strong indicator for a biological basis of the regulative resource of mental 
effort. It seems thus warranted to take a closer look at the functioning of the human 
brain as the location in which the regulative action takes place. Peripheral indica-
tors of energy consumption do indicate that, somewhere, a consumption of glucose 
has taken place. By using neuroimaging tools, we can investigate where exactly the 
neurons of the brain exhibit this glucose-consuming activity, and how this changes 
in the face of changing levels of mental effort investment. Knowing which neural 
structures are employed in the process of effort investment would help to bridge 
the gap between mental effort as a concept of brain functioning and actual, observ-
able brain functioning. 
2.2.3. Neuroimaging: A more direct way of studying mental effort 
As became evident from the research into physiological correlates of mental effort 
investment, peripheral indicators suffer from the fact that they are only indirectly 
related to the process of interest. A more direct approach might therefore be bene-
ficial. Mental effort investment happens in the brain, therefore measures of neural 
correlates of mental effort investment and its effects might be able to provide less 
perturbed indicators of the subjective experience. 
 Such investigations have a long tradition in psychological research: One of the 
earliest neuroscientific experiments, was conducted by Angelo Mosso in the late 
19th century, and was actually a basic study of the physiological correlates of mental 
effort: It measured the extra weight of blood in a person’s head when the person 
engaged in effortful thinking. Mosso employed a simple device to measure the rela-
tive increase of blood volume in the brain: His setup consisted of a bench that was 
rested on a single pivot in the middle. The subject was placed carefully in a supine 
position on the bench, and the bench was balanced (see Fig. 5). Letting the subject 
perform a mental task would, according to Mosso, lead to increased blood flow to 
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the brain, which would cause the head end of the bench to tip over. While the out-
come of this particular experiment has been disputed, Mosso`s approach to meas-
ure a correlate of the activation of the whole brain is an example of an attempt to 
measure the combined effect of all factors that play a role in mental effort invest-
ment. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Mosso’s bench experiment. The participant was placed on a wooden bench that was pivoted in
the middle, much like a see-saw. The bench was carefully balanced while the participant was at rest. 
Supposedly, cerebral activation would increase the total amount of blood in the brain, causing the bench
to tip over at the head end. 
 
Modern neuroscientific tools have advanced far beyond wooden bench setups, and 
they offer ways to investigate brain functioning in a more detailed way.  
 The most prominent for in-vivo research are Electroencephalography (EEG) 
and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). In EEG, the electrical current 
associated with neuronal activity is measured by electrodes that are attached to the 
outside of the head. A commonly used technique in EEG research is the measure-
ment of event-related potentials (ERP). ERP are essentially the electrical response 
that can be measured in relation to the start of an event, such as tone that is pre-
sented to the subject (Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000). FMRI measures local chang-
es in oxygen saturation that have been found to correlate with the activation of 
local populations of neurons (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 
2001). Those methods differ in their characteristics: EEG has a high temporal solu-
tion in the range of milliseconds, while its spatial resolution is coarse. The case of 
fMRI is the exact opposite, with a spatial resolution that can be in the sub-
millimeter range, but a temporal resolution that is more in a range of about a sec-
ond. With the help of these techniques, it is thus possible to assess changes in vari-
ables that are indicators of brain activity. This makes it possible to investigate the 
effects of mental effort investment directly in the brain during the acute experience 
of mental effort investment. Several studies have already been conducted to this 
end, and their results demonstrate that mental effort investment indeed affects a 
large number of parameters of brain functioning. 
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A straightforward approach to study the effects of different levels of mental effort 
investment has been followed by a number of researchers. In this approach, the 
level of required mental workload is varied while some parameters of brain func-
tioning are measured. Different levels of required mental workload can be achieved 
by several means. One possibility is to change the amount of effort that subjects 
invest into an unchanged task by altering the task instructions. An example of such 
an experiment can be found in a study by Mulert et al. (2008). In this study, subjects 
performed an auditory reaction task under with wither the instruction to perform 
the task in a relaxed manner or to react as fast and precise as possible, to induce 
low and high effort conditions, respectively. Simultaneously, brain activation was 
measured using both EEG and fMRI. The results showed an increase in the so-called 
N1 ERP component (a negative peak in the EEG signal roughly 100 milliseconds 
after an event). This increase in N1 amplitude was found to be related to increased 
activation in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), as shown in the fMRI data. An-
other way to achieve different levels of mental workload is to manipulate a task so 
that it requires different levels of processing effort (think for example of changing 
the number of items a subject has to keep in working memory). Such manipulations 
have been used for example in working memory tasks (Owen, McMillan, Laird, & 
Bullmore, 2005; Ragland et al., 2002), in visual discrimination tasks (Deary et al., 
2004), but see also Duncan and Owen (2000) for an overview of the effects of 
changing levels of task difficulty on classical paradigms such as the Stroop task.  
 In summary, these studies have demonstrated that changing task demands 
entail effects on a wide range of brain areas, among which the anterior cingulate 
cortex (Mulert, Menzinger, Leicht, Pogarell, & Hegerl, 2005) or the medial ventro- 
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, the insula, and parts of the inferior parietal 
cortex (Ragland et al., 2002). It remains unclear, however, which role these specific 
neural structures play in the investment and experience of mental effort. Even 
stronger, the design of these studies does not allow to actually relate specific neural 
structures to mental effort, rather than to the specific cognitive processes that were 
performed by the participants of the respective studies. Is a specific structure more 
active in a condition with high workload because it is part of a neural mechanism 
that invests or monitors mental effort? Or is it simply more active because it pro-
cesses information at a higher load? As all of the above studies only manipulate task 
load, only one of the two classes of loads that the total mental workload comprises 
is manipulated. The concept of mental effort, however, describes how the overall 
investment of a regulative resource is deployed. The crucial notion about this de-
ployment is that any parameter in an operator can be the target of this regulation, 
not depending if this parameter is related to information processing or the regula-
tion of mental state in order to perform a task. In order to identify neural structures 
which are responsible for the management of mental effort a different strategy 
needs to be employed, which includes both the manipulation of mental effort by 
varying both the task and the state load. 
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Chapter 3 
Making mental effort visible 
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3.1. The necessity to combine expertise from occupational 
psychology with neuroimaging methods 
The results of the studies described in the previous chapter show that a large num-
ber of brain areas can be shown to change their activation level when task demands 
are varied. This forms an obvious limitation to any approach that simply contrasts 
different levels in task demands: It can be difficult to separate activation that is 
specific for performing a task and activation that can be attributed to the experi-
ence and the investment of mental effort. Even when data from paradigms that use 
a number of different tasks are compared, the changes in brain functioning that are 
measured during task performance still reflect two things: the changes in brain 
function that occur due to performing the task, but also the changes in brain func-
tion that occur due to the act of investing mental effort. As a consequence, it is im-
possible to interpret these results in relation to the concept of mental effort, as 
changes in neural activity cannot be unambiguously attributed to changes in effort 
investment or the experience thereof. This limitation entails that the results har-
vested from experimental paradigms which only employ differences in task load 
only pose mostly isolated findings about the effect of a cognitive manipulation on a 
neural structure or a pattern of neural activation, without offering the possibility of 
understanding the more general process of effort investment and experience. Of 
course, most of the described studies were conducted with very specific research 
questions in mind, which in some cases explicitly focused on structure-function 
relationships, or even on the brain activation related to one single paradigm. It is 
only in the retrospective perspective of this discussion that their relevance to the 
study of mental effort becomes clearly visible. What this limitation demonstrates, 
however, is that in order to identify the neural correlates of mental effort, a careful 
design of paradigms utilizing the existing knowledge that the field of occupational 
psychology has amassed on mental effort is absolutely paramount. The concept of 
mental effort refers to two sorts of loads: The task load, which has been employed 
as an experimental variable in a number of neuroimaging studies, entailing afore-
mentioned limitations, but also the state load. The state load describes the amount 
of effort investment an operator needs to make to regulate his or her state to be 
suitable for task performance. In the theoretical framework, this state load is pic-
tured as depending on the amount of arousal (Mulder, 1986; see also figure 3 in 
chapter 1). A maladjusted level of arousal will need to be regulated and kept at a 
level suitable for performing a task, which poses additional workload, the so-called 
state load (see also section 1.3). Factors that influence the arousal level of a person 
can be manifold, such as intoxication, sleep length, food intake (think of the feeling 
of relaxation and reduced desire for activity that overcomes one after a huge meal). 
In the context of occupational research, one of the most prominent factors is the 
influence of sustained performance. Experimental evidence for the influence of 
prolonged performance can be found for example in a study by Zijlstra (1993) 
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which was carried out to validate the RSME by demonstrating its sensitivity to both 
changes in task load and to changes in state load. In this study, Zijlstra used the 
RSME to measure the amount of effort that participants had to invest into a work-
ing memory task. Two groups of participants performed the same working memory 
task with an easy and a difficult condition. Afterwards the participants indicated 
the invested amount of effort on the RSME These two task conditions represented 
two different levels of task load. Additionally, however, the groups received differ-
ent pre-treatments in order to manipulate their states: One group spend the several 
hours before the task with effortful activities, while the other group was ordered to 
abstain from any effortful activity. By this pre-treatment, Zijlstra (1993) sought to 
induce two different levels of state load, as the group of participants that performed 
effortful tasks before performing the working memory task would additionally have 
to regulate their arousal levels. The results of this study clearly show that not only 
the two task load conditions, but also the two state load conditions influence the 
amount of mental effort invested in the task, as indicated by the participants on the 
RSME. The RSME was thereby shown to measure effort investment in accordance 
with the concept of mental effort as modeled by Mulder (1986) in his integrated 
model of mental effort, as the RSME was able to pick up variations in the required 
amount of effort due to both changes in task and state load.  
 Thus, both in the theoretical accounts of mental effort and in the evidence pro-
vided by earlier research using self-report measurements of mental effort, state 
load is an integral, demonstrated factor influencing the total amount of mental ef-
fort an individual needs to invest to achieve successful task performance. Especially 
the paradigm implemented by Zijlstra (1993) provides a valuable example of how 
both the task load and the state load can be incorporated as controlled experi-
mental variables in laboratory research of mental effort. It is exactly this expertise 
and experience from the field of occupational psychology which is needed to design 
an approach to extend our understanding of mental effort with neuroimaging tech-
niques. Experimental paradigms which only employ an incomplete operationaliza-
tion of the mental effort concept only yield very limited information about the neu-
ral processes related to mental effort. Using an experimental design in which both 
main factors that influence mental effort investment are incorporated in a con-
trolled manner, however, offer the possibility to make use of the possibilities of-
fered to us by neuroimaging methods.  
 This `extension of the occupational psychologist`s toolbox`, in turn, is in our 
opinion a most necessary advance that needs to be taken in order to refine and 
extend the understanding of mental effort from the perspective of occupational 
psychology. Using the conventional methods of performance-based experimental 
paradigms and cognitive modeling, occupational psychology has arrived at what 
can be described as a peak. The modern conceptualizations of mental effort such as 
the integrated model of mental effort (Mulder, 1986) form an abstract, but appar-
ently accurate description of the concept of mental effort. The central aspect of this 
model, the notion that a limited resource is fueling all regulation, remains an un-
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challenged central aspect of the concept of mental effort (Fairclough & Mulder, 
2011). Moreover, this conceptual notion has independently been incorporated in 
other areas of psychological research, corroborating the findings and conceptuali-
zations in occupational psychology: The concept of a finite resource is also the cen-
tral pillar of the strength model of self-control (Baumeister et al., 1994), in which it 
is termed the “limited resource assumption”. It is the rich body of experimental 
literature related to the field of self-control and regulation which further demon-
strates the need for employing additional research approaches, as the probability of 
substantially adding to our understanding of the nature of this limited resource by 
conducting additional research using conventional methods seems small.. The lim-
ited resource assumption has been continuously supported by the vast majority of 
the numerous studies that have been conducted to test it (Hagger et al., 2010). 
Hagger et al. (2010) analyzed 83 experimental studies, of which 81 showed results 
consistent with the assumption of a limited resource underlying regulative abilities. 
The majority of these studies followed a pattern of measuring performance on tow 
tasks, a primary task intended to deplete the subject`s resources, and a secondary 
task on which, due to the previous depletion of resources, performance was shown 
to be decreased. A decrease in performance due to the depletion of resources be-
comes only apparent after the subjects are either not willing or not able to sustain 
the increased level of mental effort investment required to secure a stable level of 
performance (Meijman, 1997). Thus, it can be assumed that if we were to replicate 
these studies while measuring the amount of mental effort that the subjects need to 
invest, the results would yield similarly corroborative evidence supporting a model 
in which mental effort is a limited resource.  
 We have thus arrived at a point in the development of theoretical concept of 
mental effort as well as the related concept of self-regulation at which the resulting 
models have become convergent in their description of this aspect of the human 
information processing system. The experimental techniques and approaches that 
have delivered the evidence that lead to the formation of the converging models 
seem to be currently unable to provide any fundamental extension of the concepts 
of mental effort, or of self-regulation. At the same time, the relation of the concept 
of a limited resource with other, clearly influential, factors such as motivation or 
affect remains obscure. Alternative theories to the strength model have been pro-
posing a more central role of affect and motivation in explaining the observed 
changes in self-regulative abilities in paradigms incorporating sustained perfor-
mance (Hagger et al., 2010). Instead of focusing on a finite regulative resource, such 
alternative explanations assume that for example sustained performance builds up 
negative affect, which in turn prompts the individual to engage in behavior alleviat-
ing the negative mood (in the context of performance, the cessation of further in-
creasing the negative affect by ceasing performance) (Bruyneel, Dewitte, Franses, & 
Dekimpe, 2009), or that a subject`s capacity is increasingly occupied to compensate 
a steady shift of the motivational balance in disfavor of sustained self-regulation 
(Meijman, 1997). These alternative explanations would technically also work under 
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the assumption of a fixed capacity assumption in which the resource underlying 
self-regulation is not depleted, but rather progressively bound in compensating the 
increasing threat to performance. Yet, the experimental evidence still supports a 
finite resource model: lack of motivation or negative affect can unfold their detri-
mental effects on performance only when a person reaches a state of depletion in 
which the a person`s ability to engage in successful self-regulation is impaired 
(Bruyneel et al., 2009; Meijman & Mulder, 1998). Hagger et al. (2010) name a num-
ber of additional factors such as fatigue or change in affect that are consistently 
observed to occur in when people performed sustained exhaustive tasks (Govorun 
& Payne, 2006; Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001). These factors have been 
proposed as central elements of alternative theories that aim to explain the ob-
served pattern of performance decrease. As one of the lead conclusions of their 
extensive review, they interpret the analyzed studies as supportive for the strength 
model. At the same time, the evidence is not sufficient to rule out alternative ex-
planatory models. As Hagger et al. note, understanding the specific mechanisms 
that link sustained self-regulation to motivational or affective processes is para-
mount to understand the interplay of these different, clearly associated factors. Yet, 
as the authors point out, the lack of knowledge about the nature of the limited re-
source that underlies self-regulation forms a major hurdle for further research, as 
for example performance remains the main objective dependent variable that can 
be used to detect the depletion of the underlying resource.  
 In the context of mental effort, factors as fatigue, or changes in affect are in-
cluded, as well as their influence on motivation, are an integral part of the concept. 
The basic assumption is that effort investment is based on the decision of the indi-
vidual to adopt a goal and to willingly invest a certain amount of regulative re-
sources into reaching the set goal. In this view, effortful self-regulation can even be 
used to counter factors such as mood, fatigue, and even provide a protection of the 
initial motivational state against the de-motivating effects of the other factors 
(Meijman & Mulder, 1998). Models like the integrated model of mental effort 
(Mulder, 1986) fully accommodate the notion that any additional need for regula-
tion in order to keep the individual in a state that allows performance requires 
additional effort in form of the state load. Together with the state load, the integrat-
ed model of mental effort thus provides a complete account of the changing amount 
of effort that an individual must invest to perform a sustained task. In this, the 
model pictures the relationship between task and operator as interactive, thus in-
cluding the notion that the operator`s state will change over time, and that, in turn, 
the operator might change his or her strategies or even alter the set task goals as 
well. What the integrated model of mental effort does not describe, however, is how 
exactly the concept of mental effort is linked to factors such as affect, motivation or 
fatigue. Akin to the research challenges identified for the strength model identified 
by Hagger et al. (2010), a truly integrated perspective on mental effort requires the 
understanding of how mental effort is linked to affective, cognitive and motivation-
al processes. Research efforts into mental effort and into self-control seemingly 
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have approached the same concept of a limited regulative resource: The concept of 
mental effort describes the mobilization of an energetic resource that, in the 
strength model of self-control, is applied to actively regulate one`s behavior. For the 
moment, the experimental evidence and theoretical considerations of both of these 
directions have arrived at a common challenge. This challenge is to understand 
exactly what limits the self-regulative power of the human brain. The crucial gap in 
our understanding is the lack of a physiological manifestation of this limited re-
source. Thereby, naturally, the possibilities to measure the investment of the lim-
ited resource are restricted. Performance can only indirectly hint at the depletion of 
the resource, while the relation of peripheral physiological indicators of its deple-
tion such as blood glucose to the actual limited resource that underlies regulation is 
not sufficiently understood. The most direct estimation of the actual usage of men-
tal effort that is available are self-reports that can be provided by operators. Yet, 
such self-reports cannot, on their own, teach us anything new about the abstract 
resource that underlies them. 
 What Hagger et al. (2010) identified as the course of action for overcoming the 
gap in knowledge for the strength model of self-control, “Identifying physiological 
analogs for ego depletion may offer a potential solution” (p. 205), is in our opinion 
the necessary next step in extending our understanding of mental effort. What we 
know is that the way that an individual is able to regulate him- or herself changes as 
an effect of sustained regulation. We thus assume that the brain of an individual 
functions differently before and after sustained investment of mental effort. In or-
der to extend our knowledge about the nature of mental effort as a resource, we 
thus have to investigate how the use and consumption of this resource is reflected 
in the brain. The challenge is to isolate the changes in brain activation related to 
experienced investment of mental effort from the changes that are specific for the 
processes related to task performance. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary 
to utilize both the possibilities offered to us by modern neuroimaging techniques, 
and the theoretically sound design of experimental manipulations of mental effort 
investment that have been successfully employed in cognitive investigations of the 
matter so far. 
3.2. A strategy to identify neural correlates of mental effort 
The identification of neural correlates of mental effort as such is a quite complex 
problem. The only quantification available is the subjective, self-reported experi-
ence of operators, which additionally is given only after performance on a laborato-
ry task has actually taken place. Thus, normally, we would only be able to obtain a 
quantification of mental effort after the act of investing effort has taken place, and 
we would have to rely on the assumption that the post-hoc evaluation reflects the 
acute experience of the operator while performing the task. However, the possibil-
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ity to measure brain activation without interfering with a subject`s task perfor-
mance offers us a way to evaluate the similarity of experience and post-hoc self-
evaluation of mental effort investment. Brain activation can be measured during 
task performance itself, but also during the process of rating one`s own mental 
effort investment. Thereby, it can be assessed if experiencing mental effort invest-
ment acutely and the act of evaluating it afterwards share neural structures. 
 The existence of such a specialized, shared mechanism for experience and self-
evaluation of mental effort has been proposed earlier by Naccache et al (2005) 
based on observations in a patient. This patient, abbreviated RMB, was found to 
lack any sense of mental effort investment, following an ischemic lesion. Her cogni-
tive abilities were largely preserved, and she was able to react to changes in task 
demands in a flexible way. Also, RMB was able to deduce changes in task demands 
on a pure cognitive level. However, she reported a distinct lack of experiencing the 
investment of mental effort, or any sense of difference across task conditions that 
obviously were designed to create different levels of task load. Presented with dif-
ferent task conditions that only covertly varied in their associated task load, there-
by precluding a cognitive deduction of the different task levels, patient RMB was 
not able to give any account of differences in the required effort investment at all. 
Based on this evidence, Naccache et al. (2005) propose the existence of a special-
ized, dissociable mechanism that underlies both the experience and the self-
evaluation of mental effort. While the extensive nature of RMB`s lesion does not 
allow to evaluate in how far identical neural structures would be responsible for 
both the deficit in experience and in post-hoc evaluation, her case provides strong 
evidence for specialized common neural correlates of mental effort investment and 
evaluation. 
 The dissociation displayed by RMB allowed for the opportunity to isolate neu-
ral correlates of mental effort evaluation from other evaluative processes related to 
a previously performed task. An experimental paradigm that confronts a partici-
pant with different levels of task load would induce different levels of mental effort 
investment, which the participant later had to indicate using a commonly used self-
report instrument such as the RSME. By measuring the brain activation during this 
rating process and contrasting it with brain activation when a participant rates task 
difficulty, we would reproduce the functional difference that manifested in the dis-
sociation of patient RMB. We would then be able to subsequently study the behav-
ior of the thereby identified neural structures under varying levels of acute mental 
effort investment during performance. This necessitates the careful construction of 
a paradigm based on the fact that mental effort is the communal resource for meet-
ing all regulative need. Paradigms that exclusively manipulate task load will find 
widespread activation over a large number of brain areas (Duncan & Owen, 2000). 
However, differences in task load are only one class of need for regulative action 
that an individual faces. The solution is to design a paradigm that allows for a ma-
nipulation in both task and state load. Thereby, an additional criterion, namely the 
sensitivity to changes in state load could offer a way to identify changes in brain 
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activation that reflect changes in subjectively experienced effort during task per-
formance. This would allow testing the assumption that post-hoc evaluations of 
mental effort investment and acute experience thereof indeed share common neu-
ral structures. More important, the combination of the subjective self-report tech-
nique and the measured brain activation would allow, for the first time, to actually 
relate the experience of effort investment to localized neural changes. Taking into 
account findings from other subjective modalities, it is reasonable to hypothesize 
that parametrical changes in the subjective experience of mental effort are reflected 
in parametrical changes in brain activation. Similar observations have been made in 
several subjective modalities such as emotional valence (Anders, Lotze, Erb, Grodd, 
& Birbaumer, 2004) or pain perception (Kong et al., 2006), where the strength of 
the subjective experience was reflected in changes in the activation of related brain 
areas. 
 Most important, measuring brain activation in relation to sustained perfor-
mance might also offer a way to better understand the effects that investing mental 
effort has on the way that the human brain functions. Sustained investment of men-
tal effort, no matter in which respect, on which task, or in which context, has been 
shown to change the way that people are able to bring their actions into accordance 
with their goals. A fundamental change in the ability of healthy people to regulate 
their own behavior takes place, accompanied by measurable changes in the psycho-
logical constructs which surround self-regulation (Hagger et al., 2010). Achieving a 
systemic, truly integrated perspective on mental effort is only possible by under-
standing how the functioning of the brain is changed by sustained effort invest-
ment. Individually, neural correlates of affective or motivational processes have 
been identified (Anders et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004). Yet, all of these individual 
processes are embedded in the “computational platform” of the brain. More recent 
techniques in functional neuroimaging have made it possible to examine not only 
contrasting differences in brain activation, but also the way that brain regions func-
tion together (McKeown et al., 1998; Esposito et al., 2008). Information processing 
in the brain, put brief, relies on the fact that different brain regions can organize 
themselves in a flexible manner into functional networks. A large number of neuro-
logical conditions typically associated with fatigue, like for example multiple sclero-
sis, have been associated with changes in functional connectivity in the functional 
brain networks (van den Heuvel & Hulshoff Pol, 2010; Stam & van Straaten, 2012). 
Also in healthy participants, classical debilitating factors as intoxication by alcohol 
have been demonstrated to affect the functional connectivity in the brain in a dose-
dependent fashion (Esposito et al., 2010), and intoxication-mediated attenuation in 
the reactivity of brain areas that form a part of such functional networks are associ-
ated with decreases in cognitive performance in intoxicated participants 
(Marinkovic, Rickenbacher, Azma, & Artsy, 2012). We have thus reason to hypothe-
size that the changes in self-regulative capabilities and fatigue associated with sus-
tained investment of mental effort will be reflected in measurable changes in func-
tional networks in the brain. Investigating this so-called functional connectivity in 
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relation to sustained effort investment will likely show how the brain is affected by 
a sustained, depleting investment of effort. 
 
Summarizing, it is thus possible to test the hypotheses stating that 
• There are neural correlates of subjectively experienced mental effort invest-
ment that are sensitive to changes in task and state load in the same way as sub-
jective rating scales, in this case the RSME. 
• Experiencing and evaluating mental effort investment recruits shared neural 
structures. 
• The effects of sustained task performance on brain functioning can be identified 
using neuroimaging methods. 
 
Over the course of the next three chapters of this book, I present three studies in 
which these hypotheses are tested. The studies that we conducted were designed 
while building on all the efforts that have been made by other researchers before. 
Testing the hypotheses that became immanent from this earlier work will be, most 
important, a further step in extending our understanding of mental effort, and of 
the ways that we measure it. Measurement devices that are used to assess mental 
effort investment, in particular the RSME, provide valuable data about the subjec-
tive experience of people in the process of investing mental effort. In turn, by com-
bining such proven instruments with more recent neuroimaging techniques, we 
also have the opportunity to learn more about instruments as the RSME as well. 
Yet, the implications of extending our fundamental understanding of the concept of 
mental effort stretch much further than the mere direct theoretical considerations. 
As occupational psychologists, one of our central goals is to understand and im-
prove the relation of individuals with the tasks that they perform. Gaining a more 
holistic understanding of how the act of performing a task – any task - changes the 
individual in such a fundamental respect as to alter the functioning of the brain is 
simply imperative to our continued effort to pursue this goal. 
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Abstract 
Mental effort is a limited resource which must be invested in order to perform men-
tal tasks. The amount of mental effort investment that an individual experiences 
during task performance can be measured afterwards with the help of self-rating 
scales. 
 Earlier research suggests that integration of information about somatic state 
changes is crucial for the self-evaluation of mental effort investment. Damage to the 
pathways which convey information about somatic state changes can lead to an 
inability to self-evaluate mental effort investment, while conceptually similar eval-
uations of task difficulty can still be performed. 
 We used fMRI to investigate brain activation while subjects rated their mental 
effort investment and the difficulty of a previously performed task. Our results 
show stronger activation of the left anterior insular cortex (aIC) during evaluation 
of mental effort. Additionally, the activity in left aIC during task performance was 
modulated by changes in task demand in a similar way as the self-ratings of mental 
effort. We argue that aIC does not only play a role in the integration of self-related 
information during self-evaluation of mental effort investment, but that left aIC 
might also be involved in the experience of mental effort during task performance. 
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4.1. Introduction 
4.1.1. Scope of the study 
Mental effort is generally experienced while performing any sort of mental task, 
from compiling a grocery list to planning a scientific study. It is described as spend-
ing energy and consequently experiencing a feeling of strain, thus ultimately invest-
ing a limited energetic resource to perform a mental task (Zijlstra, 1993). Damasio 
(1999) considered mental effort to be not an emotion as such, but rather a feeling 
which refers to a conscious appraisal of one’s own state. The amount of mental 
effort experienced while engaging in a task is determined by a variety of factors not 
limited to its mere computational demands (Mulder, 1986). Being aware of levels of 
mental effort investment provides information about the sustainability of a current 
activity. This awareness also makes it possible to evaluate the level of mental effort 
investment related to a task, and to communicate it.  
 The goal of this article is to identify neural structures that are involved in the 
process of mental effort evaluation. We will briefly describe the concept and meas-
urement of mental effort. We will identify two crucial functions of a neural mecha-
nism that enables mental effort evaluation. Evidence from research into brain areas 
with matching functional characteristics are then used to form hypotheses about 
the role of these areas in mental effort evaluation that will be tested using function-
al magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
4.1.2. The concept of mental effort and its implications for neural structures 
Engaging in any mental task confronts an individual with a variety of demands. The 
integrated model of mental effort (Mulder, 1986) divides these in two classes of 
demands: The task load, which is related to the control of mental processes in order 
to produce the desired result, and the state load, which refers to all compensatory 
control that needs to be invested to reach and maintain a suitable working state. 
The actively invested control that an individual deploys to meet the combination of 
these two loads is referred to as mental effort. Investment of mental effort is ac-
companied by a subjective feeling of strain, and sustained high mental effort in-
vestment results in negative affect and fatigue (Hockey, 1997). The self-evaluation 
of mental effort investment has been described as a quasi-emotional appreciation 
of one’s own state, reflecting the changes that occur in the state due to meeting the 
mental workload (Damasio, 1999).  
 The ability to self-evaluate one’s own mental effort investment is necessary to 
manage one’s performance in a sustainable way regarding one’s own state. The 
existence of such an ability to intuitively self-assess the amount of mental effort 
related to the execution of a task has been demonstrated, and it is used routinely in 
occupational psychology. Modern tools measuring workload such as the rating 
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scale mental effort (RSME; (Zijlstra, 1993) make use of this feature to provide an 
assessment of regulative effort in real-life work environments. Yet, to identify the 
impact of each of the many influences a subject faces in a work environment, it is 
necessary to understand the mechanism that leads to the coherent subjective expe-
rience of mental effort. Identifying the brain areas which are involved in the evalua-
tion process provides an overview of the components of this mechanism.  
 By outlining necessary capacities of such an evaluative mechanism, it is possi-
ble to search for brain areas which have been shown to play a role in similar func-
tions. Two crucial capacities of a mechanism for evaluating mental effort can be 
derived from the theoretical model of mental effort and from research into its sub-
jective measurement. On the one hand, the mechanism must have the capacity to 
monitor different information streams that carry information about the state of the 
individual and to integrate this information into a coherent impression. Stressors 
related to task execution can affect all domains in the experience of a subject, from 
bodily homeostasis to cognitive resources. Thus, the integration of information 
originating from different domains is necessary to give an indication of mental ef-
fort. A brain region involved in joining these different information streams will 
need input from the respective regions that are concerned with the lower pro-
cessing stages of this information. 
 The second necessary capacity of the mechanism is to make the result of the 
integrative process available for self-evaluation. It enables the subject to become 
aware of recently experienced mental effort levels and to communicate it. Concep-
tionally, self-evaluation of mental effort investment is a recall of the effect of the act 
of performing a task on the state of the self. The state of the self is thus used as a 
reference point, and changes in this state due to task performance are attributed to 
the investment of mental effort. Scales such as the RSME rely on the fact that this 
self-evaluation of mental effort can be performed fast and intuitively. 
4.1.3. A possible role for structures related to self-awareness 
Evidence from earlier research (see Craig (2009) for a review) suggests the insular 
cortex (IC), especially the anterior part, as a likely candidate region to provide the 
described necessary functionality. The IC receives input from a vast number of 
cortical and subcortical regions that provide it with information about the somatic, 
emotional and cognitive aspects of the state of the individual. The IC integrates this 
information in a posterior to anterior order. The anterior IC (aIC) thus receives and 
integrates information about all major aspects of an individual’s state, which would 
enable it to determine the changes in this state due to mental effort investment. 
Thereby, it would fulfill the first criterion for a mental effort evaluation mechanism. 
 The second criterion, namely the capacity of a mechanism to perform a self-
referential evaluation, initially makes the involvement of an additional number of 
regions seem plausible. In particular, a set of regions termed Cortical Midline Struc-
tures (CMS; (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004), consisting of the anterior and posterior 
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cingulate cortices/precuneus and the medial prefrontal cortex have been found to 
be activated in paradigms contrasting self-and other related information (see (van 
der Meer, Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010) or Lieberman (2010) for a review).  
 While these regions react to changes in the degree of general self-reference, 
studies specifically investigating emotional self-awareness and interoception rather 
point towards a prominent role of aIC in this specific sub-domain of self-awareness. 
 Craig (2009) compared the results of several studies which employed experi-
mental paradigms centered around awareness of self-state or emotions. In his re-
view, Craig proposed that due to the extended integrative nature of aIC, it possesses 
the ability to essentially create a comprehensive momentary meta-representation 
of the subjective state of the self. Of particular interest in this context is the notion 
that overlapping regions in aIC have been shown to be reactive to changes in emo-
tion as well as to interoceptive awareness (Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner, 2012). A strong 
relation of somatic information and the subjective self-appraisal of one’s state has 
been proposed earlier (Damasio, 1999). The results of Zaki et al. (2012) demon-
strate that experience of emotion and attending to one’s heartbeat actually do acti-
vate overlapping areas in aIC in the same participants, while a number of earlier 
studies have shown a connection between interoceptive awareness and emotional 
reactivity (see Herbert and Pollatos (2012) for a review). 
 For one emotion, namely anxiety, a mechanism has been proposed in which aIC 
compares states of the bodily self at different times, signaling the occurrence of 
unexpected discrepancies between predicted and actual state (Paulus & Stein, 
2006). Further evidence of such a functionality of aIC comes from its consistent, 
overlapping activation during both actual experience of pain and empathizing with 
other’s pain, the latter of which involves emulating the state changes caused by the 
pain stimulus (Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). Such a state-comparing func-
tionality of aIC would fit very closely with the conceptual description of self-
evaluation of mental effort investment, especially as mental effort investment has 
long been known to cause changes in the somatic state of an individual (Fairclough 
& Mulder, 2011).  
 The involvement of several parts of the IC in evaluative processes has already 
been demonstrated in a number of paradigms. In a meta-analysis of studies investi-
gating brain activation during explicit emotional evaluation, (Lee & Siegle, 2009) 
identified the IC as being activated specifically during evaluation of one’s own emo-
tion-related states by subjects. Although the locations of activated clusters in IC 
vary over different paradigms used in the analyzed studies, the computed peak 
activation is located towards aIC. 
 These two features, the integration of information from different domains and 
the proposed relation to emotional awareness and self-evaluation, provide the aIC 
with two prerequisites for mental effort evaluation according to the outlined theory 
above: First, necessary information about the state of the self, most important the 
bodily aspect, are projected to it. Second, the combined evidence suggests a func-
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tionality of aIC in which different states are compared, thereby enabling it of as-
sessing the influence of task performance on the state of the self.  
 Findings from a patient case study (Naccache et al., 2005) provide further evi-
dence supporting the crucial role of bodily state information in the self-evaluation 
of mental effort. In this case, it was demonstrated that mental effort evaluation is 
dissociable from other evaluations concerning a recently performed task. After 
suffering an extensive lesion in the left anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), patient RMB 
was left with a specific impairment concerning her ability to evaluate her own in-
vested mental effort. While she had no problems reasoning about the various diffi-
culty levels of a task in terms of its computational demands, she did report to not 
feel any changes in her sense of mental effort investment. According to the inter-
pretation of the authors, the function of the ACC is mainly the generation of emo-
tional somatic markers in coordination with left ventromedial prefrontal regions; 
due to the lesion, these structures were disconnected which lead to the described 
inability to perform self-evaluation of mental effort investment. While in this case a 
lesion in ACC was responsible for the functional deficit, results from several studies 
reviewed by Craig (2009) showed no significant changes in ACC activation in rela-
tion to paradigms stimulating awareness of the self. Thus, in our view, ACC per-
forms a necessary prerequisite role in self-related evaluation processes, but the 
main role of integrating and evaluating bodily information is performed by aIC. 
 Nevertheless, this case study presents a valuable observation that can be used 
to study the neural correlates of mental effort self-evaluation. The functional disso-
ciation of evaluating task difficulty and invested effort offer a narrow contrast that 
can be used to assess the role of aIC in mental effort evaluation. While the evalua-
tion of task difficulty seems similar to evaluating the mental effort, there is a crucial 
difference: Difficulty concerns the objective demands of a task, as perceived and 
estimated by the subject in a purely rational manner. Mental effort evaluation con-
cerns the same task-sided loads, but it adds the subject itself in the evaluation. The 
subjective appraisal of one’s own state is a necessary element in this process 
(Zijlstra, 1993). Therefore, the two key aspects of mental effort evaluation, namely 
integration of information across somatic/emotional/cognitive domains and the 
involvement of emotional self-awareness, do not play a prominent role in the eval-
uation of task difficulty. Thus, structures that support these two aspects of mental 
effort evaluation should be more active during the evaluation of mental effort than 
during task difficulty evaluation.  
 Still, both evaluations aim at the same recent task performance, and it has been 
demonstrated that nearly identical Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) interfaces can be 
used to assess the magnitudes of both effort and difficulty (Yeo & Neal, 2004). 
Among the available tools for measuring mental effort, a one-dimensional VAS has 
the advantage of minimal intrusion, while, as proven for the RSME, still providing 
high sensitivity (Verwey & Veltman, 1996). 
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4.1.4. Goal of the study and hypotheses 
The goal of our study was to provide insight in the neural structures that are acti-
vated stronger during the evaluation of mental effort than during the evaluation of 
task difficulty. We devised a design that makes use of the contrast between difficul-
ty and mental effort evaluation. The paradigm employed a common working 
memory task, the n-back task (Gevins & Cutillo, 1993). This task was used on three 
different levels of difficulty. Earlier findings demonstrated that ratings of both diffi-
culty and amount of mental effort would be highly correlated (Yeo & Neal, 2004) 
and would correspond to the memory load of the n-back task in a parametric fash-
ion.  
Hypothesis 1: 
The difficulty and mental effort rating scores will show a significant correlation and 
will follow the parametric changes in task load.  
 
The evaluation of a recent task using a VAS is in itself a complex process. The expe-
rience must be recalled, it must be evaluated, the outcome must be translated to a 
value on a scale, and finally a cursor must be moved to the chosen location on the 
scale. Lee and Siegle (2009) provided an overview of regions which, independent of 
the actual emotional content, would support the mere performance of a rating task 
as such. This includes expected task interface specific networks, which in our study 
would refer to networks engaged in visuo-motor coordination. The rating process 
itself relies on the recall of information over the task and on attention-related and 
higher cognitive functions to reflect and evaluate this information.  
Hypothesis 2: 
During both rating tasks, areas associated with visual and motor activity, attention, 
working memory and higher cognitive functioning will be activated. Specifically, 
this should involve areas in the anterior and posterior cingulate cortex (ACC/PCC) 
and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). 
 
The main focus of our study concerned the contrast between those two rating con-
ditions. Both the theoretical accounts of mental effort (Mulder, 1986) and the find-
ings in patient RMB of Naccache et al. (2005) make it plausible that integration of 
information is a crucial part of mental effort evaluation. We propose that the aIC is 
suited to fulfill this role. The role of the aIC in self-awareness (Craig, 2009) makes it 
furthermore plausible that it serves to make the outcome of this process accessible 
to the subject as a part of the awareness of one’s own state. 
 We, thus, expected this region to show stronger activation during mental effort 
evaluation than task difficulty evaluation. 
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Hypothesis 3:  
The aIC will be activated more during the evaluation of mental effort than during 
evaluation of task difficulty. 
4.2. Methods 
4.2.1. Subjects 
14 Dutch – speaking subjects (3 male, 11 female, mean age 21.8 years, 12 right – 
handed and 2 left-handed as measured by Edinburgh handedness inventory) were 
recruited using standard criteria for MRI safety and suitability for the experiment 
(no reports of mental health or extensive vision or motor problems). In order to 
minimize the chance for artifacts in the lower regions of the frontal cortex, we also 
excluded candidates with orthodontic retainers. Screened subjects were invited for 
the testing session. All subjects gave informed consent before the start of the exper-
iment and were rewarded with either a fixed monetary reward or with a fixed 
number of student participation points.  
 2 male, right-handed subjects were excluded from analysis because of move-
ment artifacts in the functional scans that exceeded the limits described under 
4.2.3.1. This cut back our total sample size to 12, yet this reduction is far less severe 
than the effects of including low-quality data sets. 
4.2.2. Task and procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, the task was explained and practiced in a short 
version (one block of each condition) under supervision of the experimenter to 
check proper understanding. Subsequently, subjects were placed in the MRI scan-
ner and performed 2 sessions of 15 task blocks each. The duration of one session 
was approximately 28 minutes. Between the two sessions, a T1 – weighted anatom-
ical scan of the brain was carried out while the subjects were allowed to rest. The 
employed task was a version of the n-back task. Subjects saw letters appearing one 
after another on a computer screen. Subjects had to indicate if the letter currently 
presented on screen was identical to a letter that was presented either one, two or 
three letters back. These conditions were referred to as “1-back”, “2-back” and “3-
back” conditions, respectively. N-back paradigms have been used to induce differ-
ent levels of load in a number of previous studies (Owen, McMillan, Laird, & Bull-
more, 2005). The conditions were quasi-randomized, with 5 instances of each con-
dition in each of the two sessions of the experiment.  
 At the beginning of each block, an instruction screen told subjects which condi-
tion they would encounter. Subjects than had the task of responding to 20 letters 
with either left or right button press to indicate that the letters were identical or 
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not. After each letter they received feedback by either being presented with a green 
“Right” or a red “Wrong” for 500 ms. The letters in question appeared on screen for 
2000 ms, which was also the response window. After each block of 20 trials, the 
subjects were given two consecutive VAS to rate either experienced mental effort or 
task difficulty. The scales were presented in random order. Each scale was preced-
ed by a rest period of 8000ms and an instruction screen of 3000ms, which primed 
subjects on which of the two VAS would be presented next. Following the instruc-
tion screen, the scales were presented for 10000ms. During this period, subjects 
could move a cursor on the scale and press a button to make a rating. Rating peri-
ods were kept at this standard duration to encourage actual rating instead of click-
ing on as fast as possible. For the subsequent analysis, only the actual time of rating 
up until the button press would be defined as the rating period in the fMRI protocol. 
 We employed the 150-point Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME; Zijlstra, 1993) to 
allow subjects to assess the amount of invested mental effort they experienced. To 
assess difficulty, we designed a simple 150-point scale with three anchor points, 
following the argumentation of Yeo and Neal (2004) that visual scales used in the 
same experiment should be similar in design and scaling. The RSME is a vertical 
one-dimensional visual analogue scale (VAS), ranging from 0 to 150, with nine an-
chor points describing various levels of effort. These labels were carefully chosen 
and placed on the scale to ensure they have the same meaning for different sub-
jects. The RSME assesses the combined regulative demands that are experienced by 
a subject as a result of both task load and state load. It is similar to other, routinely 
used instruments in measuring the construct of mental effort and is commonly used 
in the field of work psychology (Verwey & Veltman, 1996). The reliability of the 
RSME is given in the literature with r=.78 (Zijlstra, 1993). This apparently low value 
is explained by the author as resulting from the fact that, even under laboratory 
conditions, the subjectively experienced amount of effort will vary over time even 
in the same subject. Previous research has demonstrated that the RSME does not 
rely on obvious cues to indicate differences in levels of mental work load (Zijlstra, 
1993). Therefore it is unlikely that the obviousness of the differences between the 
conditions determines the resulting RSME scores. These obvious changes in task 
load were necessary for the evaluation of task difficulty. 
 The task and the two VAS were programmed in E-Prime. They were presented 
using E-Studio on a Windows XP PC connected to a MRI compatible optic system 
consisting of a projector and mirror goggles. Task and rating input was collected via 
an MRI compatible optical 2-button Joystick (Current Designs Inc., Philadelphia, 
USA). Subjects trained the handling of the Joystick for a brief period before the ex-
periment by marking values on a VAS analogue to the ones used in the actual exper-
iment.  
 Magnetic resonance imaging was performed on a Siemens Allegra 3T head 
scanner (Siemens AG, Erlangen, Germany) at the facilities of the Maastricht Brain 
Imaging Center.  
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Anatomical imaging was carried out with a standard ADNI T1 weighted sequence, 
Voxel size1 cubic mm; flip angle = 9 deg; TR = 2250ms; TE = 2,6ms 
 Whole brain Echo-Planar Imaging (EPI) was performed using the following 
parameters: Matrix size 64x64; slice thickness 3,5mm; Slice order descending and 
interleaved; no gap; FOV 224x224mm; TE=30ms; TR= 2000ms. Slice orientation 
was tilted 30 degrees backwards in order to minimize susceptibility artifacts in the 
orbitofrontal regions (Deichmann, Gottfried, Hutton, & Turner, 2003) 
4.2.3. Analysis 
Behavioral data was analyzed using SPSS 15.0. A mixed model analysis was carried 
out in order to reflect the nested structure of the data. In order to check for exhaus-
tion effects, the number of the session (1 or 2) was also included as a covariance 
factor. 
4.2.3.1. Imaging data treatment 
Analysis of fMRI data was performed in BrainVoyager QX 2.1 (Brain Innovation BV, 
Maastricht, The Netherlands). Anatomical images were individually preprocessed 
by inhomogeneity correction and extracranial noise filtering. The data was subse-
quently transformed into stereotactic space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988).The 
transformed anatomical scans from all subjects were then averaged into a single 
anatomical data set used as background for the visualization of group analyses. 
 The first three volumes of the functional scans were discarded because of mag-
netic saturation effects. The functional scans were preprocessed by slice scan time 
correction, motion correction and high pass filtering. Data of two subjects showed 
translation/rotation exceeding 3mm/deg. Those datasets were excluded from fur-
ther analysis. High pass filtering was performed using a General Linear Model 
(GLM) approach with a Fourier basis set which was adjusted to subtract the time 
course for predictors with up to 2 sine/cosine cycles per run and eventual linear 
trends from the time course of the data. Volume Time Course (VTC) files were cal-
culated for each separate run. 
4.2.3.2. Statistical data analysis 
The E-Primer script for BrainVoyager (Hester Breman, Brain Innovation B. V., 
2009) was used to extract the timing information of the single conditions from the 
E-Prime protocol files for each separate run. This timing information was used to 
build a design matrix. The single boxcar predictor time courses were adjusted for 
the shape and delay of the hemodynamic response by convolving them with a two-
gamma-function (Friston et al., 1998). Predictors for the translation/rotation of the 
subject’s head were derived during the motion correction of the functional data and 
added in the design matrix. All predictors were z-transformed.  
 A random effects (RFX) GLM was computed for all runs of all subjects. For ex-
plorative analysis, the difficulty rating and the RSME rating condition were con-
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trasted with the baseline. To explore the specific effect of the effort-related RSME 
evaluation, both ratings were contrasted against each other. The resulting activa-
tion map was adjusted to a single-voxel threshold of t = 3.13 (p < 0.0096). This map 
was subsequently corrected for multiple comparisons by using the Cluster Thresh-
old estimation plugin of BrainVoyager. This plugin runs a Monte-Carlo-Simulation 
extension (Forman et al., 1995) in order to determine the minimal cluster size given 
a user-defined confidence level, which was set to alpha = .05. The minimal size for 
the current data was calculated to be 11 contiguous voxels. 
 Supra-threshold clusters of active voxels were labeled using a microatlas of the 
human brain (Mai, Voss, & Paxinos, 2007) and the Talairach daemon applet (Re-
search Imaging Center, Texas, USA). Corresponding anatomical locations and ap-
proximate Broadmann areas (where applicable) were identified for each cluster. 
4.3. Results 
All subjects were able to perform the task at a sufficient level (mean score 18.29 
correct out of 20 trials, SD = 0.91). A sufficient level was defined as 15 correct re-
sponses out of 20 trials.  
 Mean RSME scores for the single n-back conditions were 27.99 (Stdev = 20.68), 
42.91 (Stdev = 18.98) and 54.94 (Stdev = 20.71), for the 1-back, 2-back and 3-back, 
respectively. The according mean difficulty rating scores were 25.78 (Stdev = 
23.81), 50.16 (Stdev = 24.92) and 66.65 (Stdev = 26.56) (see fig. 1). There was a 
significant correlation (r = .88, p< .01) between the difficulty and RSME scores vari-
ables. There was no significant interaction effect between condition and the num-
ber of the session. Session did not have a significant main effect, either. The only 
significant main effect was elicited by condition: Pairwise comparisons of subject’s 
evaluation scores on both the RSME and the difficulty scale showed significant dif-
ferences (p< .01) between the conditions, confirming that the different n-back con-
ditions indeed differed in perceived workload in a parametric fashion. This pattern 
could be expected from the original validation research of the RSME (Zijlstra, 1993) 
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Fig. 1: Effort scores across different 
n-back conditions, illustrating the 
influence of task load on perceived 
effort. ** = p< .01 
 
As expected, the rating procedures as compared to baseline activated a large range 
of areas. Additionally to visual and motor areas, a number of working memory re-
lated areas in DLPFC and PPC became active during both rating tasks. Also, large 
clusters in the dorsal part of the mid-cingulate gyrus and in the anterior and poste-
rior insula were activated. Furthermore, the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) was acti-
vated. Various parts of the basal ganglia were activated, with strong bilateral tha-
lamic activation present in both tasks. Bilateral activity was also found in the bor-
der region of external globus pallidus (GPe) and putamen, albeit localized slightly 
more lateral in the difficulty rating condition.  
 
Region Peak X Peak Y Peak Z n (vox) t p 
Operculum -46 25 0 214 4,86 0,000504 
Anterior Insula -34 25 3 258 5,74 0,000131 
Precentral Gyrus -52 -5 42 417 7,32 0,000015 
Thalamus -22 -23 -3 396 8,30 0,000005 
Superior Temporal Sulcus -64 -26 6 1085 6,63 0,000037 
Middle occipital gyrus 5 -74 -6 9351 11,57 0,000000 
Fig. 2: Significantly more active clusters and their approximate locations in a contrast of mental effort vs. 
difficulty rating. P-values represent the peak p-value of a cluster. 
 
A contrast of the two rating conditions showed clusters of significantly stronger 
activation in the left aIC and IFG/operculum, as well as in the thalamus. Also, 
stronger activation was seen in the right inferior parietal sulcus (IPS), bilateral 
occipital gyrus and in the left superior temporal sulcus (STS). Separate fixed effects 
group analysis of the two left handed subjects did not reveal any results that would 
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point towards differences in the lateralization of the reported clusters due to hand-
edness.  
 
Fig. 3: Activation map showing 
the contrast mental effort 
rating > difficulty rating 
 
Fig. 4: Bar plot showing per-
cent signal change during 
mental effort and difficulty 
rating in left aIC. ** = p< .01 
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Fig. 5: BOLD curves showing 
percent signal change in left aIC 
during mental effort and diffi-
culty rating, relative to the start 
of the actual rating period. 
 
Fig. 6: Signal changes in left aIC 
during the execution of the n-
back task. See also fig. 1. 
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4.4. Discussion 
4.4.1. Summary of the findings 
We conducted this study to identify areas in the human brain that are relevant for 
the evaluation of mental effort. In particular, we investigated which areas would be 
significantly more active during mental effort evaluation when compared with a 
highly similar evaluation of task difficulty.  
 Our behavioral results confirmed our first hypothesis, regarding the correlation 
of difficulty and effort ratings and the induced differences in task load. As shown in 
earlier studies (Yeo & Neal, 2004), difficulty and effort ratings were correlated. 
Also, the scores followed the induced differences in a parametric fashion, illustrat-
ing the effectiveness of our task load manipulation (fig. 1).  
 The brain imaging results for both rating tasks were in line with our second 
hypothesis. Common activation in both rating tasks included generally expected 
areas recruited for the basic execution of the VAS rating task, namely various visual 
and motor areas. Common activation also included anterior and posterior cingulate 
areas and dlPFC, i.e. results were very similar as those reported in several studies 
reviewed by Lee and Siegle (2009). During the rating task we furthermore observed 
increased activation in parts of the basal ganglia, as can be expected for tasks in-
volving motor output as response.  
4.4.2. Activation in aIC 
Our main hypothesis concerned the contrast of the two rating task conditions. This 
hypothesis was confirmed: we found a cluster of significantly stronger activated 
voxels in the left aIC during mental effort evaluation (fig. 2 & 3). The aIC has been 
proposed to combine two necessary capabilities for the evaluation of mental effort: 
integrating information from different domains and making the result accessible to 
the subject as a part of self-awareness (Craig, 2009). This is in line with our find-
ings.  
 We interpret the stronger activation in the left aIC in our subjects as evidence 
that mental effort evaluation indeed relies on this integrative process, compared to 
a more rational evaluation such as one of task difficulty.  
 The proposed function of aIC in self-awareness could also be related to the 
activation pattern we found. While both the assessments of difficulty and effort 
incorporate a cognitive appraisal of the task itself, mental effort evaluation addi-
tionally relies on emotional and somatic self-related factors. This difference in the 
self-referential aspect of our two evaluations resulted in a difference of aIC activa-
tion during the rating conditions. Similar results have been found in a study by 
Modinos et al. (2009), who investigated the neural correlates of self-evaluation. 
They employed a paradigm contrasting self-referential versus non-self-referential 
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evaluation. Subjects had to evaluate the accuracy of various statements in relation 
to themselves or in relation to peers. The results of their study showed a cluster of 
activation in the left aIC, closely matching the location of the active cluster in our 
results. The left aIC showed a significantly stronger response when subjects were 
evaluating statements related to themselves contrasted with statements about 
peers. This was interpreted as evidence for the role of this region in self-related 
evaluations. In line with this evidence, we thus interpret the stronger activation in 
aIC found in our own results as reflecting the fact that mental effort evaluation re-
lied more on the effect of the task on the state experienced by the subject during 
task performance. The contrast employed in our paradigm is, thus, more specific 
than the one used by Modinos et al. (2009), in the sense that it compared two self-
centered evaluations. This explains why we did not find differences in activation in 
medial prefrontal regions as Modinos et al. reported for a contrast of self- versus 
other-related evaluations. 
 An alternative explanation given by Modinos et al. (2009) was that self-related 
evaluation merely elicits enhanced awareness of somatic and emotional infor-
mation reflected in aIC activation. This alternative interpretation is also relevant for 
the interpretation of our results, as it would imply that aIC is not actually recruited 
in the rating of mental effort, but merely becomes more activated by the resulting 
increase in self-awareness of self-interrogated somatic and emotional state. How-
ever, the results of Naccache et al. (2005) lend evidence against this interpretation. 
The disturbance in the somatic feedback loop left patient RMB bare of the capability 
to evaluate mental effort. If increased self-awareness was a mere by-product of the 
evaluative process, the process itself should not be impaired by a disturbance of the 
information streams related to self-awareness. Also, no changes were noted in pa-
tient RMB’s general levels of self-awareness, demonstrating that other domains of 
self-referential processing which rely less on somatic information can still work 
normally in the light of this specific functional deficit. Our results support this in-
terpretation, as our narrow experimental contrast of two self-centered evaluations 
did not elicit measurable differences in activation in the CMS, which is associated 
with differences in the level of general self-awareness. Our results illustrate the 
combination of processing capabilities of the aIC which are recruited significantly 
more during the evaluation of mental effort.  
 Additionally, our results suggest a more specific role of the left aIC connected to 
mental effort. When plotting the activation of the left aIC cluster during task execu-
tion, the activity varied in a monotonic fashion across the levels of task load, mir-
roring the pattern we observed in the corresponding RSME ratings (fig. 1). Similar 
observations have been reported earlier: Deary et al. (2004) found a change of acti-
vation in aIC as an effect of changing task difficulty, most prominent indeed in the 
left aIC. Although their design included no evaluations of task difficulty or mental 
effort, their behavioral results suggest effective changes in mental workload across 
the different levels of task difficulty. This indicates that in the case of mental effort, 
the left aIC has not only a role in offline evaluation, but also in experiencing mental 
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effort during task execution. Shared insular regions that are recruited both during 
perceptual encoding of a self-related experience and during later evaluation with a 
VAS have been reported earlier (Kong et al., 2006).  
 Our findings are in line with evidence from these two studies, demonstrating 
that the experience of mental effort and later evaluations thereof share underlying 
neural structures. 
4.4.3. Other involved brain areas 
Additionally to the activation in left aIC, our maps showed a number of other areas 
that were stronger activated during mental effort evaluation than during task diffi-
culty evaluation.  
 We interpret the activity in the left IFG / operculum as a result of the proposed 
strong connectivity between aIC and IFG / operculum (Craig, 2009). The activity in 
the left thalamus is in our view a sign of the heightened activity of the somatic loop, 
which in this case conveys information about bodily states to higher cognitive are-
as. The thalamic activation in our data was most prominent in the posterior ventral 
part of the thalamus. This part has been shown to project towards the aIC and the 
operculum. These projections have been proposed to play an important role in the 
awareness and evaluation of bodily states (Craig, 2002).  
 We also found a substantial cluster of stronger activated voxels in the left STS. 
Modinos et al. also reported a cluster in the superior temporal region, albeit contra-
lateral to our results, in the right superior temporal gyrus (STG).  
 Their interpretation is that self-evaluation includes the estimation of what oth-
ers might think about one. The STG has been reported to play a role in such theory-
of-mind-related processes (Frith & Frith, 2006). 
 Although we cannot rule out a similar explanation for our findings, our own 
interpretation is that the activation in STS is not related to a social feature of mental 
effort evaluation. The superior temporal area, especially the STS, is a functionally 
diverse region. It has been proposed that it might actually not be divided in special-
ized functional subregions, but that it provides a supportive role for different cogni-
tive processes (Hein & Knight, 2008). Our interpretation of the activation in the 
superior temporal region in our results is thus that it provided a supportive role. 
Differences in the task difficulty VAS and the RSME might have accounted for part 
of the reported clusters in our results as well; the difficulty scale did not use the 
eleven anchor points of the RSME, but merely three indications of difficulty. This 
already resulted in a richer visual stimulation, which we attribute as the cause of 
the more active clusters in the occipital cortex. The effects of the more precise scal-
ing of the RSME might have affected the rating as such as well. The subjects might 
have tried to place their rating more precisely on a designated point on the RSME, 
compared with placing it in a general area on the difficulty scale. This would explain 
the stronger recruitment of the primary motor cortex, but also of the IPS as an area 
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which has been shown to be essential for numerical distance processing (Ansari, 
Garcia, Lucas, Hamon, & Dhital, 2005).  
4.4.4. Conclusion 
The goal of this study was to investigate the neural correlates of mental effort eval-
uation. By employing the specific contrast between the objective evaluation of task 
difficulty and the subjective evaluation of mental effort, we were able to identify a 
number of brain areas that partake stronger in this process. The relation of mental 
effort evaluation with somatic awareness had been proposed earlier on the basis of 
the observations in patient RMB (Naccache et al., 2005). These findings, together 
with the theoretical implications of the integrated model of mental effort regarding 
integration and awareness, made an involvement of the aIC plausible. Our results 
support the view that the aIC unifies two important capabilities necessary for men-
tal effort evaluation. This, together with the stronger activation in the left thalamus, 
demonstrates the importance of somatic information for the emotionally salient 
awareness and evaluation of the self.  
 The relation between the RSME scores and the activation in left aIC during task 
performance suggests further research in this direction. Future studies could inves-
tigate the effect of various manipulations of mental workload on this area, which 
would solve the question if the apparent similarity originates in changes of task 
load or total perceived mental workload. Manipulating the state load, a variable 
which remained constant in the present study, could help to attribute these effects. 
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Abstract 
The left anterior Insular Cortex (laIC) has been shown to play a role in the self-
evaluation of mental effort investment after performing a task. The amount of expe-
rienced effort investment related to carrying out a task depends on both task char-
acteristics and the state of the person who carries out the task.  
 Earlier studies have also shown that laIC activation covariates with the task 
load during performance. The question remains if changes in laIC activation covari-
ate only with task load, or rather with changes in experienced mental effort. In our 
study, we manipulate task as well as state load to identify brain areas which react 
to changes in experienced mental effort. 12 healthy participants performed an n-
back task before and after either an exhausting or a free day while measuring brain 
activation with fMRI. Subjective mental effort was measured using the Rating Scale 
Mental Effort (RSME) and was found to be influenced by both task and state load 
changes, with an interaction of task and state effects on the exhaustive day. While 
bilateral anterior Insular Cortex (aIC) and several other areas reacted to changes in 
task load, only laIC also showed the same interaction effect that was present in the 
effort ratings. Available literature shows that laIC is involved in processes highly 
relevant to mental effort experience. This includes the representation of task rules 
and strategies, performance monitoring, and awareness of stressful stimuli. We 
propose that laIC unifies several functions which serve to manage effortful behav-
ior.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
E F F O R T  I N V E S T M E N T  M O D U L A T E S  I N S U L A R  A C T I V I T Y  
 77 
5.1. Introduction 
5.1.1 Scope of the study 
In the field of occupational psychology, the amount of effort an operator needs to 
invest to perform a task is a crucial factor in designing work places and interfaces. 
Mental effort investment refers to the energy invested in the task and is accompa-
nied by a subjective feeling of strain, and its prolonged investment can pose a con-
siderable stress on the organism. This, in turn, can lead to a depletion of resources, 
which can jeopardize further performance (Hockey, 1997). The amount of effort 
necessary for an individual to carry out a mental task is influenced by both the task 
difficulty and the individual’s current state (Mulder, 1986). The subjectively experi-
enced amount of mental effort can be measured using various instruments such as 
the one-dimensional Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME; (Zijlstra, 1993). In order to 
measure all changes in mental effort investment, such instruments need to be sen-
sitive to changes in the amount of effort experienced by the operator, and this abil-
ity has been confirmed in the original validation research of the RSME.  
 Next to rating scales, which can only be applied after task performance, various 
attempts have been made to also identify physiological indicators of acute mental 
effort investment. Such physiological indicators would enable the measurement of 
mental effort investment during task performance, without interrupting the task. 
Additionally, if a physiological indicator of mental effort reacts in the same way to 
changes in effort-inducing factors, this would provide evidence validating cognitive 
models of mental effort and the subjective self-report measurement instruments 
based on them. 
 Until now, research of such variables has targeted accessible, mostly peripheral 
variables, such as changes in cardiac functioning. Although certain components in 
these changes appeared to be promising (Mulder, 1986) , more recent studies have 
demonstrated that these components lack the universal sensitivity necessary to 
map changes in mental effort expenditure (Veltman and Gaillard, 1996); (Nickel 
and Nachreiner, 2003). In the present study, we investigated the presence of indica-
tors of mental effort investment directly in the brain. Such a direct approach has the 
advantage of eliminating the majority of distortions that might influence peripheral 
variables. A candidate for such an indicator would be the activity of the left anterior 
Insular Cortex (laIC). In an earlier study (Otto et al., 2012), we already identified 
this region as specifically involved during post-task self-evaluation of mental effort. 
Observations from this earlier study and a number of isolated findings from several 
other studies suggest an effort-dependent variation in laIC activation during task 
execution as well. In the current work, we describe the first coherent study into the 
reactivity of laIC to changes in mental effort.  
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5.1.2. Mental effort, state demands and task demands 
Performing a mental task, no matter how simple, requires regulative action from an 
individual. To ensure successful task completion, it takes monitoring and control-
ling of attention, information processing and behavior. The individual will also need 
to maintain a state of arousal that is suitable for performing the task. Together, all 
the regulative actions that an individual needs to perform are referred to as the 
mental workload. The integrated model of mental effort (Mulder, 1986) refers to 
two sources of demands: The task demands and the state demands. All regulative 
actions that are determined by the task itself, such as the need to control attention, 
information processing or responses, form the task demands. These can be varied 
by changes in task complexity, such as the number of items that need to be main-
tained in a working memory task. All factors that make it necessary for the individ-
ual to take regulative action in order to reach and maintain a psycho-physiological 
working state that allows task performance, however, form the state demands. Any 
mismatch of the actual and the required state of the individual, as for example in a 
situation where the individual is fatigued, increases the state demands,  
 The combination of these demands forms the total mental workload that a giv-
en task poses for an individual at a specific moment. In order to meet the mental 
workload, an individual needs to invest an according amount of mental effort. In the 
integrated model of mental effort, this is seen as a finite resource that fuels all regu-
lative action. Mental effort is limited, thus it must be invested in a sustainable way. 
5.1.3. Measuring mental effort 
The fact that the amount of mental effort available to an individual is limited has 
important implications in the field of occupational psychology. On the one hand, in 
work environments where operator failure might entail critical consequences, it is 
vital to limit the total workload to an amount which is safely within the margin of 
the operator’s resource. When designing such work environments, both the task 
complexity at every moment, but also the changes in the operator’s state during the 
course of sustained performance need to be taken into account.  
 Investing effort as such is a willful action that results from the decision of an 
individual to accept a performance goal. Effort is invested to regulate all actions 
needed to reach the performance goal. At the same time, the investment of effort is 
experienced by the individual. The nature of this perception has been categorized 
as a quasi-emotional appraisal of one’s own state (Damasio, 1999), meaning that 
one becomes conscious of how investing effort in a particular context influences 
one`s state. 
 This subjective experience of mental effort investment by an individual enables 
the use of self-report instruments to quantify the amount of mental effort that this 
individual needs to invest to perform a certain task. One-dimensional rating scales 
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belong to the most commonly used and reliable self-report instruments that are 
employed in the field (Verwey and Veltman, 1996).  
 A point of concern remains in the fact that the concept of mental effort itself 
and the instruments constructed on its assumptions have been developed largely 
on the basis of behavioral evidence. The identification of objective variables that 
are sensitive to the same changes in demands would help to evaluate these assump-
tions and the derived instruments. Peripheral physiological variables were thor-
oughly investigated as indicators. One of the first and most promising variables was 
the 0.1 Hz heart rate variability (HRV) component (Mulder 1980). The evidence on 
the sensitivity of the 0.1 Hz component is inconclusive, though. More recently, it has 
been stated that the component might correspond rather to mental stress (Nickel 
and Nachreiner, 2003). While HRV and other peripheral variables are easily acces-
sible, they only mediate the effect of mental effort expenditure in an indirect way. 
The possibility to infer a psychological variable from a physiological one depends 
on the specific connection between the two, and a causal relation is rarely found 
(Cacioppo and Tassinary, 1990). One of the exceptions is the relation of psychologi-
cal processes and measures of brain functioning. Although this relation is also far 
from trivial, it can be used to gain fundamental insights into the neural correlates of 
cognitive concepts. As stated before, mental effort is a highly abstract concept. Find-
ing a relation between the factors which have been found influential for it and 
measures of brain functioning would make it possible to validate and possibly re-
fine the instruments used to measure it. 
5.1.4. The role of laIC in self-reports of mental effort investment 
In an earlier study (Otto et al., 2012), we already investigated which brain regions 
are specifically related to post-task self-evaluation of mental effort. Changes in re-
gional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) were measured with functional Magnetic Reso-
nance Imaging (fMRI) while participants performed short blocks of an n-back work-
ing memory task. The task had three levels of difficulty (1-, 2- and 3-back). After 
each block, the participants had to rate their experienced mental effort investment 
and the task difficulty on the RSME and on a separate visual analogue scale (VAS) 
modeled after the RSME. The contrast of subjective mental effort and task difficulty 
was chosen to compare similar task-related evaluations using similar instruments. 
A cluster of voxels in laIC showed increases in rCBF during mental effort evaluation 
compared to during difficulty evaluation. Yet, our results suggest a role of this area 
not only during post-task mental effort experience but also for mental effort expe-
rience, as the beta weights of the laIC cluster varied in a monotonic fashion over the 
levels of difficult during task performance.  
 This observation from our earlier study is in line with theoretical accounts and 
evidence from other studies: Brass and Haggard (2010) propose in a recent meta-
analysis that the aIC provides an affective evaluation of the outcome of an inten-
tional action, which serves as a guidance for sustainable, yet successful perfor-
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mance. The authors suggest that an increase in effort investment should be related 
to an increased recruitment of aIC, as the evaluation of the outcome of high-effort-
actions would be of increased importance for future decisions of effort investment. 
This view is corroborated by several observations of task-load-modulations of rCBF 
in aIC, most prominent on the left side (Deary et al., 2004); (Chee et al., 2004). 
These studies demonstrate evidence for a relation between task-related changes in 
workload and activation in laIC. 
 However, the amount of experienced mental effort expenditure depends not 
only on the task, but also on the state of the person. If laIC is indeed reactive to 
changes in experienced mental workload, this should also hold true under circum-
stances in which the workload varies as a result of differences in state, that is when 
a sub-optimal working state requires the operator to invest more effort to perform 
an unchanged task (Zijlstra, 1993); (Zijlstra, 1996).  
 There are few studies investigating the effects of state differences on task relat-
ed brain activation in healthy participants. Mostly, state change is related to induc-
tion of fatigue. Examples of fatigue-inducing manipulations include sleep depriva-
tion (Drummond et al., 2004), or administration of fatigue-inducing tryptophan 
(Morgan et al., 2006). Other examples of state change include recent (but not acute) 
consumption of cannabis versus sustained abstinence (Schweinsburg et al., 2010) 
or vaccination-related acute inflammation (Harrison et al., 2009). The results of 
these studies with respect to the aIC are inconsistent, and also the effects of the 
manipulation on experienced mental workload are either absent or not measured 
directly. Schweinsburg et al. (2010) investigated the effect of recent cannabis use 
versus sustained abstinence on fMRI - assessed brain activation during a spatial 
working memory (SWM) task and a vigilance control task. As expected, SWM task 
performance, compared to vigilance task performance, lead to an increase in activa-
tion in a number of cortical areas. The main finding, however, was that this increase 
was stronger for recent users compared to abstinent controls in several regions, 
including the bilateral aIC. This increase was more pronounced in laIC. While there 
was no direct measure of mental effort expenditure, there was a trend suggesting 
increased reaction time during the SWM task in recent users. It could be argued 
that previous cannabis use does not per se constitute a state difference, yet it forms 
a transient and reversible impairment to otherwise healthy brain functioning. This 
evidence indeed suggests a workload-related increased in aIC activity, albeit bilat-
eral.  
 Harrison et al. (2009) employed the acute inflammation response due to vac-
cination together with a Stroop task featuring neutral and incongruent conditions. 
Two groups of participants received either a saline or a typhoid vaccine injection at 
two sessions. The inflammatory response to the vaccine caused a feeling of sick-
ness, with increased fatigue and confusion in participants. During subsequent task 
performance while measuring changes in rCBF with fMRI, participants who re-
ceived the vaccine showed increased activation in the bilateral aIC and mid-insular 
cortex, next to anterior and mid cingulate cortices (ACC/MCC), Thalamus, amygdala 
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and the brainstem. The authors interpreted the absence of performance decrease in 
the vaccination condition as a sign of increased mental effort expenditure. This 
interpretation relies on the assumption that there was indeed an effect of treatment 
on mental workload. In that case, the findings of Harrison et al. would indeed sug-
gest that changes in workload due to changes in state modulate insular activation. 
Yet, the absence of a measurement of this variable makes this impossible to test. 
Changes in state might be related to changes in related variables such as fatigue, 
but this does not automatically result in changes in mental workload. Drummond et 
al. (2004), for example, investigated a similar rationale with 35h sleep deprivation 
versus normal sleep as experimental treatment, and a logical reasoning task at 
three levels of difficulty. While there was an effect of treatment on sleepiness as a 
state-related variable, there was no effect of treatment on perceived mental effort 
expenditure during task execution. 
 Summarizing, the current literature provides evidence which makes it seem 
plausible that state load - mediated changes in mental workload have an effect simi-
lar to that mediated by task load changes on aIC activation, possibly stronger on the 
left side. Yet, the absence of measures of mental effort expenditure in these studies 
does not allow for any conclusion in this question. Any brain region that is modu-
lated by changes in mental workload has to be sensitive to changes in both task 
load and state load alike. 
5.1.5. Aims of the current study 
In the current study, we aimed to clarify the question if laIC is reactive to changes in 
subjectively experienced effort investment due to changes in total workload. We 
approached this question by employing a design featuring both changes in state 
and task load while monitoring changes in rCBF with fMRI and changes in subjec-
tive mental effort expenditure. Thereby, we aimed to identify brain regions which 
are sensitive to a change in perceived mental effort expenditure, resulting from 
changes in both state and task demands.  
 In order to manipulate state demands, we incorporated two different experi-
mental treatments in our study. We chose to achieve changes in state by requiring 
participants to engage in sustained performance over the course of several hours, 
simulating the strain of a working day. Such long, effortful tasks have been success-
fully used to deplete the resources of participants, which leads to not only an in-
creased feeling of mental fatigue, but also to higher costs for performing otherwise 
unchanged tasks (Scholey et al., 2009); (Boksem et al., 2005). To simulate a mental-
ly exhausting day, participants absolved theoretical and practical helicopter take-
off training in the university’s helicopter simulation lab. Similar tasks have been 
successfully employed to induce variations in state load reflected by decreases in 
vigilance and increases in drowsiness (Campagne et al., 2004) as well as, most im-
portant, increases in mental workload (Riese, 1999). The other treatment consisted 
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of a day of self-chosen activities which explicitly did not incorporate any work, 
learning or other effortful activities.  
Consequently, several hypotheses can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: 
Self-ratings of fatigue, well-being and emotional exhaustion will be influenced by 
the experimental day activity. Well-being will be reduced in the afternoon of the 
work day when compared to the afternoon of the free day. Fatigue and emotional 
exhaustion, however, will be increased. 
Hypothesis 2: 
The amount of subjectively experienced mental effort, measured with the RSME, 
will be influenced by the task conditions and the experimental day activities. Higher 
task load and higher state load will lead to increased scores on the RSME. The day 
activity is logically expected to influence the ratings only after the respective days. 
 
Variations in the task load on working memory tasks affect rCBF in a number of 
cortical and subcortical regions. Ragland et al. (2002) showed an increase in rCBF 
due to increasing n-back task load in the bilateral insula, in several foci in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) , 
bilateral inferior parietal cortex and in the left thalamus. We therefore expect to 
find an increase of rCBF in these regions due to increasing task load. 
Hypothesis 3: 
Increased task demands during n-back-task performance will be reflected in in-
creased BOLD signal in the bilateral insula, DLPFC, right ACC, bilateral inferior pari-
etal cortex and in the left thalamus. 
 
The main research interest of this study is to combine changes in task- and state 
load in the same participants. Evidence from the literature leads us to expect that 
the activation in laIC will be modulated by changes in effort investment both due to 
changes in task load and due to changes in state load.  
Hypothesis 4: 
The BOLD signal in laIC will be influenced by the n-back – condition and the day-
condition. Specifically, higher task load and higher state load will lead to an in-
creased BOLD signal. We expect that the BOLD signal will thus show the same pat-
tern of modulation as the behavioral scores measured with the RSME. 
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5.2. Methods 
5.2.1. Participants 
15 (fifteen) healthy participants were recruited from the student body at Maas-
tricht University. [Mean age 24.1 years, 6 male,]  
 Participants were invited only after being screened for any condition that 
would exclude participation in MRI research. 
 MRI – naïve participants were invited to participate in the piloting scans in the 
planning phase of the experiment. This was done in order to minimize the effect of 
the unfamiliar and potentially stressful MRI environment on participants, as we 
assumed that this would interfere with the effects of our experimental manipula-
tion. 
 All participants were introduced to the working memory task and the rating 
interface before the start of the experiment. Informed consent was acquired from 
all participants before participation. 
5.2.2. Procedure 
Participants arrived at the facilities of the Maastricht Brain Imaging Center (MBIC) 
around 09:30h, (+- 1h). Previously, they were instructed to get their normal 
amount of sleep, and not to exceed moderate caffeine levels in the morning (maxi-
mum of two cups of coffee for habitual users not less than one hour pre-
experiment). The participants were then placed in the MRI scanner. Scanner-naïve 
participants were accustomed to the scanner 1-2 weeks prior to the experiment in 
order to reduce novelty effects or stress due to being exposed to the scanner for the 
first time. 
 While whole brain functional scans were acquired, participants performed a 
version of the n-back task (Gevins and Cutillo, 1993). The task consisted of 15 
blocks of one minute each. Participants had to memorize letters appearing on a 
screen and indicate through a button press response if those letters were identical 
to the letter 1, 2, or 3 trials back. Each of the three conditions was presented five 
times, in a quasi-randomized order. Performance was measured as the number of 
correct button presses within the 2000ms response window. Participants received 
feedback on each trial in order to be able to adjust their effort expenditure. After 
each one-minute block, participants rated their subjective expenditure of mental 
effort on the RSME (Zijlstra, 1993). The task and the RSME were programmed in E-
Prime (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., US). They were presented using E-Studio 
on a Windows XP PC connected to a MRI compatible optic system consisting of a 
projector and mirror goggles. Task and rating input was collected via an MRI com-
patible optical 2-button Joystick (Current Designs Inc., Philadelphia, USA). Partici-
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pants trained the handling of the Joystick for a brief period before the experiment 
by marking values on a VAS analogue to the one used in the actual experiment.  
 After this session, participants either underwent a 4h training session in the 
university’s helicopter cockpit mock-up or spend the same amount of time with 
self-chosen, low-effort activities. The training treatment was designed to induce the 
exhaustion level of a demanding work day. The helicopter training session consist-
ed of a short theoretical instruction on helicopter take-off procedures and a practi-
cal part of trying to perform a takeoff procedure according to the presented guide-
lines. At around 16:00h, participants returned to the MRI lab. After again indicating 
their level of exhaustion on the two VAS, they were placed back in the scanner. The 
participants performed the same n-back paradigm as in the morning session. All 
subjects both underwent the free day treatment and the work day treatment in 
quasi-randomized order. 
5.2.3. Measurements 
In order to check for the effectiveness of the working day to induce a change in 
state, we had our participants provide self-ratings of exhaustion, fatigue and well-
being. The degree of exhaustion was rated on two self-constructed 0-150 Visual 
Analogue Scales (VAS). On one VAS participants were asked to indicate their degree 
of tiredness, on the other their degree of being rested. Scores of the latter scale 
were reversed and a mean score of the two scales was calculated. Fatigue was as-
sessed with four items from the Profiles of Mood Scale (POMS; McNair et al., 1971) 
as used for example by Sonnentag, Binnewies and Mojza (2008). Well-being was 
evaluated with four items from the revised English version of the Eigenzustands 
(“own state”) scale (EZ-Scale) (Nitsch, 1976), as used by Sonnentag and Zijlstra 
(2006). All items were rated on five-point-scales. Fatigue and well-being have been 
demonstrated to be an estimate of experienced strain (Apenburg, 1986). 
 Mental effort expenditure was rated using the RSME (Zijlstra, 1993). Partici-
pants were able to use an optical joystick device to move the cursor along the scale 
in the fMRI scanner. 
 Magnetic resonance imaging was performed on a Siemens Allegra 3T head 
scanner (Siemens AG, Erlangen, Germany) at the facilities of the Maastricht Brain 
Imaging Center.  
 Anatomical imaging was carried out with a standard ADNI T1 weighted se-
quence, Voxel size1 cubic mm; flip angle = 9 deg; TR = 2250ms; TE = 2.6ms. Whole 
brain Echo-Planar Imaging (EPI) was performed using the following parameters: 
Matrix size 64x64; slice thickness 3,5mm; Slice order descending and interleaved; 
no gap; FOV 224x224mm; TE=30ms; TR= 2000ms. Slice orientation was tilted 30 
degrees backwards in order to minimize susceptibility artifacts in the orbitofrontal 
regions (Deichmann et al., 2003)  
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5.2.4. Analysis of behavioral data 
Behavioral data was analyzed using SPSS 18. A mixed model analysis of the RSME 
scores was carried out in order to reflect the nested structure of the data. Factors 
included time-of-day (morning; T1, versus evening; T2); the day activity (working 
day, abbreviated WD, versus free day, abbreviated FD) the n-back condition (1-3) 
and the day order (first day versus second day). The day order was included in the 
model as, due to excluding a number of participants from the analysis for, the order 
of work day and free day was not balanced over the participants (4/12 starting 
with the free day). Reasons for exclusion consisted of misinterpretation of the rat-
ing instruments (1 case) and excessive movement during fMRI – measurements 
(two participants, criteria specified in section 5.2.5). The factors were centered and 
a model with interaction terms was build.  
 Well-being and fatigue items from each participant were pooled separately to 
form accumulated scores for the four respective time points (morning and after-
noon of the working day and the free day). The accumulated scores were than com-
pared using a paired-samples t-test, comparing the morning and afternoon scores 
per day and also the two afternoon scores. One subject reported a misinterpreta-
tion of the directionality on some of the items which lead to a number of missing 
values on the scales. Well-being and fatigue data from this subject was excluded 
from the behavioral analysis.  
5.2.5. Imaging data treatment 
Analysis of fMRI data was performed in BrainVoyager QX 2.3 (Brain Innovation BV, 
Maastricht, The Netherlands). Anatomical images were individually preprocessed 
by inhomogeneity correction and extracranial noise filtering. The data was subse-
quently transformed into stereotactic space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988). The 
transformed anatomical scans from all subjects were then averaged into a single 
anatomical data set used as background for the visualization of group analyses. One 
participant was excluded as we found an anatomical abnormality. The participant 
was informed of this according to the guidelines set in the MBIC standard proce-
dures. 
 The first three volumes of the functional scans were discarded because of mag-
netic saturation effects. The functional scans were preprocessed by slice scan time 
correction, motion correction and high pass filtering. Data of two subjects showed 
translation/rotation exceeding 3mm/deg. Those datasets were excluded from fur-
ther analysis. High pass filtering was performed using a General Linear Model 
(GLM) approach with a Fourier basis set which was adjusted to subtract the time 
course for predictors with up to 2 sine/cosine cycles per run and eventual linear 
trends from the time course of the data. Volume Time Course (VTC) files were cal-
culated for each separate run. 
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5.2.6. Analysis of the imaging data 
The E-Primer script for BrainVoyager (Hester Breman, Brain Innovation bv., 2009) 
was used to extract the timing information of the single conditions from the E-
Prime protocol files for each separate run. This timing information was used to 
build a design matrix. The single boxcar predictor time courses were adjusted for 
the shape and delay of the hemodynamic response by convoluting them with a two-
gamma-function (Friston et al., 1998). Predictors for the translation/rotation of the 
subject’s head were derived during the motion correction of the functional data and 
added in the design matrix. 
 A random effects (RFX) GLM was computed for the runs of all remaining 12 
participants. To identify brain areas that react to changes in task load, we computed 
a contrast over all four measurement points between 1-back and 3-back task execu-
tion. The resulting activation map was adjusted to a single-voxel threshold of t = 
4.18 (p < 0.0015). As the RSME – scores revealed an interaction of task load and 
state load see results), we then proceeded to identify brain areas in which such a 
specific would also take place. Therefore, we computed an interaction contrast in 
which the difference between the difference of 1-back and 3-back in the morning 
and the difference of 1-back and 3- back in the afternoon of the working day was 
tested. We then subtracted the same difference calculated over the free day from 
this contrast in order to remain with voxels which would show the interaction ef-
fect stronger on the working day. This was done to correct for circadian effects, 
which we assumed to be equal on both days. The resulting activation map was ad-
justed to a single-voxel threshold of t = 3.36 (p < 0.0064).  
 Both maps were subsequently corrected for multiple comparisons by using the 
Cluster Threshold estimation plugin of BrainVoyager. This plugin runs a Monte-
Carlo-Simulation extension (Forman et al., 1995) in order to determine the minimal 
cluster size given a user-defined confidence level, which was set to alpha = .05.  
 Locations of the remaining supra-threshold clusters of active voxels were local-
ized using a microatlas of the human brain (Mai et al., 2007) and the Talairach 
daemon applet (Research Imaging Center, Texas, USA).  
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Task performance 
All participants were able to perform the task successfully (group mean 1.26 errors 
per 20 trials, group SD 1.55, minimum of .63 and maximum of 2.21 errors per 20 
trials).  
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5.3.2. Self-reports 
One participant reported a misinterpretation of the scales for exhaustion and well-
being. Data from this participant was excluded from this analysis. There was a clear 
effect of the day activity on self-reports of fatigue and well-being. Fatigue was rated 
higher in the afternoon of the working day than in the morning (mean / SD: 9.91 / 
3.42 and 6.64/ 3.53; t(10) = -3.74, p<.05). It was also rated higher in the afternoon 
of the working day when compared to the afternoon of the free day (mean / SD: 
9.91 / 3.42 and 5.18 / 2.96; t(10) = 5.84, p<.05). Fatigue was actually rated lower in 
the afternoon of the free day when compared to the morning of the free day (mean 
/ SD: 5.18 / 2.96 and 6.45 / 3.36; t(10) = -2,61, p<.05). Well-being was rated higher 
in the morning of the working day than in the afternoon (mean/SD: 16.45 / 3.05 
and 13.64 / 4.23; t(10) = 3.6, p<.05). There was no difference in well-being on the 
free day. Well-being was rated higher in the afternoon of the free day than in the 
afternoon of the working day (mean / SD: 17 / 2.05 and 13.64 / 4.23; t(10) = -3.39, 
p<.05). These results show that our state manipulation worked as predicted in hy-
pothesis 1. Furthermore, fatigue was actually reduced over the course of the free 
day, which might indicate recovery from work stress unrelated to the experiment. 
5.3.3. Mental effort scores 
The mixed model analysis of the RSME scores showed several interaction effects. 
First, there was an interaction of time-of-day and the day activity (F(1,177,94) = 
4.81, p<.05). This was to be expected, as the effect of the state difference induction 
would be present after the respective day only. More important, we found an inter-
action of n-back condition with time-of-day (F(1,733.92) = 13.76, p<.05). This is in 
line with our expectations: The reported amount of mental effort expenditure is 
influenced by both the n-back condition and changes in state (which only happened 
on the evening of the working day), thus confirming hypothesis 2.  
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Fig. 1: Group means of the RSME scores over the four time points (Working Day (WD) and 
Free Day (FD), morning (T1) and evening (T2)) and the three n-back conditions. The effect 
of the three different n-back levels was influenced by the day activity at T2: At the evening
of the work day (WD_T2), the three n-back conditions did not influence the experienced 
amount of mental effort as strongly, as even the most simple n-back condition required 
more regulative action. Increasing the task load of the n-back task lead to increased self-
ratings of mental effort investment. Also, the influence of changing state load due to the
day treatment is clearly visible; at the evening of the work day, more effort was needed for
the same task. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
5.3.4. fMRI data 
The fMRI data revealed a robust effect of changes in task load over a wide range of 
brain areas. Contrasting 1-back versus 3-back, we found changes in rCBF in extend-
ed clusters in bilateral DLPFC/middle frontal gyrus (MFG), bilateral aIC, bilateral 
inferior parietal cortex, left thalamus and ACC (p<.0015). Additionally, we found 
increased activity in the right thalamus, bilateral precentral sulcus and bilateral 
precuneus (Fig.2). Except for the latter differences, this replicates the results of 
Ragland et al. (2002) and in line with our third hypothesis. 
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Fig. 2: Contrast showing 3-back > 1-back condition of the n-back task. Note the 
influence of increased task difficulty on bilateral aIC. 
 
As a second step, we computed a contrast analogue to the interaction between task 
and state load we found in the mental effort scores. 
  This contrast represents the difference between the 1-back and the 3-back 
condition of the afternoon of the working day minus the difference between 1- and 
3-back in the morning of the working day. Furthermore, we subtracted from this 
contrast the same contrast calculated over the free day. Thus, the map shows clus-
ters of voxels in which there was a significant interaction between n-back-condition 
and time-of-day on the working day, corrected for the occurrence of such an effect 
on the free day. 
 Clusters that react in this way were found in laIC (218 voxels, center of gravity 
at Talairach coordinates -31; 25; 7), at the border of the posterior medial superior 
frontal gyrus and the precentral gyrus (216 voxels, center of gravity at Talairach 
coordinates -3; -12; 57) and in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC; 417 voxels, cen-
ter of gravity at Talairach coordinates -38; -17; 51). From these clusters, only the 
one in laIC was also present in the contrast for task load. This is in line with hy-
pothesis 4.  
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Fig. 3: A cluster in laIC showed the same interaction effect that was present in the
RSME scores. The interaction of n-back difficulty*time-of-day*day activity leaves 
only clusters in which the effect of the n-back task was different in the afternoon of 
the working day compared to the morning of the working day, additionally con-
trolled for a the occurrence of the same difference on the free day. 
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Fig. 4: Beta values of the laIC cluster. Note the reduction of the influence of changing 
n-back task load at the evening of the working day, WD T2. 
5.4. Discussion 
5.4.1. Effectiveness of our experimental manipulation 
We conducted this study in order to identify brain areas which react to changes in 
mental workload caused by both changes in task load and state load. We were able 
to successfully induce said changes in experienced mental effort expenditure in our 
experiment. The different levels of the n-back task caused distinct levels of mental 
effort investment, as shown by the RSME ratings. Furthermore, spending several 
hours in an exhaustive learning task did induce state changes in our participants, as 
documented by increased fatigue and reduced well-being in the afternoon meas-
urement. This state change cannot be attributed to circadian effects, as the compar-
ison measurement on the free day did not show any reduction in well-being, and 
even revealed a decrease in fatigue. 
 The change to a suboptimal state resulted in changes to the amount of subjec-
tively experienced mental effort expenditure in our participants. After the working 
day, participants reported increased mental effort expenditure compared to all 
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other time points. Furthermore, the effect of the n-back conditions was reduced, as 
the state load consumed a more substantial portion of the available effort re-
sources.  
5.4.2. Isolating neural correlates of mental effort 
At the same time, our analysis of the fMRI data revealed a similar effect of our ex-
perimental manipulations on rCBF in laIC. We first checked for differences occur-
ring at the different levels of task load. As expected, there was indeed a stable effect 
of task load. This effect was not confined to the laIC, but included the right aIC as 
well as ACC, the DLPFC/MFG, and several parietal areas. This is in line with earlier 
research on the effect of different levels of difficulty in working memory tasks 
(Ragland et al., 2002). The main goal of this study, however, was to identify brain 
areas which also react to changes in the amount of subjective experienced mental 
effort mediated by changes in state load. When testing for the same specific interac-
tion that was present in the behavioral data, a cluster of voxels in laIC displayed 
these effects. At this point we would like to re-iterate that the interaction contrast 
reported here was performed on the whole brain, without the use of any mask. 
Thus, the occurrence of this cluster is purely due to the fact that rCBF in these 
voxels was modulated by our experimental manipulation in the same way as our 
behavioral ratings. Such a relation between subjectively experienced amount of 
mental effort and the rCBF in a brain region is unique to our knowledge. In our 
interpretation, this evidence, together with the previously shown increased activa-
tion of laIC in mental effort evaluation, demonstrate the crucial role of this struc-
ture in monitoring the balance of effort output in the face of changing resources.  
 It is important to keep in mind that the concept of mental effort involves more 
than purely the perception of acute strain. Mental effort is a limited resource, and 
its sustainable management is vital for the functioning of an organism in a larger 
context (Hockey, 1997). A meaningful evaluation of effort investment must take the 
state of the organism into account (Mulder, 1986). Supporting this interpretation, 
several studies and meta-analyses provide evidence of aIC involvement in functions 
highly relevant to the concept of mental effort. The bilateral aIC, specifically the 
more anterior part, has been identified as part of a network underlying domain-
general maintenance of task rules and strategies ((Dosenbach et al., 2008). Thus, 
aIC is involved in the representation of the actual task set, which defines the mental 
workload posed on the organism. Additionally, there is evidence that suggests that 
aIC also monitors ongoing task performance. Nelson et al. (2010) reported that in 
particular the anterior part of aIC is, additionally to top-down task control, also 
involved in integrating task-and performance-related bottom-up information. Per-
formance monitoring is essential for the adjustment of effort output under chang-
ing workload conditions (Naccache et al., 2005). 
 In summary, these accounts converge on a picture in which the aIC is at a criti-
cal junction between the experience, evaluation and investment of mental effort.  
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The left-sided lateralization of our aIC cluster does raise the question of a functional 
heterogeneity in aIC across hemispheres. A possible explanation is the reliance of 
the process of mental effort experience on certain somatic inputs. The experience of 
mental effort relies on integration of several sources of information about the self, 
and information about bodily states is thought to be crucial for this process 
(Naccache et al., 2005). In this context, (Gray et al., 2007) have proposed the laIC as 
a target site for heartbeat- evoked potentials (HEP). In their combined EEG/ECG 
study, Gray et al. contrasted a high-workload arithmetic task with a baseline count-
ing task in patients with heart problems. The high-workload task proved to be more 
stressful than the control task. Individual stress-related changes in myocardial out-
put were significantly correlated with changes in HEP amplitude in electrode sites 
close to laIC. The authors propose that laIC is the principal target site of afferent 
signals related to changes in myocardial function caused by changes in acute stress. 
Evidence from other studies supports this interpretation, as laIC activity has been 
found to be modulated also by other stressful stimuli such as increasing negative 
valence in visual stimuli (Anders et al., 2004). Another study by Wiech et al. (2010) 
found a modulation of bilateral aIC activation by increasing the expectancy of an 
imminent heat stimulus as being damaging in their participants. However, only laIC, 
and not its right counterpart, was found to increase functional connectivity with the 
midcingular gyrus, which in turn was activated more during subsequent stimulus 
application and predicted the perceived painfulness of the stimulus. Together, these 
results demonstrate that laIC serves a role in the propagation of the awareness for 
stressful conditions, not confined to a single modality or domain. Stress is not syn-
onymous to high effort investment, but already Mulder (1986) noted the close rela-
tion between those concepts when proposing the use of myocardial measurements 
as indicators of mental effort. In our interpretation, mental effort experience is 
inherently the result of integrating different information sources about the state of 
the self, with information about myocardial functioning being a necessary, but not 
sufficient component.  
5.4.2. Limitations and future directions 
The slightly unbalanced order of free day and working day due to participant exclu-
sions forms a minor concern, as a learning effect on the n-back task would not be 
completely independent from our day activity condition and hence might have af-
fected our effort ratings. However, we repeated the analysis of the effort scores 
with a completely balanced sample of 6 participants starting with the free day (2 of 
which had previously been excluded from the fMRI analysis) and 6 randomly drawn 
participants starting with the work day. This analysis showed the same effects as 
the ones we report earlier, without the possibility of contamination due to learning 
effects.  
 Future investigations should solve two questions: First, the connectivity of laIC 
with other regions. Akin to the findings of Wiech et al. (2010), in the expectancy of 
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painful stimuli, an increase in laIC activation might be paired with increased con-
nectivity to other, more specific areas. The knowledge about such connections 
would be helpful in connecting mental effort investment to other, related processes, 
and thereby to understand mental effort in a more holistic context. Two specific 
processes of interest would be the motivational processes that precede effort in-
vestment, and the emotional consequences of effort investment in terms of reward.  
 Second, future studies could help to understand the relation of HEPs and laIC 
activation related to changes in mental workload. This would potentially lead to a 
more complete understanding of the systemic processes that surround mental ef-
fort investment, which might even clarify the role of other related variables such as 
the much-discussed 0.1 Hz HRV component.  
 The present study is one of the first investigations into a concept originating in 
occupational psychology using neuroscientific methods. While other domains such 
as perception have seen great advances already, our understanding of the funda-
mental processes that take place during work is just starting to developed. The 
significance, however, is enormous: Work defines a large part of our waking adult 
life, and our interaction with the challenges posed by our occupation can have an 
influence on every other part of our lives (Paul, & Batinic, 2009). Understanding 
how the brain meets these challenges and adapts to them will help to design work 
in such a way that this interaction is beneficial for the person carrying out the work. 
The current study and our earlier work are examples of this emerging “occupation-
al neuroscience” in extending the rich knowledge of a predominantly cognitive 
discipline with the tools and methodological advances that are provided by neuro-
science. 
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Chapter 6 
Spatially distributed effects of mental 
exhaustion on Resting-State fMRI 
networks: An ICA-based analysis of the 
resting human brain after sustained 
cognitive performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted as Esposito, F., Otto, T., Zijlstra, F. R. H., & Goebel, R. (2013). Spatially 
distributed effects of mental exhaustion on functional MRI networks: An ICA-based 
analysis of the resting human brain after sustained cognitive performance. 
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Abstract 
Brain activity during rest is spatially coherent over functional connectivity net-
works called resting-state networks (RSNs). In resting-state functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (RS-fMRI), independent component analysis (ICA) yields spa-
tially distributed RSN representations reflecting distinct mental processes, such as 
intrinsic (default) or extrinsic (executive) attention, and sensory inhibition or exci-
tation. These aspects can be related to different treatments or subjective experienc-
es. Among these, exhaustion is a common psychological state induced by prolonged 
mental performance. Using repeated RS-fMRI measurements and ICA, we explored 
the effect of several hours of sustained cognitive performances on the resting hu-
man brain. 
 RS-fMRI was repeated on healthy volunteers in two days, with and without, and 
before, during and after, an intensive psychological treatment (skill training and 
sustained practice with a flight simulator). After each scan, subjects rated their level 
of exhaustion and performed an N-back task. ICA maps from baseline scans were 
clustered within and between subjects, yielding RSN templates. Selected RSN com-
ponents from all scans were then evaluated to detect any changes induced by the 
sustained mental performance. 
 The intensive treatment had a significant effect on exhaustion and effort rat-
ings, but no effects on N-back performances. Significant changes in the most ex-
hausted state were observed in the early visual processing and the anterior default 
mode networks (enhancement) and in the right and left fronto-parietal executive 
networks (suppression), suggesting that mental exhaustion is associated with a 
more idling brain state and that internal attention processes are facilitated to the 
detriment of more extrinsic processes. As the described application of ICA to RS-
fMRI has highlighted these effects before performance degradation, this technique 
may inspire future indicators of the level of fatigue in the neural attention system. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI, Ogawa et al., 1990) in the absence of 
experimental tasks and behavioral responses, performed with the subject in a re-
laxed “resting state” (RS-fMRI) allows measuring the amount of spontaneous blood-
oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal synchronization within and between multi-
ple regions across the entire brain (Biswal et al., 1995). In fact, RS-fMRI activity is 
characterized by low frequency (0.01-0.1Hz) BOLD signal fluctuations, which are 
topologically organized as multiple spatially distributed functional connectivity 
networks called resting-state networks (RSNs) (van de Ven et al., 2004; 
Damoiseaux et al., 2006; De Luca et al., 2006; Mantini et al., 2007; van den Heuvel et 
al., 2009). As the RSN constituent regions partially or totally overlap with typical 
brain activations induced by perceptual and cognitive tasks (Gusnard and Raichle, 
2001;Smith et al., 2009), the study of one or more RSNs has allowed a system-level 
functional description of several mental processes and the characterization of the 
associated brain status. More recently, by repeating RS-fMRI scans under different 
experimental conditions, it has been possible to relate these processes to (and ma-
nipulate by) externally modifiable factors, such as different pharmacological treat-
ments or psychological experiences (Albert et al., 2009; Esposito et al., 2010; 
Khalili-Mahani et al., 2011). 
 Independent component analysis (ICA) (Hyvarinen et al., 2001), if applied to 
whole-brain fMRI time-series, allows decomposing a single data set into a series of 
activation images called ICA “components” with associated time-courses of activa-
tion, without the need to select a specific temporal profile or constrain the anatomi-
cal space of interest. While some of the ICA components describe artifacts and other 
noise sources in the data, other components describe the BOLD signal temporal 
correlations within and between functionally connected brain regions (McKeown et 
al., 1998). However, unlike “seed-based” functional connectivity analysis approach-
es, the spatial distribution of ICA components does not rely on targeting one or 
another brain region for the analysis. Moreover, in RS-fMRI, several ICA compo-
nents correspond to highly reproducible RSNs (Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Mantini et 
al., 2007), suggesting how ICA can be used for both characterizing and mapping 
RSN functional connectivity in a region-independent fashion, and producing sepa-
rate spatially distributed (voxel-level) representations of distinct mental processes, 
such as, e. g., attention and perception, in a task-independent fashion. 
 Exhaustion is a common psycho-physiological state after prolonged mental 
performance. It reflects an individual’s need for substantial recovery that arises 
after sustained expenditure of mental effort to meet task demands (Sonnentag and 
Zijlstra, 2006). Exhaustion is also associated with an increased feeling of fatigue as 
well as an increase in perceived mental load under unchanged task conditions 
(Zijlstra, 1993). Earlier studies have demonstrated that control of attention, moni-
toring of one’s actions and response planning in complex tasks are impaired in 
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relation to the buildup of mental fatigue (Boksem, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006; van der 
Linden, Frese, & Meijman, 2003). These impairments have two potential conse-
quences: either a decrease of performance or an increase of mental effort expendi-
ture to maintain the same level of performance (Hockey, 1997). 
 The main goal of the present work was to establish and characterize a possible 
connection between mental exhaustion and the “baseline” mental activity, as repre-
sented by the unconstrained spatial distribution of the ICA-derived RSNs. To this 
end, we use RS-fMRI and an ICA-based methodology to investigate the effect of 
sustained performance over the course of several hours on the RSNs of healthy 
participants. 
 Our RS-fMRI design incorporated both a free day and a working day for all par-
ticipants to control for circadian effects (Bartlett et al., 1988). In both days RS-fMRI 
scans were acquired at the beginning and the end of the day at the same daytimes 
(+/- 30 minutes), corresponding for the working day to a period before the begin-
ning and after the ending of a number of exhausting activities. To maximize the 
likelihood of inducing exhaustion in all subjects, we used completely unfamiliar 
tasks, as these normally demand the highest regulative efforts (Hacker et al., 1978). 
Specifically, we chose to confront the subjects for the first time with a flight simula-
tor, which is expected to stimulate many concurrent and complex brain activities in 
a real world scenario. 
 ICA decompositions were performed on all RS-fMRI scans. The ICA maps from 
reference scans (free day or beginning of the day) were hierarchically “clustered” 
within subjects (across days) and between subjects, yielding RSN templates which 
were unbiased with respect to the factor of interest. Corresponding RSN compo-
nents were then evaluated in a second-level analysis to detect any "enhancement" 
or "suppression" effects induced by the sustained mental performance. 
 In addition to RS-fMRI, we also collected behavioral data at all time points to 
assess the degree of self-reported exhaustion and verify the possible consequences 
of exhaustion on cognitive performance and mental effort during a standard N-back 
task. 
 We hypothesize that the treatment will lead to an increased level of exhaustion 
and that the N-back task will be more challenging for the subjects after treatment. 
While this will not necessarily lead to a decrease in performance, we expect that 
subjects will need to invest more effort to control the cognitive processes that are 
required for task performance. As a consequence, we anticipate that, compared to 
the free day, a day spent with sustained performance would not only increase the 
(self-reported) levels of exhaustion, but also proportionally influence the RS-fMRI 
activity in one or more RSNs, causing significant change in the spatial distribution 
of the corresponding ICA components. Specifically, we expect to find networks that 
have been associated with maintaining the focus of attention on a task to be affect-
ed and that this effect could manifest itself in a loss of coherence in networks that 
play a role in actively maintaining attention, such as the fronto-parietal executive 
network (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Another possibility would be to find an 
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increased coherence in networks known to be negatively correlated to attention-
maintaining networks, such as the default mode network (DMN) (Uddin et al., 
2009). 
6.2. Methods 
6.2.1. Participants 
11 healthy participants (mean age 22.7 years, 4 males) were recruited from the 
Maastricht University student community. In order to minimize potential artifacts 
in the lower regions of the frontal cortex, we excluded candidates with orthodontic 
retainers. Screened participants were invited for the testing session. All partici-
pants gave informed consent before the start of the experiment. 
6.2.2. Tasks and Experimental Procedure 
Participants arrived at the lab at the facilities of the Maastricht Brain Imaging Cen-
ter around 09:30h, (+- 1h). Previously, they were instructed to get their normal 
amount of sleep, and not to exceed moderate caffeine levels in the morning (maxi-
mum of two cups of coffee for habitual users not less than one hour pre-
experiment). The degree of exhaustion was rated on two 0-150 Visual Analogue 
Scales (VAS). On one VAS participants were asked to indicate their degree of tired-
ness, on the other their degree of being rested. Scores of the latter scale were re-
versed and a mean score of the two scales was calculated. 
 The participants were then placed in an MRI scanner and the resting state func-
tional and anatomical image data were recorded (see below for MRI parameters). 
Afterwards, participants performed a version of the n-back task (Gevins and Cutillo, 
1993). The task consisted of 15 blocks of one minute each. Participants had to 
memorize letters appearing on a screen and indicate through a button press re-
sponse if those letters were identical to the letter 1, 2, or 3 trials back. Each of the 
three conditions was presented five times, in a quasi-randomized order. Perfor-
mance was measured as the number of correct button presses within the 2000ms 
response window. Participants received feedback on each trial in order to be able 
to adjust their effort expenditure. After each one-minute block, participants rated 
their subjective expenditure of mental effort on the Rating Scale Mental Effort 
(Zijlstra, 1993). The task and the RSME were programmed in E-Prime (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc., US). They were presented using E-Studio on a Windows XP PC 
connected to an MRI compatible optic system consisting of a projector and mirror 
goggles. Task and rating input was collected via an MRI compatible optical 2-button 
Joystick (Current Designs Inc., Philadelphia, USA). Participants trained the handling 
of the Joystick for a brief period before the experiment by marking values on a VAS 
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analogue to the one used in the actual experiment. Also, in order to avoid learning 
effects or effects of being exposed to the MRI environment for the first time, all 
subjects performed 15 blocks of the n-back task while being scanned at a separate 
session around 1-2 weeks before the actual study. 
 After this session, participants either underwent a 4h practice session in the 
university’s helicopter cockpit mock-up or spent the same amount of time with self-
chosen, low-effort activities. The practice session was organized in such a way to 
induce the exhaustion level of a demanding work day. 
 The helicopter practice session consisted of a short theoretical instruction on 
helicopter take-off procedures and a practical part of trying to perform a takeoff 
procedure according to the presented guidelines. After around 2h, subjects re-
turned to the MRI lab. Here, they again rated their degree of exhaustion on the two 
VAS and were scanned with the same resting state instructions and scanning pa-
rameters as in the morning. This midday session only took place on the working 
day.  
 After 2 more helicopter practice hours, participants returned to the MRI lab at 
around 16:00h. After again indicating their level of exhaustion on the two VAS 
scales, they were placed back in the scanner. We recorded resting state data with 
the same parameters and instructions as in the previous sessions. Afterwards, par-
ticipants performed the same n-back paradigm as in the morning session. All sub-
jects underwent both the free day treatment and the work day treatment in quasi-
randomized order. In summary, each subject had five RS-fMRI scans, which for the 
sake of brevity has been labeled according to the day, free day (FD) or working day 
(WD) and to the time point (T1, T2 and T3). A graphical description of the study 
protocol is shown in figure 1. 
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Fig. 1: The research design consisted of two days. On the free day, participants were in the lab only in 
the morning and in the afternoon. In between, they performed self-chosen, low-effort activities. On the 
working day, morning and afternoon schedules were kept identical, however, an additional resting state 
measurement was included in the noon. Time scale is not proportional see methods for timing infor-
mation.  
RS = resting state; FT = flight task. 
6.2.3. Behavioral data analysis 
Analysis of the behavioral data was conducted in SPSS 18. Behavioral scores of the 
two exhaustion scales were pooled after reversion of the “rested” scale. Exhaustion 
and RSME ratings and the number of errors made on the n-back task were z-
standardized per participant. For the analysis, we only used the ratings at T1 and 
T3. One participant reported difficulties with the exhaustion scale and therefore 
data from this participant were excluded from all analyses. For the analysis of the 
exhaustion scores, we performed a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
time-of-day (morning: T1 versus evening: T3) and the day activity (work day: WD 
vs free day: FD) as factors. The dependent variable was the normalized exhaustion 
score. As the results showed a significant interaction of the time of the day and the 
day activity, we subsequently contrasted the scores per level of daytime and day 
activity. 
 For the effort data, an initial exploratory GLM of effort scores at T1 showed an 
unexpected effect of day activity at T1. We suspected that this might show learning 
effects for the n-back tasks. Due to exclusion of 3 participants (see above in this 
section and section 6.2.5), the order of the working day and the free day were not 
balanced, as 6 of the remaining 8 participants started with the working day. We 
thus included the order of test days (first versus second day) as covariate. The sub-
sequent GLMs that we calculated separately for T1 and T3 thus included day activi-
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ties and n-back conditions as factors and the order of test days as a covariate. An 
influence of our treatment on performance was tested with an identical GLM, only 
this time using number of errors as the dependent variable. 
6.2.4. MRI and fMRI data acquisition 
The participants were placed in a Siemens Allegra 3T head scanner (Siemens AG, 
Erlangen, Germany). Respiratory and pulse measurement devices in the form of an 
expandable breath sensor and an infrared finger clip were fitted on the partici-
pants.  
 The resting state data were recorded with the participant’s eyes closed and the 
instruction to stay awake, but to not engage in any specific mental activity for the 
time of the scan. Whole brain Echo-Planar Imaging (EPI) was performed using the 
following parameters: Matrix size 64x64; slice thickness 3 mm; Slice order descend-
ing and interleaved; no gap; FOV 192x192mm; TE=30ms; TR= 2000ms, 180 repeti-
tions. Slice orientation was tilted in order to minimize susceptibility artifacts in the 
orbitofrontal regions (Deichmann et al., 2003). Anatomical imaging was carried out 
with a standard Alzheimer Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI) complaint T1 
weighted sequence, voxel size1 cubic mm; flip angle = 9 deg; TR = 2250ms; TE = 
2.6ms. 
6.2.5. MRI and fMRI data preparation 
Standard (f)MRI image data preparation, normalization and pre-processing and 
statistical analysis and visualization were performed with the BrainVoyager QX 
software (Brain Innovation B.V., The Netherlands) (Goebel et al., 2006). Functional 
data preprocessing included the correction for slice scan timing acquisition, the 3D 
rigid body motion correction and the application of a temporal high-pass filter with 
cut-off set to 2 cycles per time-course. One participant showed excessive (>4mm) 
movement in at least one of the scanning runs. Additionally, data from one run of 
another participant were lost due to a file transfer error. Data from both of these 
participants were excluded from all analyses. Structural and functional data of the 
remaining 8 subjects were co-registered and spatially normalized to the Talairach 
standard space. In the course of this procedure, the functional images were 
resampled to an isometric 3 mm grid covering the entire Talairach box. 
 Although ICA separates neural activity from physiological artefacts in most 
cases, it has been also reported that in some cases a component automatically iden-
tified as RSN was the same as the component identified as respiration-related (Birn 
et al., 2008). Therefore, to account for possible BOLD effects due to cardiac pulsa-
tion and respiratory cycle (Birn et al., 2008) physiological noise correction was 
performed on each functional scan using the RETROICOR technique (Glover et al., 
2000). Time-courses for components of heart rate, respiration and respiration vol-
ume per time were created from the recorded physiological signals at the fMRI 
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sampling rate using Matlab scripts (The Mathworks, United States) available from 
the AFNI suite (Cox, 1996) and used, together with the motion estimate time-
courses available from the previous 3D rigid body motion correction, as predictors 
in single-study general linear model (GLM) analysis (Friston et al., 1995) of each 
functional scan. Using the residual time-courses from this GLM allowed us to re-
gress out possible signal fluctuations time-locked with the phase of cardiac and 
respiratory cycles and residual movement-related signal fluctuations. 
6.2.6. Resting-state fMRI data analysis 
Single-subject and group-level ICA analyses were performed on the pre-processed 
functional time series and the estimated independent components using two plug-
in extensions of BrainVoyager QX implementing the fastICA algorithm (Hyvarinen, 
1999) and the self-organizing group-level ICA (sog-ICA) algorithm (Esposito et al., 
2005;Esposito and Goebel, 2011). 
 For each subject and each scan, 30 independent components were extracted 
and scaled to spatial z-scores (i.e. the number of standard deviations of their whole-
brain spatial distribution). These values express the relative amount a given voxel 
is modulated by the activation of the component (McKeown et al., 1998) and hence 
reflect the amplitude of the correlated fluctuations within the corresponding func-
tional connectivity network (effect size): within the same component, positive and 
negative ICA values respectively reflect in-phase or out-of-phase fluctuations of a 
voxel with respect to the network activation. The final number of ICA components 
is a free parameter, which has previously been either empirically determined or 
estimated (Calhoun et al., 2009) as the number of principal components retained in 
the multivariate data. This number typically lies between 20 and 60 depending on 
the data. In the present work we chose to keep a number of principal components 
corresponding to one sixth of the number of time points (Greicius et al., 2007) and 
accounting for more than 99.9% of the total variance. 
 The group ICA analysis was conducted in two steps. In the first step, the base-
line scans from both days (FD-T1 and WD-T1) were submitted to a "hierarchical" 
sog-ICA analysis (van de Ven et al., 2009). The purpose of this first step was to de-
termine the most representative RSN template maps to be used in the second step. 
To avoid day- and treatment bias, the baseline scans of the two days were pooled 
together in the first level of the hierarchical sog-ICA and the scans corresponding to 
the exhausted states were not included. The final result of the first step consisted of 
30 clusters of 8 components (one per subject) and this was the basis of a random-
effects analysis which was conducted as a 1-factor ANOVA with 1 within-subject 
factor ("cluster membership") and subjects as random observations. From this 
ANOVA, we produced 1-sample t-test maps (one for each cluster) and identified at 
least seven of the most relevant RSN components as reported and illustrated in 
previous studies (see, e. g., Mantini et al., 2007). For each identified RSN, an RSN 
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template mask was obtained by applying a voxel-level threshold of P=0.05 (Bonfer-
roni corrected). 
 In the second step, all RSN template masks were used to select one component 
per subject per RSN in each separate scan (Greicius et al., 2004;Greicius et al., 
2008). For each RSN, we selected five best-fitting RSN components per subject, one 
component per condition, and ultimately submitted 32 individual components (4 
components per condition: FD/WD_T1/T3, 8 subjects) to a new random effects 
analysis which was conducted as a 2-factor ANOVA with 2 within subject factors: 
"day" (F vs D) and "time point ("T1 vs T3"). In order to isolate exhaustion-induced 
effects, from this 2-way ANOVA, we combined three linear contrasts, respectively 
accounting for (i) the effect of the treatment across days at T3: [WD-T3 vs FD-T3], 
(ii) the effect of treatment in the working day: [WD-T3 vs WD-T1] and (iii) the ef-
fect of treatment across days and time points [WD-T3 vs FD-T1]. The third contrast 
was added to exclude any interaction effects implied by the contrast [FD-T3 < FD-
T1] and not by the contrast [WD-T3>WD-T1]. Combining all these inequalities 
yields: [3*WD-T3>WD-T1+FD-T1+FD-T3], which is the linear contrast that we have 
tested to identify the regions with statistically significant effects of "enhancement" 
or "suppression" of the regional RS-fMRI oscillations. Regional effects were only 
accepted for compact clusters surviving the joint application of a voxel- and a clus-
ter-level threshold, which were chosen using a non-parametric randomization ap-
proach. Namely, an initial uncorrected threshold was applied (p=0.01) to all voxels 
and, then, a minimum cluster size was calculated that protected against false posi-
tive clusters at 5% after 500 Monte Carlo simulations (Forman et al., 1995;Goebel 
et al., 2006). To further correct for the number of studied RSNs, a cluster-corrected 
level of 5/N% was considered, N being the number of RSNs selected in the first step 
of the analysis (and therefore the number of actual 2-ANOVA contrasts). For re-
gions passing the full correction criterion or, for an exploratory analysis, at least the 
cluster-level correction criterion, individual ICA z-scores were extracted for the 
scans from time points WD-T2 and WD-T3, averaged over all voxels and used for a 
linear correlation analysis with the degrees of exhaustion, as expressed by the 
mean VAS score. To compute a pooled statistical significance of these correlations, 
while correcting for the implicit study effect, we entered the regional ICA scores 
into a 2-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with one categorical factor (time 
point), one continuous factor (VAS score) and a time point-by-exhaustion interac-
tion term. Because these analyses were only exploratory, we report their statistical 
significance level without correction for multiple comparisons. 
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6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Behavioral results 
In the analysis of the exhaustion scores, the results of the ANOVA showed a signifi-
cant interaction effect of time-of-day and the day activity (F (1,31) = 10.2, p < 0.05). 
Subsequent analysis per level of time-of-day showed that exhaustion was rated 
higher (F (1,14) = 30.19, p < 0.05) in the afternoon of the work day (WD-T3) than 
on the afternoon of the free day (FD-T3). There was no significant difference 
(p>0.05) at the T1 measurement points (see Figure 2). 
 When testing for differences in RSME ratings at T1, we initially found an unex-
pected effect of day activity (F (1,236) = 18.98, p < 0.05). As we suspected a possible 
learning effect, we repeated the analysis with the order of test days as a covariate. 
Test day was indeed a significant factor (F (1,235.) = 38.46, p < 0.05), as was n-back 
condition (F (2,235.) = 107.91, p < 0.05), while day activity was no longer a signifi-
cant factor (F (1,235.) = 0.93, p > 0.05). At T3, order of test days (F (1,235.) = 10.89, 
p < 0.05) and n-back condition (F (2,235.) = 26.53, p < 0.05) were both significant. 
At this point, however, also day activity was significant (F (1,235.) = 5.60, p < 0.05) 
(see Figure 3). The performance of the participants, measured in number of errors, 
was shown to be influenced at T3 by both the order of test days (F (1,235.) = 14.78, 
p < 0.05) and the n-back condition (F (2,235.) = 19.81, p < 0.05), but not by the day 
activity (F (1,235.) = 2.45, p > 0.05). 
 
 
Fig. 2: Exhaustion levels over the course of the work (wd_t1/t3) and the free day (fd_t1/t3) with stand-
ard error bars. 
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Fig. 3: Effort ratings for all N-back conditions as an effect of treatment (work vs free days): Estimated
marginal means per time-of-day and day activity (value of the centered covariate day order = 0). Error
bars represent standard errors. 
 
6.3.2. Imaging results 
 
In the first step of the analysis including only the morning sessions, at least seven 
RSN components were identified that were highly similar to those reported in pre-
vious ICA-based RS-fMRI studies. These RSN components could be functionally 
categorized by the Talairach coordinates of the most active sub-regions (for refer-
ence, we used, e. g., the table presented by Allen et al. (Allen et al., 2011)) and were 
accordingly labeled as (two) default-mode networks (an anterior and a posterior 
default-mode network), a visual network, an auditory network, a sensori-motor 
network, and two (lateralized) dorso-lateral fronto-parietal networks. These com-
ponents were selected as “baseline” RSN components for the second step of the 
analysis (fig. 4). 
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Fig. 4: Group ICA results for the analysis of the pooled baseline resting state scans (WD-T1, FD-T1): (a) 
anterior default mode network; (b) posterior default mode network; (c) visual network; (d) sensory-
motor network; (e) right fronto-parietal network; (f) auditory network; (g) left fronto-parietal network 
 
In the second step of the analysis, that included both free and work sessions, clus-
ters of voxels displaying statistically significant differences in the comparison be-
tween the most exhausted condition and the mean of all other conditions were 
detected within four RSNs. These are reported in table 1 and will be illustrated and 
discussed below. 
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Table 1: Regional effects of exhaustion in resting-state networks (individual clusters). 
(*) P<0.05 cluster-level corrected. 
(**) P<0.05 cluster- and network-level corrected. 
Resting-state 
Network 
Anatomical Region Center of Mass
x,y,z (Talairach) 
T-stat
[Avg, Max] 
Extension
[mm3] 
Correlation with 
Exhaustion  
[F-stat, p-value] 
Early Visual Left Lingual Gyrus -16, -62, 0 +4.16, 
+6.77 
1796 (**) 6.7, 0.0237 
Anterior  
Default-mode 
Medial Frontal Gyrus -1, +46, +33 +4.06, 
+6.24 
380 (*) 6.04, 0.03 
Left Fronto-
Parietal 
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus -34, +7, +48 -4.59, 
-9.82 
2590 (**) 0.01, 0.93 
Right Fronto-
Parietal 
Right Angular Gyrus +46, -61, +36 -3.50, 
-7.369 
887 (**) 0.57, 0.46 
Right Fronto-
Parietal 
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus +33, +7, +35 -4.24,
-6.568 
911 (**) 2.52, 0.13 
 
We found statistically significant regional effects of exhaustion in the early visual 
processing network (fig. 5), in the anterior default mode network (fig. 6) and in 
both the right and the left dorso-lateral fronto-parietal networks (fig.7 ), corre-
sponding to the two executive attentional networks. 
 In the visual processing network (fig. 5), a compact cluster located in left lingual 
gyrus showed a statistically significant regional effect, with rs-fMRI signals en-
hanced in the most exhausted condition (p<0.01, clus. size > 702 mm3, cluster- and 
network-level corrected). Extracting the average ICA scores in this region from 
each individual revealed a statistically significant positive correlation with the self-
reported exhaustion scores (p<0.05) but no significant scan-by-exhaustion interac-
tion (p>0.05). 
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Fig. 5: Early visual processing network. (a) Statistical map of the differential effects (WD_T3 > WD_T1 +
FD_T1 + FD_T3). (b) Bar graph of the regional ICA scores (with standard error bars) in all conditions. (c) 
Correlation graph of the regional ICA scores against the normalized degree of exhaustion for the sepa-
rate working day sessions (with fit lines indicating the directions of the correlations). 
 
We found no significant effects in the anterior and posterior default mode net-
works. At an uncorrected level of significance, in the anterior default mode net-
work, a compact cluster located in medial frontal gyrus showed an effect similar to 
that observed in the early visual processing network (p<0.01, clus. size > 378 mm3, 
cluster-level corrected) with a positive correlation between the regional ICA scores 
and the exhaustion scores (p<0.05) (fig. 6) and no significant scan-by-exhaustion 
interaction (p>0.05). 
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Fig. 6: Anterior default mode network. (a) Statistical map of the differential effects (WD_T3 > WD_T1 +
FD_T1 + FD_T3). (b) Bar graph of the regional ICA scores (with standard error bars) in all conditions. (c)
Correlation graph of the regional ICA scores against the normalized degree of exhaustion for the sepa-
rate working day sessions (with fit lines indicating the directions of the correlations). 
 
 
Finally, both left and right fronto-parietal executive attentional networks exhibited 
reduced functional connectivity in the most exhausted state compared to all other 
states. More specifically, in the left fronto-parietal executive attention network, a 
compact cluster located in left middle frontal gyrus showed an effect opposite to 
that observed in the anterior default mode and the visual processing networks 
(p<0.01, clus. size > 675 mm3, cluster- and network-level corrected). In the right 
fronto-parietal network, the suppression of RS-fMRI signals was distributed across 
the anterior and posterior nodes. In fact, two compact clusters (p<0.01, cluster size 
> 540 mm3, cluster- and network-level corrected) located anteriorly in right middle 
frontal gyrus and posteriorly in the right angular gyrus exhibited a similar signifi-
cant suppression. However, for none of the regions, the correlation with behavioral 
scores or the scan-by-exhaustion interaction reached statistical significance 
(p>0.05). 
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Fig. 7: Left (a,b) and right (c,d) fronto-parietal networks. (a,c) Statistical maps of the differential effects 
(WD_T3 > WD_T1 + FD_T1 + FD_T3). (b,d) Bar graphs of the regional ICA scores (with standard error
bars) in all conditions. 
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6.4. Discussion 
 
In line with previous studies, the combination of an RS-fMRI experimental design 
with ICA-based methodology has gathered a robust task-independent fractionation 
of the spontaneous brain activity into multiple domain-specific spatial patterns. In 
this study, we used spatially distributed ICA patterns of RS-fMRI activities, first, to 
establish a task-independent link between system neurophysiology and behavioral 
psycho-physiology, and, second, to address the possible modulation of the func-
tional connectivity in the prominent RSNs by an intensive psychological treatment 
without constraining the brain regions of interest on the basis of prior anatomical 
or functional knowledge. More specifically, we explored the distributed topological 
changes of the main RSNs in healthy volunteers who spent an entire full day in 
completing challenging and demanding tasks, which caused abnormal levels of 
mental exhaustion without impairing the normal performances in a standard cogni-
tive test. By using a rigorous multi-level ICA-based approach, we demonstrated 
domain-specific spatially selective effects which were in some cases correlated with 
the increased levels of mental exhaustion reported by the studied subjects. 
 
6.4.1. Subjective reports of state and effort investment 
 
The behavioral results were in line with our hypotheses. Namely, the sustained 
performance in the working day induced an increased self-reported level of exhaus-
tion compared to the free day. Although, theoretically, using a self-report instru-
ment for exhaustion could have lead the participants to deduce our key interest and 
give desired ratings, this seems unlikely in this particular case. In fact, exhaustion 
was just one of several self-reports that was assessed, with other variables such as 
well-being and emotional state being collected for an undergraduate project that 
was linked to this study. 
 In the working day, there was no significant difference between exhaustion 
levels at T1 and T2. We speculate that the short training periods were not enough 
to actually exhaust the participants strongly already at T2. This reflects our ra-
tionale to design a paradigm featuring longer task duration. In fact, a short period 
of activity in a stimulating environment such as a flight simulator can be assumed 
to actually increase arousal and thereby decrease experienced exhaustion. Also, it is 
possible that at T1, participants still experienced effects of sleep inertia and low 
body temperature, as their bodies just started to wake up (see, e. g., Valdez et al., 
2008). Nonetheless, when correlating brain and behavior, we pooled data from 
both T2 and T3 as we did not want to exclude the possibility that functional brain 
networks could predict potential sub-threshold exhaustion effects already at T2.  
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Next to an increase in exhaustion, we also found a significant increase of mental 
effort expenditure to maintain the same performances (i. e. same error rates) in the 
N-back task at the end of the working day compared to the free day at identical day 
times. This means that participants were able to sustain their performance level, 
yet they had to invest a significantly higher amount of mental effort. This finding is 
consistent with the framework of Hockey (Hockey, 1997) and similar findings have 
been demonstrated earlier (see, e. g., van der Linden et al., 2003). 
 
6.4.2. Changes in functional connectivity related to exhaustion 
 
Another important objective of the present work was to establish whether a signifi-
cantly higher than normal level of mental exhaustion would be also reflected in 
different amounts of functional connectivity in certain brain networks at rest, i.e. 
prior to (and independent of) any specific task or performance, and to what extent 
the amount and synchrony of RS-fMRI signals from certain regions within certain 
RSNs would be predictive of the subjective measure of fatigue. Therefore we de-
composed whole-brain RS-fMRI into spatial independent components and com-
pared the distributions of the most typical RSN components on a voxel by voxel 
basis to detect possible regional differences between an exhausted and a control 
resting brain state. This approach has a number of advantages over the use of seed 
voxel-based approaches (Esposito and Goebel, 2011) and provides a voxel-wise 
measure of functional connectivity that reflects the correlation between the activity 
of each voxel and the rest of the network being tested. 
 First of all, we found a remarkable effect of the work treatment on the early 
visual processing network, where the RS-fMRI fluctuations were significantly high-
er in the exhausted state and the regional scores were positively correlated with 
the degree of exhaustion. This RSN has been previously found to be principally 
associated with the electro-encephalographic (EEG) “alpha” rhythm (Mantini et al., 
2007), which is typically more prominent in exhausted states, such as, e. g., after 
sustained visual attention (Boksem et al., 2006) or driving tasks (Kamei et al., 
1998;Schrauf et al., 2011), but also proportionally more attenuated in relaxed 
states, such as, e. g., after a daytime nap (Tamaki et al., 1999).  
 Most relevant to our own findings, a recent study by Lim et al. (Lim, Catherine-
Quevenco, & Kwok, 2013) has demonstrated a correlation of alpha band power as a 
predictor of successful recovery from a sustained mental task during a short break. 
Participants demonstrating a lower level of alpha power in a resting period be-
tween two blocks of task performance showed both a stronger decrease in frontally 
focused theta power from pre- to post- break and a higher increase in performance 
after the break. Upper alpha band power during the break was found to be the 
moderator between theta band power reduction and performance differences 
across the break.  
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Taking these evidences together, and considering that it is generally believed that 
the presence of alpha oscillations signifies ‘‘idling’’ or inhibition of cortical pro-
cessing (Pfurtscheller et al., 1996; Worden et al., 2000), the observed regional in-
crease of the RS-fMRI signal fluctuations in the visual network induced by exhaus-
tion clearly points to increased inhibition of the neural activity in the early visual 
system implied by exhaustion. 
 Albeit only descriptively, we also report a weak positive effect of exhaustion in 
the anterior DMN, characterized by the regional increase of RS-fMRI signal fluctua-
tions in the medial frontal gyrus. In this spot, the correlation between the mean 
regional ICA scores and the self-rated degree of exhaustion was also positive and 
statistically significant in the exhausted states. A similar effect of increased resting 
state frontal connectivity in the anterior DMN has been recently observed in pa-
tients with mild traumatic brain injury (Zhou et al., 2012). In contrast to this study, 
however, no significant effects were found in the posterior DMN. 
 Different from what has been observed in the early visual processing and the 
anterior default mode networks, both the right and the left dorso-lateral fronto-
parietal networks were found to be suppressed in the exhausted, compared to the 
relaxed states, with clusters of significantly negative differences in frontal and pari-
etal lateralized regions. 
 The suppression of the fronto-parietal networks could be a sign that brain fa-
tigue is deteriorating the subjects’ executive abilities. In fact, the suppressed areas 
in these networks have long been established as crucial in the effortful maintenance 
of sustained attention (Lewin et al., 1996; Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000; Corbetta and 
Shulman, 2002; Kim et al., 2006; Lim et al., 2010; Demeter et al., 2011), therefore 
the functional connectivity of these networks could be impaired after long periods 
of sustained activation with associated heavy mental workload. In our experimental 
and analytical framework, this possible RSN impairment was detected before any 
visible performance degradation in the subsequent N-back tasks. 
 
6.4.3. Evidence for a bidirectional relation between RSNs and performance 
 
The suppression of fronto-parietal networks observed with RS-fMRI in a signifi-
cantly exhausted state could be linked to recent arterial spin labeling (ASL) perfu-
sion based fMRI (P-fMRI) results (Lim et al., 2010; Demeter et al., 2011). 
 Lim et al. (Lim et al., 2010) showed that sustained periods of taxing cognitive 
workload represented by 20-min executions of a psychomotor vigilance test (PVT), 
besides measurable performance declines, also cause significant deactivations (as 
reflected by regional cerebral flow (rCBF) reductions) in a right fronto-parietal 
network during a post-task resting interval, compared to a pre-task resting base-
line. Remarkably, it is this rCBF decrease between post- and pre-task baselines, and 
not the rCBF increase during the task, that turns out to predict the PVT perfor-
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mance decline, suggesting the presence of persistent effects of cognitive fatigue in 
the right fronto-parietal network after a period of heavy mental work, as well as the 
critical role of this executive attention network in mediating the (temporary) im-
pairment of cognitive abilities. 
 Even if RS-fMRI suppression occurred in both dorsal fronto-parietal networks, 
this effect appeared more widespread and distributed over distant regions in the 
right lateralized network, where both frontal and parietal nodes were suppressed, 
than in the left dorsal fronto-parietal network, where only one anterior region in 
the left middle frontal gyrus was suppressed. In other words, the suppression ap-
pears to be a more generalized phenomenon in the right fronto-parietal network, 
even if the correlation with the self-rated degree of exhaustion does not reach sta-
tistical significance in any of the single spots of regional differences detected. Con-
trariwise, the suppression is stronger in the left fronto-parietal network, suggesting 
a potentially worse damage in the anterior portion of this network. 
 In line with the idea that more sustained activity during the tasks causes more 
deterioration to the executive attention network after the tasks, the more wide-
spread involvement of the right fronto-parietal network could be linked to the right 
lateralization reported (in both human and monkey studies) when these areas are 
engaged in tasks requiring attention, vigilance and continuous performance 
(Corbetta et al., 1993; Colby and Duhamel, 1996; Nobre et al., 1997; Coull et al., 
1998; Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000; Fan et al., 2005; Ogg et al., 2008). In the working 
day, i. e. during intensive helicopter flying practice in the simulator, subjects were 
confronted with a task that required continuous attention and careful control of the 
cockpit interfaces to successfully operate the aircraft. Hence, the task requirements 
in our study can be assumed to strongly engage the right fronto-parietal network, 
even if we cannot be as specific as to predict which aspect of the task in particular is 
responsible for the reported increase of exhaustion and the suppression of the right 
fronto-parietal network. Contrariwise, the higher deterioration observed in the left 
middle frontal gyrus (compared to its contra-lateral counterpart) could be attribut-
ed to the fact that in healthy (non-depressed) subjects cognitive performance in-
ducing stress, causes abnormally higher activations in left compared to the right 
middle frontal gyrus during the same working memory task (Koric et al., 2011). 
Thereby, it is plausible that this kind of stress could have contributed to the more 
regionally specific deterioration of the left fronto-parietal network. 
 Other groups have previously addressed possible alterations in RSN functional 
connectivity and their endogenous dynamic features that can be related to cogni-
tively effortful tasks. For instance, using a similar "rest-task-rest" design, Barnes et 
al. (Barnes et al., 2009) found that brain endogenous dynamics tend to recover 
some of their pre-task dynamic features relatively slowly, suggesting that large-
scale neurocognitive systems can take a considerable period of time to return to a 
stable baseline state after demanding task. In line with this theory, Gordon et al. 
(Gordon et al., 2012) demonstrated that after a working memory task, the immedi-
ately following resting state functional connectivity remained persistently altered 
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compared to the baseline resting state, in a fashion similar to how this was altered 
during the task performance. Particularly, when examining the task positive net-
work (TPN) and the DMN, a suppression of the within-network functional connec-
tivity in the TPN (as well as a modest non-significant enhancement of the DMN) was 
observed in this study which seems highly relevant to the interpretation of the 
present findings. In fact, following Gordon et al. (Gordon et al., 2012), the observed 
reduction of the functional connectivity in the fronto-parietal networks may well 
reflect a cognitive after-effect, such that the brain continues to ruminate with the 
flight simulation after the task is ceased, or, more likely, the persistence of subjec-
tive aspects from the recent effortful cognitive experience. 
 Some studies examining pre vs. post task resting state functional connectivity 
have also suggested or demonstrated the existence of learning effects in multiple 
domains, albeit not all in the same RSNs and regions, and not all in the same direc-
tion (i. e. manifesting as positive or negative changes). Duff et al. (Duff et al., 2008) 
have shown negative changes in the sensorimotor network following a simple fin-
ger tapping exercise. Using motor learning paradigms, Albert et al. (Albert et al., 
2009) have reported an increased functional connectivity in the left fronto-
temporal network, whereas Vahdat et al. (Vahdat et al., 2011) found that the only 
regions showing functional connectivity changes purely associated with motor 
learning were located in the cerebellar cortex and in the superior parietal lobule 
and all exhibited negative correlations with learning. Using a visual learning para-
digm, Lewis et al. (Lewis et al., 2011) were in line with Albert et al. (Albert et al., 
2009) in that within-network learning effects would mainly consist of increased 
resting state functional connectivity that were related to highly specific synaptic 
mechanisms stimulated by the learning task. Finally, both Waites et al. (Waites et 
al., 2005) and Grigg and Grady (Grigg and Grady, 2010) used different language 
tasks to show a positive after-effect of the cognitive activity in which positive 
changes in resting connectivity were prevalent in high order areas. The common 
denominator of all these evidences is that learning effects generally cause positive 
changes in the resting state functional connectivity of high order brain regions and 
networks, whereas low order domains, such as the sensorimotor or visual domains, 
might require highly specific learning tasks to show similar learning-related effects 
prevailing over perceptual or fatigue-related effects. Along this line, considering 
that our stimulation was not specific to any of the studied low order systems (but 
rather engaged all brain systems in highly and purposely effortful performances), 
and that we observed a reduction of the resting state functional connectivity in both 
the left and the right FPN, we suggest that the learning factor was not as prominent 
in our experimental design as the exhaustion factor. 
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6.4.4. Limitations, outlook and conclusion 
This study has two important limitations. First, given the low number of subjects, 
the reported analyses are to be considered only exploratory and, therefore, all re-
sults are at present useful only for elaborating initial working hypotheses in the 
design of future studies. In fact, although we collected five scans per subject, ending 
up with forty individual scans in total, our approach relies on individual scan ICA 
components which are known to be noisier and less reproducible than aggregate 
scan ICA components (Zuo et al., 2010) and, thus, potentially less useful for a small 
group ICA. Second, it should be considered that the N-back task, while very com-
mon and popular in cognitive experiments, could be not appropriate in relation to 
possible learning effects induced by the practice with the flight simulator. In our 
experiments, it was not possible (due to technical problems) to record objective 
indicators regarding the performance at the simulation and therefore the possibil-
ity that the extensive practice with the simulator might also have caused that sub-
jects gain knowledge of new skills, cannot be excluded. On the other hand, several 
studies have shown that apparently less efficient mental processes (resulting, e. g., 
in increased reaction time on task) can actually correspond to improved perfor-
mances due to practice (see, e. g., Ackerman and Kanfer, 2009).  
 In conclusion, this study demonstrates the potential utility of RS-fMRI, in com-
bination with ICA-based distributed modeling of the spontaneous BOLD activity 
synchronization, for revealing and characterizing the neural networks that present 
some immediately visible effects of mental exhaustion after sustained and highly 
demanding training and practice. In fact, our results demonstrate that some of the 
ICA components corresponding to the most important and reported RSNs exhibit 
regional changes in their spatial distribution which can be associated with persis-
tent effects of exhaustion, as measurable in the immediate aftermath of a period of 
heavy cognitive workload. Therefore, characterizing the resting state functional 
connectivity of these RSNs with ICA may provide novel markers of cognitive fatigue 
and mental exhaustion useful for identifying neural “risk factors” for accidents and 
errors due to prolonged task performance. For instance, considering the specific 
paradigm used here, this framework could be potentially useful to identify risk 
factors in pilots in relation to, e. g., the maximum number of flight hours allowed. 
Moreover, a possible clinical implementation of this paradigm could help neurolo-
gists to address the effects of cognitive fatigue in neurological diseases (Langdon, 
2011). 
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In the previous chapters, I have presented three studies that are, to my knowledge, 
unique in their approach to investigate the neural correlates of mental effort. For 
the first time, it was explored how mental effort investment is experienced, evalu-
ated and which consequences it has on functional networks in the human brain. 
The unique aspect of this work is that the subjective experiences of the participants 
in terms of mental effort were measured by a proven instrument while simultane-
ously measuring correlates of brain activation. Thereby, it was possible to quantify 
the influence of our changing experimental conditions on the participants´ experi-
ence and their neural processes at the same time. 
 In doing so, we aimed at solving fundamental, but also practical questions about 
mental effort. Is experiencing mental effort handled by the same neural systems 
that are recruited in its later evaluation by an operator? Is it feasible to assume that 
post-performance self-ratings reflect the experience of an operator during perfor-
mance? If mental effort is a costly, finite resource, how does this affect brain func-
tioning? 
 
In particular, we aimed to answer three questions: 
• Which neural mechanism underlies the subjective post-performance self-
evaluation of mental effort investment?  
• Does this mechanism reflect the experience of mental effort investment during 
task performance? 
• Can we find measurable differences in brain functioning that result from sus-
tained mental effort investment?  
 
Our understanding of mental effort is reflected in the tools that we use to measure 
it in laboratory and real-world situations. In using subjective self-report tools, we 
assume that the operator can give an accurate account of his or her experience at a 
later point, using an instrument such as the RSME to quantify a subjective first-
person impression. In other words, we assume that the process of remembering 
and evaluating one’s previous effort investment brings back an accurate memory of 
the experience. We also assume that changes in effort correspond to a coherent 
construct, irrespective of the question if a task-sided or operator-sided factor 
caused the change in effort requirement. The first step in evaluating this assump-
tion was to identify the neural structures which are recruited during effort evalua-
tion. As a second step, we needed to test if these neural structures have an overlap 
with structures that are sensitive to changing levels of effort investment while a 
participant performs a task. Finding that neural structures recruited during effort 
evaluation are different from structures that are sensitive to effort investment dur-
ing performance would rather suggest that the two processes do not rely on similar 
computational resources in the brain. While this would not automatically condemn 
the validity of self-ratings of mental effort in general, it would constitute that self-
ratings are a less direct measure of the subjective experience as previously thought. 
A similar case would be finding that the neural structure would for example be 
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reactive to changes in effort due to one class of loads, but not another, i.e. being 
only sensitive to changes in task-, but not in state load. A finding like this would 
argue against an instrument such as the RSME which measures mental effort as one 
coherent concept irrespective of the fact that task load and state load pose different 
sources of alterations in mental workload.  
 Other domains of subjective experience have yielded exactly such separations 
in their neural correlates: The experience of pain, for instance, is processed in the 
human brain in two networks which predominantly are concerned with predomi-
nantly the sensory-discriminant or with the affective/attentional component of the 
pain experience (Peyron, Laurent, & Garcia-Larrea, 2000). This prompts the con-
ceptual question if the subjective experience of pain can be seen as a coherent con-
struct, or if sensory and affective components should be viewed as related, but sep-
arable aspects of the pain experience. 
 Last, but maybe most important, our fundamental understanding of mental 
effort suffers from the lack of a concrete and measurable resource. This assumption 
of a finite resource that “fuels” effortful self-regulation is central to modern cogni-
tive models such as the integrated model of mental effort (Mulder, 1986), or the 
strength model of self-control (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). 
 An important part of the concept is that the resource is finite, and thus an oper-
ator will not be able or willing to invest it endlessly. Sustained effort investment 
increases the amount of effort that is required to guarantee performance (Odle-
Dusseau, Bradley, & Pilcher, 2010). If the amount of required effort is larger than 
what the operator is willing to invest, he or she will disengage from the task (Rich-
ter & Gendolla, 2007). As the last study of this project, we used a paradigm involv-
ing sustained effortful activity, in order to see how changing levels of mental effort 
“fuel” affects brain functioning. 
 As the next part of this chapter, I briefly summarize the three studies that we 
conducted and relate their findings to the overarching questions that prompted this 
project. Next, extending the individual discussions of these findings in the respec-
tive chapters, I relate the individual results to the understanding of self-report in-
struments such as the RSME and to the underlying theoretical considerations and 
assumptions. In the last part of this chapter, I elaborate on the implications that not 
only the results, but also the approach of this project have for the further advance 
of occupational psychology. 
7.1 Summaries of the conducted studies 
7.1.1 Study 1 
In the first study of this project, described in chapter 4, we investigated which brain 
areas became differentially activated when participants rated the difficulty and 
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their effort investment on a mental task using subjective self-report instruments. 
Self-evaluation instruments enable the individual to provide reliable estimates of 
his or her mental effort investment related to performing a task.  
 The design of this study build on results from earlier research, in which it was 
demonstrated that the ability to report mental effort investment is dissociable from 
similar self-ratings (Naccache et al., 2005). The evidence underlying this finding 
consisted of a case report into one patient, abbreviated RMB. Following a brain 
lesion, RMB was neither able to experience her own effort investment, nor to per-
form self-evaluations of mental effort investment. However, she could without 
problems deduct and evaluate the difficulty of a task from overt task characteris-
tics. 
 The combination of functional loss of both of these capabilities in patient RMB 
constituted evidence in favor of common neural substrates for experiencing and 
self-evaluating mental effort. However, the case of patient RMB also demonstrated 
that the neural processes related to mental effort are apparently dissociable from 
other, similar processes, as RMB was able to deduce changes in task difficulty. This 
illustrated that the acts of rating the difficulty of a recently performed task and 
rating the amount of effort needed to perform this task are not identical in their 
reliance on neural information processing. A demonstration of a functional dissoci-
ation of two processes in a lesion case like this forms an important begin in relating 
functions and neural structures. Alas, such patient studies only represent isolated 
cases, as the sustained lesions sustained by single patients are mostly extensive and 
not defined in their location. Hence, it is in most cases not possible to establish a 
generalizable relation between a specific functionality and a neural structure on the 
basis of observations like this one. However, this case showed that apparently, two 
constructs as highly related as difficulty and effort do not rely on identical neural 
correlates. In our first study, we used this observation to isolate brain areas which 
become more activated during mental effort self-evaluation in healthy participants. 
For this, we had participants perform a working memory task on different levels of 
difficulty. After each short block, participants had to perform self-ratings of per-
ceived task difficult and perceived effort investment. The results showed that in 
particular the left anterior insular cortex (laIC) was activated stronger during self-
evaluation of effort expenditure when compared to an evaluation of task difficulty. 
The anterior insular cortex has been proposed to integrate cognitive, emotional and 
somatic information to form a coherent representation of the state of the self 
(Craig, 2009). Evidence from a study by Modinos, Ormel and Aleman (2009) pro-
vides further evidence for a functionality of laIC related to self-related evaluations 
by showing that this region becomes more activated during evaluation of state-
ments about oneself than during evaluation of statements about peers. 
 Following the view of Craig (2009) we interpret the increased activation of laIC 
during mental effort evaluation as a sign that this type of evaluation relies on the 
successful integration of somatic, emotional and cognitive information related to 
the state of the self. It has been proposed earlier that such an integration of infor-
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mation from different domains is necessary in order to perform self-evaluations of 
mental effort investment: The original interpretation by Naccache et al. (2005) of 
their patient`s inability to perform self-evaluations of effort investment focused on 
the effect of her lesion on the neural system mediating the propagation of somatic 
information. The lesion of patient RMB disturbed the generation of somatic mark-
ers in her brain. Somatic markers signal changes in physiological parameters of the 
body and are used to relate cognitive information to emotions (Damasio, 1999). 
Without somatic markers, patient RMB was not provided with information about 
the effects that performing a task had on her own state. As Naccache et al. have 
elaborated, this lack of information lead to patient RMB being unable to experience 
or evaluate her own effort expenditure. 
 Our results support this interpretation by showing that the self-evaluation of 
mental effort leads to increased activation in the laIC as a neural structure that is 
assumed to integrate somatic, emotional and cognitive information. We interpret 
the recruitment of this structure as evidence for the need to integrate these differ-
ent categories of information in order to perform a self-evaluation of mental effort 
investment. Logically, if one of the information categories is missing, the integration 
cannot be performed. 
 Apart from this, our results suggested a further role of laIC during performance 
itself: While the participants performed the task at different levels of difficulty, the 
signal change in the laIC cluster varied roughly in the same pattern as the RSME 
scores that the participants provided directly after each block of task performance. 
This suggested that laIC not only serves a role in the later evaluation of effort ex-
penditure, but also monitors it during performance. 
7.1.2 Study 2 
The observation of parametrical modulations in laIC activation had an important 
implication for solving the second question. This question referred to an important 
assumption behind self-rating measurement tools for mental effort, namely that the 
evaluation of one`s effort investment after task performance equals the experience 
of mental effort investment during task performance.  
 Patient RMB`s combined inability to both experience her investment of mental 
effort and to provide an evaluation of it at a later point already supported the as-
sumption of a relation of experience and later evaluation. Finding now that a neural 
structure that is activated particularly strong during mental effort self-evaluation 
displays task-load sensitive changes in activity during task performance is further 
evidence in favor of a common mechanism for the experience and off-line evalua-
tion of mental effort investment. The paradigm that we used in study 1, however, 
did not allow making a statement about the role of laIC in the acute experience of 
effort investment. In study 1, we only manipulated the task difficulty. Variations in 
difficulty on the same task did by no means only affect activation in laIC during task 
performance, but a lot of other frontal and parietal areas. This finding is common in 
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working memory tasks as the n-back task that we used here (Owen, McMillan, 
Laird, & Bullmore, 2005), but also for other mental tasks (Duncan & Owen, 2000). It 
is not easily possible to separate the changes in activation due to increased pro-
cessing from the changes in activation due to a change in the experienced amount 
of mental effort investment. Furthermore, task load only forms one factor in the 
total mental workload that participants face. If a neural structure is sensitive to 
workload as such, instead of merely reflecting the level of task load, it has to react 
to changes in both task and state load. Our results indicated that laIC reacts to 
changes in task load, but would it also react to changes in state load? To answer this 
question, we had to take a closer look at brain activation during task execution. 
From the literature and also from our first study, we knew that only varying the 
task demands would affect a large number of brain areas. This would include all 
areas that simply become more active to process the additional amount of infor-
mation the “muscles” of the brain, so to say. Areas that would be modulated due to 
changes in effort would be difficult to separate from these wide-spread activation 
differences. Thus, in our second study, described in chapter 5, we used an extension 
of our original design form study 1 to solve this problem. Study 2 investigated the 
supposed role of laIC during task execution. Again, we used short blocks of n-back 
tasks with varying task load. But instead of only manipulating task difficulty, also 
the state of the subjects was manipulated. This was achieved by having subjects 
spend the day with an effortful activity or leisure time before having them perform, 
again, an n-back working memory task while we measured their brain activation. 
This time, however, we were not interested in differences between different kinds 
of self-ratings; rather, we were interested in which brain areas activity would be 
influenced in the same way by changes in task and state load as the subjective rat-
ings of effort investment. The RSME scores obtained after task performance showed 
an interaction of task difficulty and the state of the subjects. This means that after a 
day of effortful activity, the differences in task difficulty affected the subjectively 
experienced amount of effort investment differently: While the total amount of 
effort needed was increased, the difference between the most easiest and hardest 
n-back conditions became smaller, as even performing the simple 1-back condition 
required the participants to invest effort in regulating their state, adding to the 
effort they had to invest purely into the task as such. When analyzing the fMRI data 
taken during task performance, the same interaction effect was found in laIC. This 
shows that indeed, laIC reacts on factors which influence the amount of mental 
effort that a subject needs to invest to perform a task. More important, both task- 
and subject-sided sources of demand change where influential. This demonstrates 
clearly that the changes in activity observed in laIC are not simply related to chang-
ing levels of information processing load mediated by the different n-back condi-
tions. Thus, next to being more active during the post-task evaluation of mental 
effort expenditure, laIC is apparently also involved in its experience during perfor-
mance. This is the first time that any central variable has been shown to react to 
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changing demands of mental effort that are mediated by both changes in task load 
and in state load.  
 It is known from the literature that the bilateral laIC, as well as its right coun-
terpart are involved in the representation of task goals and strategies (Dosenbach, 
Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008), but also in monitoring performance (Nel-
son et al., 2010). One factor setting laIC apart, though, is that it is the target site of 
heartbeat-evoked-potentials (HEP) (Gray et al., 2007). Measures of heart rate have 
historically been used to indicate levels of elevated mental workload (Nickel & Na-
chreiner, 2003), which, given that the operator accepts this increased load, results 
in increased mental effort investment. As Nickel and Nachreiner (2003) note, heart 
rate is not a very specific indicator of mental workload changes, as it is influenced 
by numerous other processes in the human body. In our interpretation, information 
about myocardial functioning is one of several information components that must 
be integrated to derive an indication of the amount of invested mental effort.  
 In the emerging picture of the laIC’s role in effort management, we thus have 
the prior knowledge that laIC is supplied with information that needs to be inte-
grated in order to evaluate the impact of mental effort investment on the state of 
the individual, not only in cognitive, but also in emotional and somatic terms (Craig, 
2009; Gray et al., 2007).  
 We also have at least the isolated observation from patient RMB that a failure to 
integrate the state-related information leads to both the inability to experience 
effort investment, but also to the inability to evaluate it at a later point. Taking now 
the results from study 2, in which we find that a cluster in laIC is modulated by 
changes in workload during task performance in the same fashion that the RSME is 
modulated by these changes after performance, we conclude that laIC plays a cru-
cial and common role in both the acute experience of effort investment and its later 
off-line evaluation. This carries important implications for the second question 
behind this project, the assumption of a commonality of experience and later self-
evaluation of mental effort. Although we have no direct way of objectifying the sub-
jective experience of a participant, we do have evidence which shows that the same 
cortical area is implied in experience and later self-evaluation of mental effort. Also, 
we show that this area reacts in the same way to changes in task- and state load 
during task performance as the closest available indication of subjective experi-
ence, the RSME, shortly thereafter. In our interpretation, this evidence supports the 
assumption that the RSME scores given after task performance reflect the experi-
enced amount of acute mental effort investment during performance.  
7.1.3 Study 3 
The third and last study of this project investigated changes in the resting state 
networks in the brains of subjects as an effect of depleting mental resources. This 
study, described in chapter 6, was conducted to solve the question if the depletion 
of the mental resources of a person would correspond to changes in functional 
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networks of brain areas. The integrated model of mental effort assumes an abstract 
resource as the crucial, yet finite factor driving regulations of state and information 
processing. A depletion of this resource leads to a progressive increase of the 
amount of effort necessary to perform an otherwise unchanged task. This is mainly 
reflected in the impairment of controlled attention and controlled processing, usu-
ally accompanied by a feeling of exhaustion. To induce such depletion, subjects 
spend several hours performing an effortful task. As a contrast, subjects spent the 
same time with low-effort, self-chosen activity. When comparing the measurements 
taken in the afternoon, the effortful day lead to a number of changes both in the 
subjective self-reports provided by the subjects and in the functional networks of 
their brains. The results showed an increase in exhaustion and an increase in sub-
jectively rated mental effort expenditure on a working memory task after the effort-
ful day. At the same time, functional connectivity in a network associated with ex-
ecutive functioning was decreased, indicating reduced efficiency in controlled in-
formation processing. Also, we observed increased coherence in the default mode 
network and the early visual network. Increases in default mode network are asso-
ciated with a tendency for unguided, intrinsic attention, while increases in coheren-
cy of the early visual network have been linked to inhibition of visual processing. 
Furthermore, in all three of those networks, there were also more regionally specif-
ic effects that correlated with the subjective exhaustion scores. This could be shown 
by correlating the regional independent component analysis (ICA) scores (see box 
1) with the subjective exhaustion ratings. The ICA score of a brain area in the net-
work related to executive functioning was negatively correlated with exhaustion, 
suggesting that rhythmic fluctuations of activity in this area was more out of sync 
with the rest of this functional network when participants were more exhausted. In 
the early visual network and the default mode network, several regions` ICA scores 
correlated positively with exhaustion. These results show that the implementation 
of specific areas in functional networks can be modulated by sustained effort in-
vestment. Our experimental treatment had thus not only a measurable effect on 
functional networks of brain regions, but this effect was correlated to the partici-
pants` self-evaluation of their own state in terms of exhaustion. Again, these chang-
es were accompanied by a significant increase in effort expenditure to maintain 
performance during a separate working memory task. Although the precise cause 
for these changes in the functional networks is not yet known, they represent a 
physiological manifestation of the effect of depleting the still-abstract resource 
underlying mental effort. This finding will be discussed more detailed in the general 
discussion, as it yields implications for the conceptualization of mental effort in 
general. 
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Box 1: Understanding ICA scores
To understand ICA scores, start by comparing the brain to a restaurant full of 
people. Imagine that we would know nothing about the way a restaurant is orga-
nized. To make sense of how this restaurant functions, we take a look at the staff. 
Pretend for the sake of simplicity that this restaurant features an open kitchen, 
giving us an overview of pretty much all the staff. The restaurant in our example 
has a very friendly atmosphere, thus the greeters guide patrons to their tables, 
and the cooks check up on the reception of their food, so we cannot simply de-
duct the function of staff members from their location. The first thing that we 
notice is that staff members wear different uniforms. The greeters wear a differ-
ent suit than the waiters, and both are easily distinguished from the cooks in 
their white aprons. Imagine now that all the staff members would wear the same 
outfit. How would you still be able to put different staff members into a category? 
One way is to look at their coordinated activity. If a party of patrons arrives, the 
greeters work in a coordinated way to welcome the guests, take the coats, and 
lead the patrons to their table. When a course for this party is ready, a swarm of 
waiters will hurry to serve all plates simultaneously. If we thus see a waiter run-
ning with a plate, we will be able to predict that other members of the same staff 
category will also be running at the same time. We can thus say that our observa-
tion of the initial waiter yields information that can be used to predict the behav-
ior of other waiters. Thereby, we have identified one component within the staff. 
Also, we can make a difference between members of this staff component and 
another staff component by observing that the behavior of a waiter does not 
yield predictive information about greeters. We thus conclude that these two 
staff components are independent. The same approach can be used on brain 
data; the total mass of voxels can be split in independent groups, or components, 
based on the fact that the behavior of voxels in one component does not yield 
information that can be used to predict the behavior of a voxel in another com-
ponent. The ICA score, then, represents how much a voxel is in phase with the 
other voxels in this component. Looking back at our restaurant example, a waiter 
who moves slightly out of sync with his fellow waiters would have a low ICA 
score. In study 3, we averaged the ICA scores of the single voxels of a component 
that were also spatially clustered together, meaning that these voxels were in the 
same brain area. In that sense, voxels that are clustered together would repre-
sent one member of the staff. Thus, from one staff component, we derived sever-
al staff members, or clusters. The behavior of these clusters in terms of how 
much their activation changes are in phase with the other clusters is thus ex-
pressed in regional ICA scores. 
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7.2 General discussion 
7.2.1 Neural correlates of mental effort and their implications for self-rating 
instruments  
The three studies that we conducted during this project represent the first step 
towards a more thorough understanding of the neural processes that take place 
during the performance of effortful mental activities.  
 Evidence from our first two studies has demonstrated a central role of laIC in 
mental effort investment. When we take evidence from earlier research into the 
functionality of laIC into account, a picture starts to emerge in which laIC apparent-
ly forms a neural junction fit to monitor and control effort investment. Several stud-
ies have shown that the laIC, but also its right counterpart, perform a role in the 
representation of the goals of a task, and also of the strategies that operators apply 
(Dosenbach et al., 2008); Fair et al., 2007). Also, Nelson et al. (2010) have shown 
that, additionally, left and right aIC integrate performance-related information dur-
ing task performance. Thereby, both aICs are involved directly in the execution of 
mental tasks. Although the actual information processing that needs to take place 
has been shown to be handled in a variety of areas, the aICs take more of a manage-
rial role. Our own evidence supports this interpretation and extends it: At least in 
case of one aIC, namely the laIC, the managerial function extends to monitoring 
effort investment and to bringing effort investment to the awareness of the opera-
tor.  
 Finding evidence in support of a common neural basis for experiencing and 
evaluating mental effort has direct implications for the fundamental assumption 
behind self-rating instruments such as the RSME. In our understanding of these 
instruments, there has always been a major gap, caused by the lack of a possibility 
to evaluate the construct validity of the instruments in a more objective manner. In 
case of the RSME, but also in general with subjective self-report instruments, the 
measurement scores that are collected reflect a more or less abstract indication 
that a participant gives about his or her first-person experience. The crucial point in 
the case of mental effort is that we cannot, with any other psychological tool, get 
closer to the first-person-experience of the participant. This experience is, so to say, 
the at the most inner core of the psychological construct that we want to measure. 
Between the experience and any measurable manifestation such as related behav-
ior (e.g. performance in the case of mental effort), there are numerous other pro-
cesses which all pose sources of interference. Thus, it is imperative to ensure that 
the instrument measures the construct that it is intended to measure. Meeting this 
criterion of construct validity can be difficult in case of instruments measuring sub-
jective experiences. These difficulties affect design and validation of instruments 
alike: Even when self-report instruments are tested under laboratory conditions, 
the same experimental manipulations can affect several aspects of the subjective 
C H A P T E R  7  
 136 
experience in participants. For example, manipulating the demands of a task will 
affect both the perceived difficulty of a task and the perceived amount of effort 
investment necessary to perform the task. Measures of difficulty and mental effort 
investment have been observed to be highly correlated in the past, and this obser-
vation has even been interpreted previously as a sign that the measurement in-
struments of difficulty and of effort refer to highly similar constructs (Yeo & Neal, 
2004). Without any closer indicators of mental effort than self-ratings and the even 
more indirect performance output of the participant, it is not trivial to evaluate if an 
instrument measures one or the other construct. Task load is an integral part of the 
construct of mental effort, as elaborated in the introduction of this volume. Thus, 
depending on the experimental paradigm that is used, it can be impossible to sepa-
rate subjective experiences of effort and task difficulty. The observations in patient 
RMB demonstrated that there apparently is a difference in the neural processing 
structures of effort and difficulty. This initial observation enabled us to successfully 
identify the laIC as a neural structure that reacts different during evaluations of 
difficulty and effort. In order to investigate if laIC would be influenced by changes in 
experienced effort and not just by changes in difficulty, we used manipulations of 
task and state load, similar to the ones used to influence the experienced amount of 
invested effort in participants during the validation research for the RSME. The 
original validation procedure of the RSME included the manipulation of both the 
task load and the state load by varying not only the processing complexity of a task, 
but also by testing participants after a free day and a working day.  
 Our results show that the activation of laIC during task execution is influenced 
both by changes in task load and also by the interaction of task load and state load. 
The related ratings that participants provided using the RSME showed correspond-
ing changes in the reports of subjectively experienced mental effort investment. We 
were thus able to demonstrate that the subjective ratings of participants on the 
RSME and laIC activation in their brains react in a similar way to changes in task 
load and state load. Thus, the way that the RSME reflects the subjective experience 
of an operator`s mental effort investment is similar to the way that a neural struc-
ture implied in the management of mental effort is modulated in its activity. This 
allows us to propose that the RSME offers operators a quite direct way to express 
their experienced amount of mental effort investment, free of any systematic dis-
tortion. 
 Yet, the observation of a common effect of task- and state load manipulations 
on the same neural structure also allows to make additional statements about the 
RSME`s rationale of measuring one single dimension of mental effort. The fact that 
manipulating subjectively experienced mental effort investment relates to changes 
in one single brain region also provides support for the rationale of the RSME in 
which effort is measured as one coherent experience. In this approach, the RSME 
stands in contrast to other instruments such as the SWAT (Reid, Eggemeier, & Shin-
gledecker, 1982) or the NASA-TLX (Hart & Staveland, 1988), which aim to capture 
different aspects of effort investment by including multiple rating items. As already 
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noted by Zijlstra (1993), at least the studies using the 6-dimensional NASA-TLX 
reported high correlations between different sub-scales of the instrument. This was 
one of the main factors, next to considerations such as usability, which lead Zijlstra 
to favor a one-dimensional approach when constructing the RSME. Our findings, in 
which we demonstrate that changing the experienced amount of mental effort with 
both state- and task load manipulations manifests in the same neural structure, 
pose evidence in favor of this approach. Considering the neural processes underly-
ing apparently simple self-reports of a psychological concept have the potential to 
change our understanding of those very psychological concepts. Research into oth-
er subjective ratings such as measurements of experienced pain have for example 
shown that the seemingly uniform concept of pain is, in fact, not uniform at all: 
Different aspects of a painful experience have been shown to be processed in dif-
ferent neural systems, which made it plausible to differentiate between sensory-
discriminant and affective/attentional components of the pain experience (Peyron, 
Laurent, & Garcia-Larrea, 2000).  
 In the case of mental effort, our results constitute evidence in favor of a concept 
of mental effort in which effort is one coherent resource that is consumed by meet-
ing task load and state load alike. The laIC as a brain region that is recruited selec-
tively stronger during mental effort self-evaluation was shown to be affected by 
both changes in task load and in state load alike during acute effort investment. Our 
study thus continues the example of earlier work in underlining how cognitive 
models of subjective experiences and the associated measuring instruments can 
benefit from a more thorough investigation of their neural correlates.  
7.2.2 Rethinking the energetical resource assumption 
Arguably the most fundamental contribution that our project has made in advanc-
ing the concept of mental effort is related to the last and most challenging question 
that stood at the beginning of this endeavor. The concept of mental effort describes 
how a limited resource is invested in order to regulate processing, behavior or even 
the fundamental state of an individual. By assuming that this resource is necessary 
for all regulative processes, but at the same time finite, it is implicitly stated that 
spending this resource has a profound influence on the individual, or more precise-
ly on the functioning of the brain. While the precise nature of this resource remains 
unknown, our results open the possibility for a potential paradigm shift in concep-
tualizing it. As shown, the depletion of mental resources by sustained effort invest-
ment had measurable effects on the functional connectivity of brain areas. It was 
shown that these changes in functional connectivity correspond to the need of in-
vesting an increased amount of mental effort in task that objectively did not change 
in its demands. Our results thus demonstrate a close relation of the concept of men-
tal effort to measures of the brain`s functional organization. Even more, the meas-
urements of functional connectivity that we report form, for the moment, the most 
direct and objective correlate of mental effort. While earlier attempts into finding a 
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physiological variable have largely focused on identifying a correlate of acute or 
recent effort investment such as HRV components (Mulder, 1980) or blood glucose 
levels (Gailliot et al., 2007; Scholey, Harper, & Kennedy, 2001), our approach links 
the effect of mental effort investment to brain functioning in a much more direct 
way.  
 The challenge posed by both the integrated model of mental effort (Mulder, 
1986) and the strength model of self-control (Baumeister et al., 1994) was to use 
physiological measures to identify the nature of the resource that underlies effort-
ful regulation. Our results open the way for considering a radically new view of 
mental effort as a resource. Traditionally, effort has been pictured as an energetical 
resource. Based on our results, we propose a different perspective: What if the con-
cept of mental effort does not relate to an energetical resource, but to the normal, 
ideal harmony of the brain, in which functional networks of brain regions cooperate 
in an efficient manner?  
 Recent studies into the functional organization of brain areas have consistently 
shown two findings which are related to this interpretation: First, the functional 
organization of brain areas is a very delicate process. Functional networks of brain 
areas operate in a flexible manner to offer the required processing while minimiz-
ing operational costs in form of glucose and oxygen (Bullmore & Sporns, 2012). The 
second consistent finding is that a large number of neurological diseases and inju-
ries that are associated with a decrease of mental capabilities are accompanied by 
changes to functional networks (Van Den Heuvel & Hulshoff Pol, 2010; Stam & van 
Straaten, 2012). Recent evidence from a clinical study even demonstrated a signifi-
cant correlation of improving connectivity in the right fronto-parietal network 
(FPN) after surgical treatment of invasive tumors, and cognitive abilities of the 
patients (van Dellen et al., 2013). The FPN forms one of the brains executive net-
works, and our own results showed a widespread reduction in right FPN coherence 
as an effect of sustained, effortful performance. It seems thus warranted to assume 
that any changes in the normal balance of functional connectivity can manifest in an 
increased need to invest regulative resources in order to guarantee performance. In 
the view proposed here, the very act of investing mental effort to sustain perfor-
mance actually disturbs the functional harmony in which brain areas can form flex-
ible, effective networks in the most efficient way. Thereby, homeostatic balance 
itself would form a resource, which can be seen as being invested. This view of 
mental effort as a homeostatic instead of an energetical resource is compatible with 
the integrated model of mental effort (Mulder, 1986) and the strength model of 
self-control (Baumeister et al., 1994): Although these models depict a reservoir of 
effort, this reservoir could equally well represent an overall indicator of the homeo-
static status of the brain in terms of functional organization. Regulative action 
would affect this reservoir by de-balancing the delicate overall balance of this func-
tional organization, thereby increasing the need for regulative action further on 
throughout the course of sustained performance. 
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 There are two immediate open questions which need to be solved to evaluate 
our proposed homeostatic concept of mental effort. One, it remains unclear by 
which mechanism regulative action affects the delicate balance of functional organ-
ization. Two, it is far from sure if the proposed disturbance in functional organiza-
tion is the only factor that plays a role in an increased need for regulative action in 
the case of sustained performance. Both of these issues could very well be related 
to functional changes on a neuronal level as an effect of sustained performance. One 
plausible mechanism for such a localized reduction in function might be the deple-
tion of local glucose resources. Evidence from animal studies has demonstrated that 
the local level of glucose in the extracellular fluid surrounding task- relevant neu-
rons can decrease as an effect of cognitive load (McNay, Fries, & Gold, 2000). A fur-
ther investigation of the local mechanisms of neuronal supply in humans might thus 
lead to an additional, actually energy-related factor in our understanding of mental 
effort.  
7.2.3 Implications and outlook 
The studies conducted in this project form a step forward in the exploration of oc-
cupation-related phenomena using neuroimaging methods. While task-specific 
processes in the brain have been investigated to a greater extend, more general 
aspects of goal-directed performance (“work”) are just now becoming a subject of 
interest. 
 One aspect setting this work apart is the novel approach of using neuroimaging 
methods next to the known instruments used in occupational psychology. This 
approach has opened the possibility to understand the fundamental processes un-
derlying the interaction of a person with a task. In the case of mental effort, this 
regards an aspect that is universally present in every task-person interaction, pro-
fessional and casual. The studies presented in this book mainly concerned three 
aspects of mental effort investment: The self-evaluation of invested effort, changes 
in the amount of experienced effort as an effect of the factors described in the inte-
grated model of mental effort; and the changes that can be observed as a conse-
quence of sustained effort investment. These aspects arguably form the most rele-
vant components of the subject of mental effort when looking at the applied side of 
occupational psychology. Self-rating instruments as the RSME are used in the field 
to determine the amount of effort that is invested in task performance. Using these 
measurements, the interaction of persons and tasks is optimized to provide an op-
timal workload while ensuring safe performance. The depletion of resources forms 
one of the most detrimental factors leading to human error, with all consequences 
that may entail. While factors in the person-task-interaction have been identified 
which are influential for the outcome of this interaction, the underlying processes 
in the human brain were not well understood. By exploring the neural substrates of 
these three aspects of mental effort, the first step has been made to further under-
stand how functions in the brain contribute to the interaction of task and operator.  
C H A P T E R  7  
 140 
In the case of mental effort, the most plausible continuation of this exploration 
would be to study the mechanisms behind the experience of mental effort expendi-
ture. How do single factors - in the task or in the person - influence the total experi-
ence of effort investment? Although the results in this study feature the laIC promi-
nently, it can be speculated that this region is only a part of a larger network of 
brain regions that influence this experience. Studies involving an analysis of the 
functional connectivity of laIC with other regions could give more information 
about the determinants of effort experience. An exciting next step would be to find 
neurobiological relations between laIC and brain structures implied in motivation, 
or laIC`s eventual connection to neural systems that are connected to reward. The 
investment of mental effort does not happen in a vacuum, of course, and under-
standing how the neural correlates of mental effort are related to the neural corre-
lates of processes that are closely connected to it potentially yields a better holistic 
understanding of how effortful performance is integrated in the total (neural) func-
tioning of an individual. One can assume that the sustained investment of mental 
effort, as it happens in the case of work, has a profound effect on the individual over 
time, as a substantial period of our waking adult life is spent on occupational activi-
ties. It has been shown that such activities carried out over a long time can change 
brain functioning in a profound way. This can go as far as to lead to structural 
changes in the brain, as for example observed in cab drivers (Maguire, Woollett, & 
Spiers, 2006). London cab drivers, when compared to London bus drivers, were 
found to have a greater gray matter volume in parts of the hippocampus, which the 
authors attribute to an extensive memorization of London`s street maps. Bus driv-
ers, who in theory have a very similar occupation, follow fixed routes. Such a seem-
ingly minor difference in the job characteristics of a person`s occupation can thus 
influence brain functioning not only on a transient level, as the effect of sustained 
performance that we have shown in study 3, but can even result in stable, structural 
changes in the brain. Such changes have the potential to influence a person`s func-
tioning: While some parts of the hippocampus where enlarged, other parts showed 
less grey matter volume, and the authors suggest that this reduction might be the 
cause of cab drivers performing worse on a neurological learning test.  
 This particular observation concerned the effects of highly specialized tasks on 
the functionally specialized brain structures which support them. However, it can 
be argued that also more general characteristics of the person-task-interaction will 
have a profound influence on brain functioning. While the specific content of the 
tasks performed during our working life may change, our strategy to approach 
them and experience our investment of effort can remain the same. Evidence even 
shows that this interaction is influenced by our stable personality traits (Yeo & 
Neal, 2008). The effects of a long term exposure to a certain pattern in this interac-
tion can be supposed to have dramatic influence on several aspects of a person`s 
life, manifesting themselves for example in the many adverse psychological and 
physiological effects of work stress on mental (Juster, McEwen, & Lupien, 2010) 
and physiological health (Chandola et al., 2008). By understanding the way that the 
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brain interacts with the challenges, more possibilities to influence this interaction 
in a beneficial way are likely to emerge. To strike a comparison, the field of occupa-
tional medicine has made great advances in developing guidelines that help to 
shape the interaction of the body and the task challenges in an ergonomic way. This 
was only possible by the advances in medical knowledge and techniques, which 
made it for example possible to explore the etiology of musculoskeletal disorders 
related to work. In the same way, it has become possible to explore the functions of 
the brain in relation to work with the modern neuroimaging methods that are now 
at our disposal. These methods can extend the view of occupational psychologists 
in the same way that x-ray and MRI extended the view of occupational physicians. 
Occupational psychology is unique in its combination of theoretical, cognitive as-
pects on the one hand and the applied side on the other. Combining this unique 
expertise with neuroimaging methods, creating a so-called “occupational neurosci-
ence”, would extend its reach dramatically. In the end, the main goal is to foster the 
mutually beneficial interaction of a person and a challenging environment. This 
approach extends the existing direction of Neuroergonomics (Parasuraman, 2003) 
in the sense that it does not only aim at fostering the direct improvement of inter-
faces based on the knowledge of the implementation of cognitive processes in the 
brain. Occupational neuroscience adapts a rather broad scope in which the implica-
tions of the “brain at work” are considered in the larger context of the effects of 
work on the individual. Without dispute, the potential benefits of interfaces follow-
ing the ergonomic principles of brain functioning are most promising. Yet, such 
measures form just a part of the possibilities that are opened up by utilizing the 
broad knowledge base of occupational psychology. These possibilities extend far 
beyond the direct work environment. They literally begin in the pre-adolescent 
training of the individual and follow it beyond the workplace, to recovery and to 
other domains of life, and by leaving a lasting effect on the brain, into retirement. 
Occupational neuroscience opens the possibility to educate individuals about the 
principles that connect the way they use their brains at work to the way that their 
brains, in turn, shape their conscious experience. The capability to regulate oneself, 
one`s affective state or motivation are just the most obvious aspects that are influ-
enced by the one`s way to face an effortful task. Realizing the implications and con-
sequences of one`s way to approach a mentally demanding task, in turn, opens the 
possibility to become aware of issues in one`s interaction with work at an early 
time. Occupational neuroscience, in the future, might even hold a possibility for 
people to solve these issues far before they cause more obvious or even clinically 
relevant problems. A possible application could be the use of mobile devices meas-
uring central variables related to effort investment. Utilizing methods such as func-
tional near-infrared spectroscopy, a technique which measures the same changes 
as fMRI in a limited, yet mobile way, such devices could provide an on-line account 
of the acute effort investment, but also of the overall state of the user. Configuring 
these devices would probably still need to occur in stationary MRI machines, which 
provide qualitatively higher data for the whole brain. Yet, with the extensive data 
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provided by MRI measurements, the devices could “learn” to deduce indicators for 
certain processes and states in their individual user from their own reduced data. 
Such devices could be connected to interfaces used for mental work, or for learning. 
Thereby, the workstation could actually help the user to pace his or her work, take 
breaks, eat, or to know when to engage in another type of activity. Such a setup 
would provide e.g. students with the chance to acquire the meta-skills necessary to 
utilize their full potential while safeguarding them against the pitfalls of maladap-
tive work patterns. Most of all, it would in our opinion be inevitable that students, 
but also workers who use this system, become more aware of their own state, and 
how the way they use their brain affects their experience beyond the immediate 
context of a task. In the end, such awareness could serve to empower people in any 
sort of mentally demanding context. With this awareness, they could meet the chal-
lenges posed on them by any occupation in an informed way, and utilize their full 
potential without unknowingly exceeding their limits. The research presented in 
this book forms merely the start of this process, yet it demonstrates that extending 
the reach of occupational psychology with modern neuroimaging methods poten-
tially yields fundamental advances and applications in the future.  
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Summary 
The concept of mental effort originates from the notion that humans have a limited 
capacity to perform mental tasks. More precisely, this concept describes the feeling 
of investing an abstract resource, a limited sort of “energy” into regulating oneself 
and one`s mental activities in order to perform a task (Zijlstra, 1993; Hockey, 
1996).  
 The research that I performed in this project was aimed at identifying the neu-
ral correlates of mental effort investment; both in the sense of which brain regions 
take part in managing effort investment and in how the concept of a limited under-
lying resource relates to measurable parameters of neural functioning. 
 In the beginning, early psychological researchers focused mainly on the mo-
mentary limitations of the human information processing system. These limitations 
in processing capacity were readily observable in variables such as the time that a 
person needed to perform a given task, which increased after adding small subtasks 
to the main task. While observing and modeling the characteristics of the human 
information processing system at work, various researchers such as Kahneman 
(1973) or Moray (1968) noted that humans are able to regulate their processing of 
information in a flexible way.  
 This regulation, however, seems to consume a limited resource (Hockey, 1996). 
Sustained investment of this resource would lead to a reduction in its availability. 
More important, it was realized that the prolonged performance of tasks would also 
affect the general level of arousal of a person, and that maladjusted levels of arousal 
would require further investment of regulation in order to secure successful task 
performance. Mulder (1986) cast these two different taxing factors in his integrated 
model of mental effort: The need to invest regulative action to control one`s infor-
mation processing, as determined by the characteristics of the task and the baseline 
capacity of the individual, is in his model referred to as the task load. The need to 
invest regulative action to control one`s arousal state is conceptualized as a sepa-
rate factor, the state load (Chapter 1).  
 The observation that the regulative capacity of an individual is limited has ob-
vious implications: While humans can adapt their amount of effort investment in 
order to compensate for changes in task load or in state load, at some point the 
amount of effort that needs to be invested becomes higher than the amount of ef-
fort that the individual can or is willing to invest. Insufficient regulation eventually 
entails drops in performance. Such drops potentially have severe consequences, 
especially in occupational settings, where an individual can be in charge of machin-
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ery or vehicles. Hence, in particular occupational psychologists have sought ways to 
measure the amount of effort that an individual needs to invest into performing a 
task. Self-evaluations of effort investment with the help of rating scales have be-
come an accepted technique in the field; with comparative research favoring scales 
which measure effort as one coherent concept, as opposed to multi-dimensional 
scales that attempt to measure different aspects of that experience of investing 
mental effort separately (Veltman & Gaillard, 1996). Furthermore, different physio-
logical variables such as parameters of the heart`s electrical signals or such as blood 
glucose levels have been investigated as possible indicators of effort investment. 
More recently, also measurements of neural activity have been employed to identify 
indicators of mental effort investment (Chapter 2). 
 Currently available research into neural processes related to the investment of 
mental effort is frequently limited by the incomplete utilization of modern theoreti-
cal conceptualizations of mental effort. A neural correlate of mental effort invest-
ment has hence not been indicated to this day. As a result, subjective self-reports 
remain the most feasible measure of mental effort investment, with the limitation 
that it is not known to which processes in the human brain they are related. This 
lack of evidence precludes a conclusive validation of self-rating scales of mental 
effort and, to a degree, of the model that they are based on. More specific, self-rating 
scales rely on the assumption that acute experience and post-hoc evaluation of 
effort investment are identical. Furthermore, the integrated model of mental effort 
and as a result also one-dimensional self-report scales assume that task load and 
state load affect the same underlying resource, and in turn the experience of effort 
investment. Identifying neural correlates of mental effort investment is a necessary 
step to test these assumptions. 
 Equally important, a central assumption of the integrated model of mental ef-
fort, namely the assumption of a limited resource which fuels regulation, remains 
an abstract concept. Existing evidence clearly supports the concept of a limited 
resource. This concept is also a central element in current models in the closely 
related field of research into behavioral regulation, with a substantial body of con-
vergent experimental evidence (Hagger, 2010). However, the current evidence only 
allows speculative interpretations of how the concept of a limited resource is relat-
ed to neurophysiological processes in the human brain. 
 A better understanding of the neural correlates of mental effort is thus neces-
sary for two reasons: First, to identify objective indicators of mental effort invest-
ment, second, to gain an idea of how the concept of a limited resource underlying all 
regulative processes is related to measurable parameters of neural functioning. 
Combining the conceptual expertise on the subject of mental effort that is present 
in occupational psychology with the methods offered by cognitive neuroscience 
offers a way to gain this knowledge (Chapter 3). 
 In chapter 4 a study (study 1) is described in which the neural correlates of the 
self-evaluation of mental effort investment were investigated. We based the exper-
imental design on observations described by Nacchache et al. (2005) which suggest 
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a dissociability of the neural correlates of evaluations of task difficulty and amount 
of invested effort by an individual. Participants performed several short blocks of a 
working memory task with three levels of difficulty. After each block, they indicated 
task difficulty and the amount of invested mental effort on two self-report scales. 
During task performance and during self-rating, brain activation was measured 
with fMRI. Results showed that a cluster in left anterior Insular Cortex (laIC) was 
selectively more active while participants performed self-ratings of effort invest-
ment. Additionally, the activity in laIC during task performance was modulated by 
changes in task demand in a similar way as the self-ratings of mental effort. We 
interpret these findings as evidence that self-evaluation of mental effort crucially 
relies on the integrative functions that have been argued (Craig, 2009) to take place 
in the anterior Insular Cortex. The observation of task-load-dependent activation 
changes in laIC during task performance suggests that laIC plays a role in the acute 
experience of effort investment, additional to its role in post-performance evalua-
tion. 
 In chapter 5, I describe a study (study 2) that was designed to identify brain 
areas that react to both changes in task load and to changes in state load. This study 
builds on the design of study 1. In study 1, only manipulations of task load were 
implemented in the research design by incorporating different levels of difficult of 
the working memory task. In study 2, we extended this design to also include varia-
tions of state load: Participants performed the same working memory task before 
and after either a low-effort free day or after an effortful work day. Again, effort 
investment was indicated by the participants after performing short blocks of the 
working memory task. The behavioral results showed an interaction between the 
effects of task load (the different levels of the task) and state load (induced by the 
two different day pre-treatments). Neuroimaging results showed that in particular 
activation in laIC during task performance shows the same interaction effect. This 
confirms the observation from study 1 that laIC plays an important in the acute 
experience of effort investment. Together with evidence from other studies which 
have demonstrated the functionality of laIC in a range of processes relevant to the 
investment of mental effort, this leads us to propose that laIC unifies several func-
tions which serve to manage effortful behavior. 
 Chapter 6 describes the last of the three studies conducted in this research 
project. In this study (study 3), we employed measures of resting state functional 
connectivity to investigate how depleting the abstract energetical resource that is 
assumed in modern models of mental effort effects brain functioning. Measures of 
resting state brain activation were obtained with fMRI on a group of participants in 
the morning and in the afternoon, with either a free or a work day in between, iden-
tical to the state manipulation employed in study 2. Additionally, participants rated 
their level of subjective exhaustion and the amount of effort they perceived to be 
investing in a working memory task that they performed after each resting state 
measurement. In the afternoon, the day condition was shown to influence the be-
havioral measurement, manifested in increased reports of exhaustion and in-
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creased self-rated effort investment on an unchanged working memory task. More 
important, the day condition influenced the coherence in three functional networks, 
the executive network, the default mode network and the early visual network. In 
the early visual network and the default mode network, several local coherence 
scores correlated positively with exhaustion. We interpret these results as evidence 
that sustained functioning affects the functional connectivity between brain regions 
that cooperate in distributed networks. 
 In chapter 7, a brief overview of the three studies that I performed in the course 
of this project is given. I discuss the respective findings of each study, extending the 
discussions in the individual chapters. This is followed by a general discussion, in 
which I elaborate on the implications of my findings for the main questions of this 
project. The results from study 1 and 2 support the assumption that mental effort 
investment can be measured by a one-dimensional self-report scale, and that the 
acute experience and the post-performance self-rating are closely related. 
 The findings of study 3 give rise to a novel interpretation of the nature of the 
presumed resource underlying effortful regulation: I offer the view that instead of a 
limited energetical resource, it is rather the harmonic, flexible functional organiza-
tion of different brain regions that is the key to effective volitional self-regulation of 
the individual. Sustained exerting of effortful regulation seems to transiently affect 
the ability of the brain to form some of the commonly reported functional networks 
in the same way as they are observed in un-exhausted participants. I discuss the 
implications of this view for the field of mental effort. 
 In the last part of chapter 7, I give an outlook of the possibilities that arise from 
the successful combination of occupational psychology and neuroimaging methods, 
and I outline a possible course for the emerging discipline of occupational neuro-
science.  
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
Het concept van mentale inspanning komt voort uit de observatie dat het menselij-
ke vermogen om mentale taken uit te voeren beperkt is. Kort samengevat beschrijft 
dit concept het gevoel van het investeren van een beperkte, energieachtige bron ten 
behoeve van zelfregulatie. Deze is gericht op zelfregulatie van emotionele maar 
vooral ook van cognitieve mentale processen in het kader van de uitvoering van 
een taak (Zijlstra, 1993, Hockey; 1996). 
 Het door mij verrichte onderzoek had als doel de neurale correlaten van het 
investeren van mentale inspanning te identificeren. Dit onderzoek kende twee 
hoofdpunten: ten eerste, het lokaliseren van hersengebieden die het investeren van 
mentale inspanning  reguleren en, ten tweede, hoe het concept van een onderlig-
gende beperkte bron gerelateerd is aan meetbare parameters van hersenfunctie. 
 In hoofdstuk 1 beschrijf ik de historische oorsprong van het concept van menta-
le inspanning en de ontwikkeling van theoretische modellen. Vroege psycholo-
gische onderzoekers richtten zich vooral op acute beperkingen van het menselijke 
informatieverwerkingssysteem. Een voorbeeld van deze beperkingen was de toe-
gevoegde tijd die een persoon nodig had na het uitbreiden van een taak. Later on-
derzoek verfijnde dit perspectief: onderzoekers zoals Kahneman (1973) of Moray 
(1968) lieten zien dat mensen hun informatieverwerkingssysteem op een flexibele 
manier kunnen reguleren. Deze regulatie lijkt dus een beperkte bron te verbruiken 
(Hockey, 1996). Het investeren van deze bron leidt op korte termijn tot een ver-
minderde beschikbaarheid ervan. Bovendien bleek uit onderzoek dat langdurige 
mentale prestatie ook een effect had op de activatietoestand van het centrale ze-
nuwstelsel. Indien de activatietoestand niet optimaal is, moet een persoon eerst 
regulatie toepassen om een activatietoestand te bereiken die prestatie mogelijk 
maakt voordat de taak uitgevoerd kan worden.  
 Mulder (1986) gebruikte deze tweedeling van factoren als basis voor zijn Inte-
grated model of Mental Effort. Alle noodzaak voor regulatie van informatieverwer-
king zoals bepaald door de eisen van de taak wordt in de zgn. task load samengevat. 
De noodzaak om de activatietoestand te reguleren om überhaupt in staat te zijn een 
mentale taak uit te voeren wordt state load genoemd. Samen vormen task load en 
state load de zgn. mental work load (hoofdstuk 1). 
 De observatie dat het menselijk vermogen om informatie te verwerken beperkt 
is heeft een aantal implicaties. Mensen zijn in staat om door verhoging van hun 
investering van mentale inspanning verhogingen in task- en state load te compen-
seren maar de mogelijkheid om meer inspanning te leveren is beperkt. Als de com-
S A M E N V A T T I N G  
 150 
binatie van task- en state load meer regulatie (en dus inspanning) vergt dan een 
persoon kan of wil leveren, zal de taakprestatie dalen. Zulke dalingen van prestatie 
kunnen dramatische gevolgen hebben. Vooral in de context van arbeid, waar men-
sen verantwoordelijkheid voor machines of voertuigen dragen, zijn de gevolgen van 
prestatiedaling niet te onderschatten. Het is daarom niet verwonderlijk dat vooral 
arbeidspsychologen naar mogelijkheden hebben gezocht om de benodigde mentale 
inspanning die een persoon op een gegeven moment moet leveren te meten. Zelf-
evaluaties van de hoeveelheid geïnvesteerde mentale inspanning met behulp van 
schalen zijn inmiddels een geaccepteerde methode. Onderzoek wijst uit dat schalen 
die de hoeveelheid inspanning als een enkele dimensie meten betere resultaten 
leveren dan schalen die verschillende aspecten van het leveren van inspanning 
apart te meten (Veltman & Gaillard, 1996). Daarnaast is ook onderzoek verricht 
naar de bruikbaarheid van fysiologische variabelen zoals bloedsuiker of hartstro-
men als indicatoren van geleverde mentale inspanning. Recent werden niet alleen 
perifere maar ook centrale variabelen als mogelijke indicatoren onderzocht. 
(hoofdstuk 2).  
 Onderzoek naar de onderliggende neurale processen die betrokken zijn bij het 
leveren van mentale inspanning maakt onvoldoende gebruik van moderne theore-
tische concepten en modellen van mentale inspanning. Als gevolg hiervan is dus tot 
op heden geen echt neuraal correlaat van mentale inspanning gerapporteerd. Sub-
jectieve zelfevaluatie met behulp van schalen vormt nog steeds de meest accurate 
manier om mentale inspanning in de praktijk te meten. De neurale mechanismen 
die leiden tot een indicatie op een dergelijke schaal zijn niet bekend. Het ontbreken 
van vooral deze informatie bemoeilijkt het toetsen van meetmethodes en de onder-
liggende theoretische assumpties over mentale inspanning,. Alle zelfevaluatie-
schalen hanteren bijvoorbeeld de assumptie dat de door een persoon herinnerde 
investering van mentale inspanning na het uitvoeren van een taak overeen komt 
met de daadwerkelijk ervaren hoeveelheid tijdens de uitvoering. Het integrated 
model of mental effort (Mulder,1986) neemt verder aan dat task- en state load de-
zelfde onderliggende beperkte bron gebruiken. Deze aanname is tevens cruciaal 
voor alle eendimensionale schalen voor mentale inspanning. De identificatie van 
neurale correlaten van het investeren van mentale inspanning is een nodige stap 
om deze assumpties te toetsen. Een andere cruciale assumptie van het integrated 
model of mental effort is dat regulatie door een beperkte bron aangedreven wordt. 
Cognitief onderzoek, ook uit het gerelateerde veld van gedragsregulatie, steunt 
deze aanname (Hagger, 2010). De bevindingen uit onderzoek beperken interpreta-
ties over de relatie van het concept van een beperkte bron en het functioneren van 
het menselijk brein tot speculaties. 
 Een beter begrip van neurale correlaten van het investeren van mentale in-
spanning is dus om twee redenen noodzakelijk: ten eerste, om een objectieve indi-
cator voor de hoeveelheid geïnvesteerde mentale inspanning te vinden, en ten 
tweede, om beter te begrijpen hoe het theoretisch concept van een beperkte bron 
gerelateerd is aan neurofysiologische processen. Hiervoor is het belangrijk om de 
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uitgebreide theoretische en conceptuele kennis vanuit de arbeidspsychologie te 
verbinden met de technieken waarover het veld der cognitieve neurowetenschap-
pen beschikt (hoofdstuk 3). 
 In hoofdstuk 4 beschrijf ik een onderzoek (studie 1) waarin ik de hersenactiva-
tie van proefpersonen in kaart breng tijdens het invullen van eendimensionale 
schalen, om de geïnvesteerde hoeveelheid mentale inspanning te meten. Het doel 
van dit onderzoek was om de neurale activatie gerelateerd aan zelfevaluatie van 
geïnvesteerde mentale inspanning te scheiden van activatie tijdens een evaluatie 
van taakmoeilijkheid. Eerder onderzoek heeft uitgewezen dat deze twee op elkaar 
lijkende evaluaties van verschillende neurale structuren afhangen (Nacchache et al., 
2005). In mijn onderzoek voerden de deelnemers enkele korte blokken van een 
geheugentaak uit. De blokken hadden drie verschillende niveaus van moeilijkheid. 
Na ieder blok gaven de deelnemers op een eendimensionale schaal aan hoeveel 
mentale inspanning ze geïnvesteerd hadden en hoe hoog ze de moeilijkheid van de 
taak schatten. Tegelijkertijd werd de hersenactivatie van de deelnemers met behulp 
van functionele magnetresonantietiomografie (fMRT) gemeten. De resultaten we-
zen uit dat vooral een gebied in het linker anteriore insulaire cortex (laIC) sterker 
geactiveerd was tijdens het beoordelen van geïnvesteerde mentale inspanning. 
Deze bevinding wijst volgens ons uit dat het beoordelen van eerder geleverde men-
tale inspanning heel sterk op het integreren van verschillende zelf-gerelateerde 
informatiestromen aangewezen is. Deze vindt volgens Craig (2009) vooral in het 
voorste gedeelte van de insulaire cortex plaats vindt. Bovendien wijst een activatie-
verschil in laIC overeenkomend met de verschillen in taakmoeilijkheid tijdens de 
uitgevoerde werkgeheugentaak op een mogelijke rol van laIC bij de ervaring van 
het investeren van mentale inspanning.  
 In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een onderzoek (studie 2) beschreven dat op de resultaten 
van studie 1 voortbouwt. Studie 2 had als doel om hersengebieden te identificeren 
die op veranderingen in zowel de task load als de state load reageren. Terwijl in 
studie 1 alleen manipulaties van de task load gebruikt werden, maakte in studie 2 
ook een manipulatie van state load een deel uit van het experimentele paradigma. 
Hiervoor gebruikten we een soortgelijke werkgeheugentaak als in studie 1, maar nu 
lieten we de proefpersonen deze ofwel voor en na een inspannende dag, ofwel voor 
en na een vrije dag uitvoeren. Wederom beoordeelden de deelnemers na ieder kort 
blok van de taak de hoeveelheid geleverde mentale inspanning. De gedragsdata 
wezen uit dat er een interactie–effect tussen de manipulatie van task- en van state 
load aanwezig was. Het effect van de verschillende levels van taakmoeilijkheid 
(task load) op het ervaren niveau van mentale inspanning verschilde dus naarmate 
de proefpersonen een werk- of een vrije dag doorgebracht hadden (hierdoor werd 
een verschil in state load opgewekt). De analyse van de fMRT – data gemeten tij-
dens de taakuitvoering wezen op hetzelfde interactie–effect uitsluitend in de eerder 
gevonden laIC. Hieruit interpreteren wij dat laIC al tijdens de taakuitvoering een 
belangrijke rol voor het management van mentale inspanning speelt. 
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In hoofdstuk 6 beschrijf ik een derde onderzoek (studie 3). De focus lag hierbij op 
het onderzoeken van de verandering van meetbare parameters van hersenfunctie 
door langdurige prestatie. In dit onderzoek heb ik dezelfde opzet gebruikt als in 
studie 2, om wederom een paradigma met zowel manipulaties van task- en state 
load te creëren. Naast de mentale inspanning werd in dit experiment ook het ver-
moeidheidsniveau van de proefpersonen gemeten. De fMRT – meting van dit expe-
riment was op een periode van rust gefocust waarin de deelnemers juist niet met 
een taak bezig waren: het zogenoemde Resting-State-paradigma. Zoals verwacht 
gaven de deelnemers aan dat de werkgeheugentaak na een veeleisende werkdag 
meer inspanning vereiste dan na een vrije dag. Tevens waren de deelnemers na een 
werkdag vermoeider. De dagconditie bleek bovendien een duidelijke invloed te 
hebben op een aantal bekende functionele netwerken. Maten van coherentie in 
sommige knooppunten van enkele netwerken vertoonden zelfs een significante 
correlatie met de gerapporteerde maten van vermoeidheid. Hieruit concluderen wij 
dat langdurige investering van mentale inspanning een temporeel effect kan heb-
ben op de functionele netwerken van het menselijk brein. 
 Hoofdstuk 7 begint met een overzicht van de verrichtte onderzoeken. Ik be-
spreek hier nogmaals de belangrijkste bevindingen uit elk apart onderzoek en breid 
de discussie van de verschillende hoofdstukken uit. Vervolgens bespreek ik de re-
sultaten in het kader van de theoretische achtergronden en van de beginvragen die 
mij tot dit onderzoek aan hebben gezet. De resultaten van studie 1 en 2 ondersteu-
nen de assumpties die vooral aan eendimensionale schalen ten grond liggen, name-
lijk dat het acute ervaren van mentale inspanning en het latere evalueren ervan 
nauw samenhangen.  
 Het hersengebied dat in studie 1 actiever was tijdens het evalueren van menta-
le inspanning bleek in studie 2 beïnvloed te worden door zowel variaties in task 
load als in state load tijdens het uitvoeren van een taak. Deze gezamenlijke invloed 
van task- en state load op hersenactivatie wijst uit dat eendimensionale schalen 
inderdaad een goed instrument zijn voor het meten van mentale inspanning. De 
bevindingen van studie 3 zetten aan tot een nieuwe interpretatie van de veronder-
stelde energieachtige aard van de onderliggende bron: Ik bespreek een zienswijze 
waarin ik voorstel dat de onderliggende bron, welke door zelfregulatie verbruikt 
wordt, niet zo zeer als letterlijke energie dient te worden beschouwd, maar als het 
vermogen van het menselijke brein om flexibele, doelgerichte en gebalanceerde 
functionele netwerken uit verschillende hersengebieden te vormen. Dit vermogen 
is uitermate belangrijk voor een effectieve regulatie van mentale processen. Mijn 
resultaten suggereren dat dit vermogen door langdurige inspanning tijdelijk beïn-
vloed kan worden. In het laatste stuk bespreek ik de implicaties van mijn onder-
zoek, ook met betrekking tot de mogelijkheden die door het succesvol combineren 
van arbeidspsychologie en neuro-wetenschappelijke methodes ontstaan. Ik sluit af 
met een visie op een mogelijke koers voor het jonge veld van occupational neu-
roscience. 
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